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SUMMARY 
This dissertation is set in the North East (NE) of England and demonstrates how an 
experimental form of elite governance, characterised by multi-level, intra and inter- 
agency negotiation and co-ordination developed within complex and ambiguous 
socio-political structures and traditional hierarchies to deal with unmet social and 
economic needs. This emergent form of entrepreneurial governance has resulted from 
a poorly institutional ised field of regeneration, and allowed elites to seek autonomy 
by adapting national policies to specifically regional projects. A top-down, manageri- 
alist form of governance, it is not entirely democratic or open to public participation, 
but strategically contingent on global and other constraints. Central to an understand- 
ing of regeneration is the way strategies are formulated and implemented. 
This regime, with a broader mix of enterprising public servants and politically minded 
business and other interests, has coalesced over a long period to respond entrepreneu- 
rially to the consequences of globalisation and uneven development, and the failure of 
national and regional policies. A legacy of decline has created a strategic, cohesive 
and identifiably exclusive regime of actors, who act in the region's interests. 
This regime is unlike the static or re-constructive regimes prevalent in other regions, 
rather it blends the positive aspects of traditional regional decision making with a 
more innovative approach. Democratic forms of managing regional space have gradu- 
ally been replaced by a more adaptable and flexible form more suited to modem day 
and future needs. Power and influence shift dynamically over time, space and initia- 
tive, activities are legitimised by absorbing state officials into activities, and being in 
close proximity to civic society. As part of the history of change, and embedded in the 
social system, elites interact formally and informally. 
It evolved from an aristocratic grouping in the late nineteenth century to a more rec- 
ognisable corporatist form of governance during the Post Second World War period. 
This continued until the mid 1980s, when it was reconfigured into a wider system of 
interests of elites who contribute organisational, personal and civic resources to re- 
generation. The altered composition of the regime reflects changes in education, so- 
cial and industrial sectors. 
Elites have always been central to decision making, but this NE regime is a unique 
blend of entrepreneurial and business-like public servants, many retaining the former 
civil service mind set, collaborating with politically minded business and other repre- 
sentatives. It occupies the policy gap, and various 'post -industrial' initiatives have 
become the elite response to exhortations for 'cultural change'. 
The research draws on a selection of research techniques and theoretical frameworks 
to argue that complexity and variety of phenomena means that no one theory is capa- 
ble of explaining the diversity, or where power and influence lie. Existing research 
emphasises business involvement and pays insufficient attention to cultural, historical, 
political and external dimensions. 
Based on a series of in depth interviews with elites, three very different case studies of 
specific regeneration initiatives illustrate that despite political differences between 
elites, limited autonomy, and lack of any ftindamental improvement in social and eco- 
nomic performance, elites have been able to sustain a consensual and strategic ap- 
proach, in response to a changing national and global order. 
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I dedicate this research to my husband Graham, whose love, 
support and encouragement enabled me to embark upon it, but who, 
sadly, is no longer here to see the finished result. 
vi 
Declaration 
This is to certify that the articles/publications and conference presentations presented 
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half year period. Some of them have been jointly written but all are the result of em- 
pirical and secondary data collected throughout the research period, some from the 
major literature review and interview period (between 1994-1997) and others from 
supplementary interviews and other data collection (between 1997-2000). All this 
work has been a spin off from the main thesis and I have deliberately chosen to work 
with individuals from geography, political science, economics and management sci- 
ence. The reason for joint publication is based on my desire to work collaboratively 
and across disciplinary boundaries. The resultant body of work is evolutionary and 
illustrates the threads of continuity and learning as ideas were developed. 
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Personal note 
This PhD research has been 25-30 years in the making. As an unashamed and un- 
reconstructed native North Easterner, considered as an effective networker, I have had 
the good fortune to be able to live and work in this region, and over the years bene- 
fited from the connections made with a wide range of individuals (too many to name 
individually) across the public and political, private and commercial, academic and 
many other spheres of the North East (NE) economy. This has enabled me to speak 
and share views and ideas both formally and informally with literally hundreds of 
individuals across and beyond the region. It has also allowed me access to agencies 
and people with whom, otherwise, I might not have had the opportunity to connect. 
It would be impossible to live and work in a region such as the NE without recognis- 
ing the very real importance of 'elites' in all sectors of the regional economy. This 
PhD research is an attempt to try to understand the socio-economic, historical and 
political processes, and the formal and informal interactions that lie beneath elite dec- 
larations of consensus and regional cohesion. It also written in memory of my father 
who spent his working life down a black hole and didn't live to see one of his off- 
spring take up a position in what he would have considered to be a more 'respectable', 
but nevertheless 'softer', profession. In my father's view, academics had their place, 
but only in as much as they could use their rational thought processes and arguments 
to understand the socio-economic and political worlds where history mattered. As an 
ardent trade unionist, my father inspired me to understand the processes that lead to 
change. 
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Professionally my 'first' careers in my 20s and early 30s were as a civil servant, based 
in Durham City, then, after marriage, as a company Director of a family-mvned SNIE. 
Following the birth of my two sons I changed career in my mid 30s. My * second ' 
career was an interim re-education process as a mature undergraduate and post- 
graduate where I was inspired at the University of Durham in particular by Huw Bey- 
non (now Professor), Professor Richard Brown and Dr David Bryne on the socio- 
political aspects of regional change and Professor Richard Chapman and Geoff Atkin- 
son on the public administration/management aspects (the degree was a combined BA 
in Sociology/Politics). My interest and understanding of the boundaries between the 
political and managerial were enhanced in two ways. Firstly, my undergraduate dis- 
sertation subject was the sociology and development of management education, in 
particular how management was a reflection of the socio/political and historical envi- 
ronments. Secondly, I completed a Masters Degree in Politics by conducting a com- 
parative analysis of the managerial and political decision making processes in local 
authorities in the County of Durham. 
During my undergraduate and post-graduate studies, I was fortunate to teach poli- 
tics/public administration and management at local colleges and universities and this 
brought me into contact with a large range of middle managers/company representa- 
tives in all sectors of the regional economy. This helped to develop my local contacts. 
I also carried out commissioned research for private and commercial organisations 
(notably Teesside Chamber of Commerce where I spent one year on the Labour Force 
Survey and Training and Recruitment Needs Survey, as well as other government 
sponsored work, SCPR (Social and Community Planning Research, then part of 
OPCS), work sponsored by the Departments of Health, Environment, Education, Em- 
ployment, and Trade and Industry). Over a 10 year period, this involved interview and 
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survey research with literally hundreds of individuals and groups across the social. 
political, economic and managerial spheres of the NE. 
At the same time I worked as a part-time research interviewer with the University of 
Durham Economics Department, and undertook research and consultancy on behalf of 
New College, Durham. 
During and after my time at Durham, I was an active member of the PPSG (Public 
Policy Studies Group), RIPA (Royal Institute of Public Administration), a founder 
member with Professor Howard Elcock (University of Northumbria) of a grouping of 
regional academics who met regularly to share ideas, and was PAC (Public Admini- 
stration Committee) representative of the Joint Universities Council (JUC). Despite 
my long standing interest in regional affairs, attendance at numerous geography and 
political conferences, and nine years experience as Treasurer and Executive member 
of the Campaign for a Northern Assembly (now the Campaign for a NE Assembly), 
and working group member of the NE Constitutional Convention (CNEE), it is only 
in the past 12 months that I joined the RSA (Regional Studies Association). My role 
as an activist has put me into contact with many politicians, trade unionists, academ- 
ics, business and other sectoral representatives. It has been gratifying to meet and 
learn from these local, regional and national representatives. In particular I have been 
fortunate to meet and discuss ideas with politicians (local, national and MEPs) and 
other representatives from Scottish, Welsh and North Ireland Assemblies, as well as 
those fi7om the Constitution Unit, University of London, at a very significant time in 
devolutionary history. 
After my undergraduate and post-graduate studies at Durham, I took up my 'third" 
career as a management trainer and educator, firstly setting up training courses for 
women returners into management at a training organisation in an unemployment 
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blackspot in the East of Durham, then as MBA Director at the University of Sunder- 
land Business School, with responsibility for teaching strategy and public sector man- 
agement. Whilst at Sunderland I conunenced PhD research and during the past five 
and a half years have also worked as the NE interviewer with researchers at Warxvick 
on diverse areas such as Europeanisation. of Local Government (1995, with Dr Steve 
Martin), Social Exclusion in Meadowell (1996/7, with Dr Mike Geddes), and local 
government internal Cabinet changes (1999, again with Mike Geddes). I have also 
been very lucky to be invited as an active participant to the Warwick University Local 
Government Centre Annual Research Consortium at a time of public sector reform 
and devolutionary change. Over the past 5 years, I chaired workshops in which CEOs 
and political leaders fi7om 38 UK Local Authorities discussed the changing political 
and administrative landscape, and was able to learn from the speeches of all RDA 
Chairs and CEOs, academics from diverse disciplines, senior national Cabinet Minis- 
ters and other politicians involved in regional change. 
At Sunderland, I shared an academic room with two very inspiring colleagues in- 
volved in regional and national politics. One was the Leader of an Opposition Party 
and Cabinet member in a NE Metropolitan City Council and the other, the national 
organiser for the Association of Small Town Councils. Over a nine year period, many 
hours were spent discussing national, regional and local politics and management, 
plotting idiosyncratic political campaigns and using the regional and local press to 
express our combined independent views. 
In September 1999,1 joined the University of Durham Business School as a lecturer 
in strategy, with a particular research interest in the links between private and public 
sector strategy and partnerships for regeneration. As well as being a Task Group 
member of the NE Cultural Strategy Team and the Universitv of Durham Business 
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School's representative on the NE Objective Two European Partnership and on the 
Joint Universities Council's Public Administration Committee (Secretary to the Re- 
search Committee), I have been fortunate to work closely with Professor Andrew 
Gray on public sector issues, and with Professor Tony Cockerill and Dr Alan South- 
ern on regional issues. Furthermore, recent focus group involvement with Professors 
Greg Lloyd, Peter Roberts and Paul Benneworth, allowed me to discuss the adminis- 
trative, managerial and technical aspects of the operation of RDA, and in a particular 
the role of One North East (ONE), July 2000. 
The dynamic approach I have adopted in my career and political development as I 
have moved between private, commercial, academic, public and political spheres will, 
I trust and hope, be enhanced and furthered at Durham where I anticipate continuing 
my life-long interest in political and managerial issues and the blurring boundaries 
between organisations and sectors in the NE region. It is my intention to stay in the 
region and regularly commentate on regional change. 
MII 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I am especially grateftil to academics from the wide and disparate academic fields of 
public administration, public policy, geography and management, who inspired me (in 
some cases unknowingly) to undertake this research. In particular, I would like to 
express my gratitude to Professor Richard Chapman who is a continuing inspiration. 
Other colleagues at Sunderland Business School and the University of Durham Busi- 
ness School have given support when necessary, and to them I also give thanks. In 
particular, Professor Andrew Gray provided the opportunity for me to test out ideas in 
seminars and lectures in the comforting environment of the PPSG (Public Policy 
Study Group) at the University of Durham. The Universities of Sunderland and Dur- 
ham were supportive financially in assisting with travel costs for interviews and su- 
pervisory meetings. 
A large number of regional individuals agreed to be interviewed during the course of 
the research and I thank them for their co-operation, without which the completion of 
the thesis would have been impossible. In addition, my involvement in regional cam- 
paigning gave a contemporary insight into the thinking of many interesting and com- 
mitted individuals. 
Thanks to Steve Martin and Mike Geddes for their supervisory support. 
Dr Rebecca Stratling, whose IT skills are second to none, has been a great support and 
it would have been impossible to produce this without her. 
Richard and Gareth, my two sons, have helped to keep me going by undertaking most 
domestic tasks, provided cuddles when things went wrong, and grown up despite their 
absent mother. I can't thank them enough for their continuing love and support. 
A selection of some of the many individuals who (either deliberatelý, or unwit- 
tingly) gave comments on thesis/helpful suggestions/development of the ideas: 
xiý 
Professor John Mawson, Professor Tony Cockerill, Dr Alan Southern. Professor An- 
drew Gray, Professor Ash Amin, Professor Richard Chapman, Dr Joe Painter, 
Dr David Sadler, Professor Ray Hudson, Professor Colin Talbot, Rhoddri Morgan 
(Welsh Assembly), Eileen Bell (Northern Ireland Assembly), Warwick academics, Dr 
Dylan Griffiths (Constitution Unit, University of London), Dr John Tomaney, Peter 
Sagar (CNEA), Glenn Simpson (CNEA and Tyne Valley DC), Dr David Byrne, Dr 
Keith Shaw and Dr Fred Robinson,, Professor Ian Stone, Professor David Storey, Pro- 
fessor Fred Holliday, former VC of the University of Durham, who allowed me ac- 
cess to his personal archives. The many academics with whom I have been able to 
discuss ideas over the years. 
General support and encouragement: 
K Cassidy, Dr Rebecca Stratling, Dr Bob Watt, Dr Peter Hamilton. 
NB 
I have resisted the temptation to totally rewrite materials despite the political and ad- 
ministrative changes that have arisen since April 1999 (though chapter three discusses 
the creation of One North East (ONE) and the changing devolutionary situation and 
the case study chapters have been updated), and the fact that some of main identifi- 
able elites have changed professional positions and moved between regional organisa- 
tions. since originally being interviewed (between 1996-7). This is deliberate because 
neither the creation of ONE,, nor the changing devolutionary situation or movement of 
personnel alters the fundamental or core hypothesis. A second tranche of primary and 
secondary data collection took place between 1998-2000 with the objective of updat- 
ing the material. 
Key formal interviews 
Respondents (in no particular order of importance) in tranches between February 
1996 and December 1997 
Don Bowman English Partnerships, Gateshead. 
Mr T Robertson TWDC Executive 
Liz Deane TWDC Community Development Executive 
Richard Arkell City of Sunderland Partnership 
Jean Laurie North Tyneside Council External Affairs Committee 
Alistair Balls Former CEO,, TWDC; now CEO of International Centre 
for Life 
Andrew Dixon CEO, Northern Arts 
Carol Carr TVvIDC 
Peter Hewitt Former CEO, Northern Arts; now an Independent 
Consultant,, East Gateshead Regeneration 
Sandra Moffatt NDC Corporate Communications 
Susan Johnson Former CEO, Northern Business Forum 
Dr John Bridge Former CEO,, NDC; now Chairman Designate,, ONE 
Sir Ian Wrigglesworth NBF founder, Northern CBI and UK Land Estates 
Limited 
Bob Howard Northern TUC 
Sir Jeremy Beecham LGA and former leader of Newcastle City Council 
David Kelly General Manager, North of England Newspapers 
George Gill Leader Gateshead MBC, NEA, NDC and Committee 
of Regions UK representative 
Karl Watkin Former Chair of Crabtree UK, founder of NBF, 
UK Land Estates LTK and self made entrepreneur 
Don Robson Former Leader Durham County Council, NEA and 
NDC member 
Joe Mills Former leader of TUC; now Chair of Sunderland Area 
Health Authority 
John Lennox Leader of Sunderland City Council Liberal Democrats 
Group and University Academic 
Olivia Grant Former CEO of Tyneside TEC 
Dr Ann Wright Former VC and CEO of the University of Sunderland 
and CEO of the Universitv of Industry 
XNV I 
Pamela Denham Fon-ner Regional Controller GONE 
Ken Frankish Director of Economic Development, Durham Count,, 
Council 
Sir Fred Halliday Former VC, University of Durham; now Chairman of 
Northumbria. Water (Lyonnaisse) 
Sir Ralph Iley Chairman of Cookson International,, Northern CBI and 
pron-finent Conservative Party member 
Kevin Richardson Policy Director, North East Chamber of Commerce 
Key Informal interviews 
Informal interviews carried out between February 1996 and December 1997 
Rheinard Schutz Executive,, Freudenberg, West Germany 
PJ Tizzard. Managing Director, Siemens PLC 
Karen Bilson Siemens Project Office 
Piers Wilson NDC. 
Nathan Pellow Economic Development Officer, North Tyneside 
Rosemary Eatherden Communications Manager, Siemens UK, Bracknell 
Ross Forbes External Affairs Director, Siemens UK 
Helen Goode DTI,, Newcastle 
Derek Horsfield T. W. E. D. C. O. 
Mr John McCormick Leader Wansbeck District Council and NEA member 
Dr Fred Robinson University of Durham 
Dr David Byrne University of Durham and former Chair of the 
Campaign for a Northern Assembly 
Dr Dylan Griffiths Politics lecturer, University of Newcastle 
Mr John Dixon Dawson National Chairman of the Association for Larger Town 
Councils and University Academic 
Professor Howard Elcock Emeritus Professor, University of Northumbria 
Dr Chris Lanigan District Auditor's Office, Gateshead 
Trevor Sheehan Business Development Manager, Vickers Defence 
Irene Lucas Deputy CEO, Sunderland City Council 
Martin Swales Leisure Services Officer. North Tyneside BC 
David Johnson Ever Ready Batteries, Newcastle 
11 
Kate Howie Corporate Affairs, North Tyneside BC 
Paul Donnelly Manager, Job Centre, Sunderland 
Sue Nordgen. Northern Arts 
Bryn Sidaway Sunderland CC 
Les Graham Executive Board Member,, MKL, Sunderland 
Paul Collard Newcastle Gateshead Initiative 
Individuals who were not interviewed (due to non availability) and whose views 
would have benefited the research. Secondary data was obtained on these individuals. 
Sir Paul Nicholson Vaux Breweries 
Sir Tom Cowie Cowie Motors 
Peter Sloyan Northumbria Tourist Board 
Dr John Tomaney University of Newcastle 
Sir John Hall Millionaire Property developer 
Sir George Russell Chair of NDC 
Llew Avis Siemens Personnel Director 
'D - Reay Atkinson University of Northumbria 
Supplementary interviews (between mid 1998-mid 2000) with a range of: 
Economic Development Directors and Councillors from most NE local authorities, 
various Board members of One North East (ONE), various members of Tyne and 
Wear Sub-Regional Partnerships, County Durhan-ý Northumberland and Teesside 
Sub-Regional Partnership and Sunderland ARC (Area Regeneration Compact). 
Main Secondary Data Sources include: 
University archives, particularly the personal archives of Professor Fred Holliday, a 
fervent regionalist, Universities of Sunderland, Durham (NE Area Studies and other 
econornics/geography data), Newcastle (especially CURDs), Northumbria, and Tees- 
side data, local authority Economic Development Strategies and other official and 
iii 
marketing information, documentation from both UDCs, all regional TECs, GONE, 
NDC, NEA, CNEA, NECC,, Regional Chamber of Commerce. NE Chamber of Com- 
merce, Northern Business Forum, CBI, TUC, Northern Arts, Sports CounciL North- 
umbria Tourist Authority, VODA (Voluntary Organisations Development Agency). 
NE Regional Ecumenical Churches Council, Tyne Tees and BBC NE, Northumbria 
Water/l. yonnaise, ONE, Regional Chamber, St Peters' Development Office, North 
Tyneside and other local authorities, newspaper archives regional, local and national, 
all English RDA strategies, County Durham and Tyneside Sub-Regional Partnership 
Concordats, Northumberland Sub-regional Partnership, Sunderland ARC (Area Re- 
generation Compact), Teesside Joint Strategy Unit, Cambridge Econometrics, atten- 
dance at the many Regional Forums/Conferences and Public Lectures during the past 
9 years, in particular those relating to devolution, RDAs and the role of Universities in 
economic Development, DTI Regional Competitiveness Indicators, Northern Re- 
gional Strategy Team, Economic Development Strategy Documents of all NE Local 
Authorities. 
Secondary data from Campaign for a North East Assembly, NE Constitutional Con- 
vention. ) NE Regional Assembly, Culture North 
East,, Campaign for English Regions. 
xix 
Introduction 
This dissertation argues that a regeneration regime, an experimental form of goý, em- 
ance,, characterised by multi-levels of intra and inter-organisational negotiation and 
co-ordination have developed within a complex and ambiguous external environment 
in attempts to deal with unmet economic, social and cultural needs. This emergent 
form of regime, with innovative and entrepreneurial actors in public, private and other 
sectors has emerged from a poorly institutionalised inter-organisational field of regen- 
eration and the loosely coupled networks at national, regional, sub-regional and local 
levels have allowed regime actors to identify particular initiatives/projects for regen- 
eration. 
The research shows that the regime is a top-down, managerialist form of governance, 
which is not entirely democratic or open to public participation, but strategically con- 
tingent on global and other constraints. The overall objective is to ameliorate the leg- 
acy of decline, within a much broader concept of governance, and where political 
negotiation and co-ordination take place within wider socio-political structures and 
traditional hierarchies. It is central to an understanding of how regeneration policies 
are formulated, implemented and evaluated because the elites involved are embedded 
in the social system and part of the history of change. 
The legitimisation of mechanisms and processes involved in strategic formulation and 
implementation are always open to debate, but are rarely challenged by excluded 
groups. Penetrating and accessing policy making in the region in order to influence 
choice and direction is difficult, mainly because the regime maintains itself by infor- 
mality and secrecy, and wider social influences do not impact on its activities. 
Existing forms of analysis are limited so a synthesised methodology, which combines 
elements of political science frameworks, Urban Regime Theories, partnerships, net- 
works and power analyses, strategic management and stakeholder models is proposed. 
Existing urban theories are weak on; the role of history, informality, linkages between 
individuals and institutions, existing power relationships and traditional institutional 
forms of decision making, socio-cultural and external aspects, use narrow categorisa- 
tions of business and state institutions, and assume that state institutions incorporate 
business and other interests into decision forums. The blurring of boundaries within 
and between business,, individual actors and institutions, state, civic and other interests 
have added to confusion. They fail to account for micro decision-making, especially 
the question of who has power, how it is distributed and how conflict/consensus is 
managed. 
Strategy /stakeholder and power models throw more light on these but still cannot 
deal with hidden levels of power, assumptions on incorporation of business class into 
state agendas, structures of public, private and quango state, or the service class. No 
valid analysis of auxiliary agencies such as universities, sporting, artistic, trade unions 
or combinations of public and private agencies exists. Business is fragmented, SME s 
and inward investors are given insufficient prominence and current literature makes 
assumptions on leadership and entrepreneurialism. A thread that continues throughout 
this dissertation is that entrepreneurialism can be detected in all sectors, and is not the 
sole preserve of the business sector. The importance of lobbying and external links, 
the broader involvement of other agencies, blurring of state and business agendas, and 
blurring of boundaries makes it problematic to say that one is more important than the 
other. 
The omissions do not signal the demise of existing theories, rather it is argued that 
additional components from strategy management and power models creates a more 
compelling interpretation, and help to fill the gaps. The proposed model synthesises 
geography and political science and management theoretical frameworks, and it is 
argued that a researcher should present subjective interpretations rather than detached 
or objective explanations of research, because existing explanations of urban and re- 
gional regeneration do not provide fundamental truths about governance and the 
change process. 
Funding is critical in urban and regional regeneration but other elements are important 
such as project realisation, building up trust and mutuality, recognition of social as 
well as profit driven motives, networks beyond the regimes, and connection between 
regimes. Empirical data is used to show how dynamic relationships cut across time, 
space, initiative and sectors. 
A research project cannot occur in a vacuum. There needs to be a frame of reference 
to investigate the veracity of claims made. The three very different case studies are 
examined within a political/economic and historical framework and give a rich and in 
depth interpretation of regional regeneration, with a concomitant alignment to sub- 
regional regeneration processes. 
As the social context and space for collective action has become enlarged within the 
field of regeneration, there has been an increase in the potential for ambiguity on ac- 
countability, legitimacy and autonomy. The uncertainty of the environment coupled 
with the lack of mandatory guidance has created a situation in which individuals and 
agencies adjust to each other in more flexible and innovative ways to maintain, en- 
hance and enlarge their power bases. 
There is a review of explanatory strengths and limitations of existing theoretical Per- 
spectives, in an attempt to show how the NE regime has attained a strategic position 
and how it continuously struggles for legitimacy and autonomy. 
Access and control of relevant policy networks, communities and elites are critical to 
the formulation and elaboration of the regeneration agenda, as is the capacity to draw 
on organisational resources and information to implement chosen policies. Manipula- 
tion of symbols and images and strategic rhetoric and discourse has become the cho- 
sen method of fostering an ideology of growth and transformation. 
This research demonstrates that elites from a wide sectoral basis have always drawn 
in civil servants to legitimise regime activities, purpose and rationale. The problem, of 
course is how much public support and legitimacy and autonomy the regime has, be- 
cause its activities are ill defined, projects and initiatives emerge in imprecise and 
largely unknown ways. They are rarely clearly specified in advance so that excluded 
groups subject them to local debate or challenge. There is continued uncertaintv on 
how solutions to regeneration problems will be evaluated, and the overall regional 
mission to which all contributing agencies and individual elites adhere is ambiguous, 
not clearly articulated but yet rhetorically agreed upon. Legitimacy and autonomy 
cannot be taken for granted, continual appeals to the regional story of growth, and aný- 
potential conflicts over means and ends are defended within the political and institu- 
tional arena. 
Clearly the elites from various sectors, including civil servants have a pivotal role in 
defming which projects and initiatives will aid regeneration, as they decide how 
change will be instigated and realised. Measurement of effectiveness is difficult to 
achieve, not least because the means of measuring success on 'soft', socially and cul- 
turally desirable projects are difficult to substantiate on any hard, objective, economic 
basis. Regeneration activities are never quite explicit or open, but governed by im- 
plicit and embedded social interactions and relationships. Elites operate by their own 
rules and conduct; there are many hidden agendas, and unwritten or unspoken social 
conventions, practices and behaviours. The accrued benefits of regeneration are not 
open to measurement by conventional means, because the direct, let alone indirect 
effects, or how and where to attribute value,, is always going to be difficult. 
The research shows that a recognition that once state organisations began to lose 
power and influence over the local and regional domains, and could no longer engi- 
neer feasible solutions to social and economic problems, a much more complex field 
of intra and inter-organisational negotiation and co-ordination emerged, strategically 
contingent on the varied constraints. This has created a role for entrepreneurs who are 
able to mobilise and co-ordinate advocacy coalitions that penetrate and shape policy 
networks and communities through which projects are formulated and realised. 
By striking the right balance between structural constraints and collective agency and 
strategic contingency, and harmonising economic and socio-cultural activities. within 
a dynamic institutional environment, inter-organisational politics and power relation- 
ships have emerged as the critical factor in managing an shaping policy formulation 
and implementation. 
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Pluralist analyses, such as stakeholder models are regarded as dispersed and accessi- 
ble to subordinate groups, but it is clear from this research that power in the NE is still 
hierarchically structured, though not necessarily organisationally concentrated. Power 
is concentrated in the hands of elites who claim to act in the interests of the wider 
community. However, organisational agency continues to be of strategic importance 
in the legitimising process, and professional and managerial power relationships be- 
tween elites help to structure and legitimise power networks by projects and initiatives 
articulated and mandated by state officials. These are then exposed to the political 
arenas and multi-sectoral elites inter -link and dominate the values and interests 
through the process of identifying policies/projects and the formulation and imple- 
mentation stages. 
Local elites imitate and conform to a combined managerial/professional and regional 
discourses to attain legitimacy, but the downside is in using a managerial discourse 
and ideology, local politicians then become colonised by professional and managerial 
rules of the game. This dilutes political roles and value systems, but continued appeals 
to the regional rhetoric of growth ensure that the ideology is sustained. 
In pursuit of the goals the thesis will be structured as follows: 
Chapter One: is an historical analysis of the effects of regional policies on the NE of 
England and the responses of a regional regime of elites. It develops the conceptual 
framework for the subsequent chapters, and by examining the concept of 'power el- 
ites'; it shows how the need for regeneration within national policies and globalisation 
of economies and public services has created conditions in which a particular type of 
elite governance has evolved in the North East. Some prominent definitional and 
theoretical traditions on the local, urban and regional regeneration help to refine the 
concept of a NE 'region', and allow an examination of an unique form of entrepreneu- 
rial governance, with politically minded business people and entrepreneurial public 
servants and politicians. It is argued that in the NE elites have always been involved 
in decision making, but global challenges have challenged the power and capacity of 
all nations states, multi -levels of governance now have multiple pressures and Euro- 
pean funding regimes have forced regional elites to forge partnerships and regimes in 
ever more fragmented decision spaces. As each region in the UK has responded 
uniquely to the external forces, cadres of public and private sector entrepreneurs have 
been created, but in the NE, it is argued that a regime of entrepreneurial actors has 
always operated through formal and informal linkages. 
Earlier research on urban and regional change was limited in showing formalised and 
institutional linkages, and research on entrepreneurship was focused on the role of the 
individual. The case is made that institutions are no longer appropriate to confront 
new challenges, so it is important to explain the dynamics between new combinations 
of institutional capacities and individual entrepreneurship. In the NE long-standing 
strategic connections and linkages between multi-sectoral elites have increased 
knowledge and information flow, and created a regime that has continually adapted to 
external changes. For over a hundred years a unique blend of multi-sectoral elites 
have acted entrepreneurially in individual, organisational and civic roles on behalf of 
the region, by adopting their own self imposed codes of conduct and mores. The re- 
gime is a form of governance that combines entrepreneurial, managerial political and 
public servants with politically minded business and other sectoral interests, but cru- 
cially civil servants are the pivotal link between all levels of governance. 
Top down styles of decision making within hierarchical frameworks have planning, 
objective setting and implementation at core but such approaches omit the very im- 
portant, subtle power relationships between agents, so by reviewing literature on 
power and the more traditional analyses of elites it is shown that behavioural, reputa- 
tional, institutional and outcomes approaches used to identify power relationships had 
limitations, though later writers do accept that hidden levels of power are difficult to 
determine. It is accepted that in most societies a small elite monopolise and enjoy the 
advantages of power; and they circulate and form cliques and associations, as societal 
changes create new conditions. However, in traditional analyses position and prestige 
were recognised as being based on wealth, intelligence. special talents, status, occupa- 
tion, or social or political position but it is argued that elites in the NE also achieve 
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their positions on the basis of functionality and instrumentality. Historically the-, 
have used individual, organisational and civic positions as a way of contributing to 
regional objectives by calling on resources, personnel and information to implement 
innovative, multi sectoral projects that can achieve unrnet needs. They also use their 
position, reputation, and friendships to lobby on behalf of, and market the region. 
This elite regime has evolved from a period in the nineteenth century where economic 
factors were the basis for involvement, to one in which other factors have broadened 
representation. The regime is cohesive, interdependent and sustained by mutuality and 
friendship, and these multi-professional and multi-representative actors suspend class, 
political, professional, social and other affiliations to make pragmatic responses to 
external changes. The important gaps in institutional coverage have allowed elites to 
transfer knowledge between generations, and between professional and political 
worlds, and have significantly drawn in local central and local state officials and other 
sectoral interests. 
Globalisation of both public and commercial worlds, is used as a backdrop to illus- 
trate the fragmentation of governance structures, and shows that activities formally 
carried out by state agencies are now shared in attempts to regenerate impoverished 
areas5 as elites struggle to integrate policies, priorities and resources. Local econo- 
mies are linked into the global economy, and providing defMitions on the urban and 
the region are difficult because of the welter of co-existing epistemological, theoreti- 
cal and methodological approaches. Researchers have sought to bridge the macro 
structuralist and the micro levels of analysis by developing meso -level approaches, or 
by attempting to bring together agency, structure and institutions but all have weak- 
nesses. 
Chapter Two: explains the methodology, the rationale for a qualitative approach and a 
discussion on the chosen methods. It explains that existing methods of enquiry have 
many flaws, and few studies of public leadership are longitudinal analyses of who was 
involved in decision-making, how priorities were determined. and the formulation of 
strategies. Regional change cannot be isolated from national and global forces. and to 
understand it we must show the social and human dimensions and multiple meanings 
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and interpretations individuals place on events. It is also vital to have a historical per- 
spective and the use of three diverse cases within regeneration showed how the same 
actors became involved in local, sub regional and regional projects at different points 
in the region's history. 
By adopting a reputational, positional and issues based analysis on diverse regenera- 
tion cases it was possible to obtain a rich picture of elite social interactions and causal 
links as elites communicated in decision spaces, both formally and informally. At the 
macro research level literature reviewing helped to defme a framework and interviews 
were used for conceptual elucidation and to highlight questions then tested out in de- 
tailed case studies. Relating the empirical data to a theoretical construction allowed 
inferences to be drawn and isolation of key concept at the micro research level shaped 
the analytical framework. General and subordinate data was useful in setting criteria 
for selection of the cases. 
Stakeholders were chosen from a range of agencies across the region, to collect inter- 
view data on perceptions, meanings and attitudes, and this was triangulated with ques- 
tionnaires, case study material, non-verbal observations and documentary data. The 
aim was to make sense of a mass of data, make the links between the conceptual and 
empirical worlds, as well as developing an iterative process of induction and deduc- 
tion. By using theory to drive the research, and by having a representative sample of 
interviewees rigour was maintained throughout. It was recognised at the outset that no 
single research method is 100% accurate and the problems associated with qualitative 
methods were all overcome by maintaining a professional approach and drawing on 
long experience as a commercial and academic researcher 
Chapter Three: is a historical analysis of the evolution of the regime, in different 
phases, as it responds to global and national changes. It explains that regionalist de- 
mands are growing because of the frustration elites feel with current governance ar- 
rangements. It shows how this regime of elites attempts to adapt national policies to 
regional needs by identification of projects, but that autonomy is severely constrained. 
Autonomy is relative, not absolute. Many of the activities are dependent on external 
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support, which leaves elites to carry out a range of activities. Networking and lobby- 
ing has allowed elites to draw in national and local state officials to legitimise activi- 
ties. In the quest to transform the image of the region, innovative projects that can 
improve the quality of life and physical conditions of the local population have been 
identified. 
Each phase of regional policy has created the conditions in which a unique type of 
elite regime, based on enduring relationships and a sense of regional identity and 
common purpose has evolved and synthesised, despite changes to composition and 
personnel. From the class based regime of aristocrats and commercial interests in the 
nineteenth century, through its various stages to present day multi-representative, post 
democratic forms, this regime has attempted to fill the gaps where state intervention 
failed. 
It shows that the regime has evolved in response to the failure of top down regional 
policy and planning to address long-standing inequalities and speculates on whether 
current political and administrative systems are any more satisfactory or effective in 
dealing with decline and deprivation. The regime operates in the decision vacuum 
where administrative and political arrangements are incapable of plugging gaps in 
coverage. Broader sectoral representation of individual, civic and organisational inter- 
ests of the region are now involved in a multitude of ways. Some are democratically 
elected, some are appointed, some self-appointed and still others remain outside and 
beyond institutional boundaries. It is a very broad and complex system of elite inter- 
ests that has emerged to fill regional decision space. 
The legitimacy and accountability of present arrangements are questioned, as they fail 
to represent excluded groups. The processes through which strategies are developed 
and debated are nor transparent, generally secretive and informal. New administrative 
arrangements around a complex set of interactions between new and reformed institu- 
tions of GOs, RDAs, and NERA, means that a regional agenda is loosely defined, and 
institutional capacity to deal with economic, social and environmental pressures is 
unproven, and incapable of providing a framework to solve the problems. 
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Chapter Four: argues throughout that available literature on local, urban and regional 
governance has offered partial and particularistic insights but failed to capture the 
complexity, fluidity, flexibility, advocacy or external forces on regeneration. Broader 
literature from political and managerial fields and selective comparative regional data 
are used to explain empirical findings, and the chapter explores defmitions of strategy 
and stakeholders to synthesise models for a more comprehensive understanding of the 
cultural, political and historical dimensions, and the macro and micro elements omit- 
ted from earlier accounts of regeneration. In particular there is an examination of re- 
gime activities, power inter-relations, and effectiveness. It confirms the existence of a 
regime of elites who act on behalf of civic society, though it is accepted that it is an 
exclusionary and fails to include disadvantaged groups. 
Synthesising managerial and political theories, allows those vital micro and macro 
elements omitted by regime theories to be incorporated, but many hidden elements of 
power and influence remain, because observable and non-observable aspects of power 
and influence are notoriously difficult to discern and secrecy and informality lubri- 
cates elite decision-making. The chapter argues that wider social influences are 
claimed to be open to debate, but in reality elites are rarely challenged by excluded 
groups, because of the difficulties in penetrating regeneration forums. 
There is a discussion on what is meant by success on 'soft', socially and culturally 
desirable projects because of the difficulties in substantiating hard, objective, eco- 
nomic data. Drawing the boundaries around a unit of analysis and looking for causal 
linkages is not a simple operation and no one can say whether accrued benefits would 
have arisen without elite intervention, because of the ambiguity and contestability on 
what, when and how to measure. It may take years, or generations for any real impact 
to be seen, or to determine whether these entrepreneurial interventions had any real 
effect. An important policy question remains, 'how much worse would the region be 
in regeneration terms, without the existence of this regime, or the activities that have 
been carried out? ' 
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Despite still lagging behind other regions, it is argued that there has been a physical 
transformation of areas of the region and examples of high profile projects, but no one 
can no for certain whether there were other attributable factors. Undoubtedly elites 
have been instrumental in developing strategic forums, and task forces to cope with 
FDI withdrawals or other issues, but it is impossible to say if they were stimulated by 
earlier regime activities or not. Some of their activities have achieved success, and a 
circulation of elites around the region has added to the knowledge and information 
flow. 
There is little to prove that cultural change and raising aspirations have result from 
elite activities, but in the political sphere, there is more apparent success. Lobbying 
was a contributing factor in the establishment of RDAs, RDA budget increases, pro- 
posed reviews of the Barnett Formula and a Regional Assembly. The region is much 
higher up the political agenda than it was, but none of these successes can be directly 
attributable to elite activities, but undoubtedly helped to put them on the agenda. 
Despite elite exhortations of a confident and self-assured region, no longer dependent 
and looking towards a successful future, the rhetoric has not quite matched the reality, 
as the region is still heavily reliant on public subsidies. 
Chapter Five: is a case study of Siemens that demonstrates how elites strategically 
collaborated to attract the company to the region, and how managing stakeholder alli- 
ances became a vital component, once the closure decision was announced. The case 
reveals that central and local state actors inter-acted with regional elites to develop 
some coherence as the NE was pitted against other competitor regions. It brings into 
question just how much autonomy and legitimacy elites had, how they were drawn 
together to negotiate and bargain, and confirms that autonomy was constrained and 
contingent on funding decisions made by central government and the corporate might 
of Siemens. 
This short-lived, high profile case does demonstrate evidence of institutional innova- 
tion and elite entrepreneurship in multi-sector agencies, as they were permitted to 
redefine and validate their activities. However, it also revealed the risks associated 
with using inward investment as a core regional strategy for regeneration. A clear 
knock on, and indirect benefit arising from this case was the way in which elites be- 
gan to re-appraise the role of indigenous industries, and look for ways to support ex- 
isting and new businesses. Nonetheless the legacy of the Siemens'case includes a 
sound infrastructure, newly established networks, improved R&D in universities, and 
enhanced clustering and supply chains. 
No matter how effective elites were in developing regional capacities including PR, 
marketing and lobbying skills to embed such an important FDI as Siemens, the na- 
tional and international flow of capital was outside of the control of regional elites, 
and despite continued exhortations for regions to shape their own regeneration poli- 
cies the rapidity and increased mobility of international capital left them neutered in 
this instance. 
Furthermore the chapter shows the political capital to be gained from the investment, 
but the many technical and strategic issues to be considered, inevitably resulted in a 
top down strategy where regional elites were marginalized and forced into a secon- 
dary role at the attraction stage. They did, however, fulfil significant roles, not least 
high level lobbying prior to the decision and the capacity to draw on resources, per- 
sonnel and information. Despite this, the volatility and transience of global capital 
meant that no matter what Herculean regional efforts were made (metaphorically) the 
plug was still pulled. 
Chapter Six: is a case study of Visual Arts, a bottom -up artistic and cultural event 
that had regional significance. It demonstrates how the lessons learned by elites from 
earlier FDI successes were transferred to a cultural and artistic setting. It revealed how 
the project was used to manipulate symbols and strategic rhetoric to foster an ideol- 
ogy of change and raise the profile of the region. The aim was to maximise social 
benefits and minimise the disadvantages of earlier fragmented approaches, and it did 
have limited success in involving some excluded groups, however management of the 
process remained in the hands of elites. 
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Visual Arts was a project firmly rooted in the local social systen-4 but classicalIN, 
demonstrated how national and local state officials were drawn in to legitimise activi- 
ties, draw resources and harmonise social and economic need by adapting and shaping ltý 
a national initiative to play to regional strengths. 
There are countless positive impacts of cultural regeneration, but there are also disad- 
vantages. It can unlock creativity, imagination and innovation but there are concerns 
that it does not make up the shortfall in manufacturing activities. Not everyone be- 
lieved that the time, personnel and other resources and costs devoted to cultural activi- 
ties would bring the promised benefits. When questioned, elites believed that Visual 
Arts would raise the profile, stimulate the economy, create dynamism and bring local 
talent together. The theory was that cultural role models would help communities to 
become involved in arts, - and 
have the knock on effect of producing world-class pro- 
jects as magnets to property development and investment. The Baltic Arts develop- 
ment has already attracted a large, popular property development scheme. 
Overall Visual Arts was hailed by elites as a great success, as a region with few art 
galleries became the focus for international interest, and public perceptions and 
expectations of the role of art improved. Individuals who had never had any con- 
nections with the artistic world initiated projects, and major companies were 
persuaded to sponsor the event, and it became the biggest ever sponsorship out side of 
London. The success created the confidence to bid to be the European Capital of Cul- 
ture in 2008, but it was a catalyst for other projects, such as The Tall Ships Race, The 
Angel of the North, the f23 million Baltic Centre. 
It was independently hailed a PR and financial success, as well as achieving eco- 
nomic, artistic and social/cultural regional objectives, but the ultimate objective as a 
vehicle to make the NE a leading region in Europe for Arts has yet to be realised. 
However, politically and commercially the national and international profile of the 
region was improved as a result of the initiative. Furthermore, politically it had a bear- 
ing on the White Paper on RDAs. 
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There is hard evidence to show that the event was a successful one, but giving con- 
crete evidence on how successful the elite intervention was, proved to be more elu- 
sive. There have been some useful networks developed for the future, and it is argued 
that without elite intervention these might not have happened. A strategic architecture 
and useful networks were created, and these are considered as useful mechanisms for 
cross-sectoral transfer of ideas, and the skills needed to obtain sponsorship were 
passed on to later projects, along with many other valuable lessons. 
Chapter Seven: is a case study of St. Peter's Development. This gives ffirther evi- 
dence of the transfer of learning from regional initiatives to sub-regional level. It pro- 
vides data on St Peter's Development in Sunderland, a phased development project, in 
which elites further refmed their activities, and by networking and information shar- 
ing were able to learn use collective wisdom to pool resources and affect change. A 
strong institutional framework and strong simultaneous connections of multi-agency 
representatives across FDI, artistic and cultural projects at sub-regional and regional 
levels of governance were harmonised to formulate and implement this property de- 
velopment. 
Many of the initiatives under the St Peter's umbrella would have been impossible 
without negotiation between the various levels of governance and without the co- 
coordinative efforts of key individuals and agencies. It was another example of the 
way in which elites identified projects to enhance the profile, and used lobbying skills 
to pressurised Ministers and civil servants to secure resources, in doing so they strug- 
gled for legitimacy and autonomy. It is a classic example of the way that elites aligned 
social and economic needs, but does illustrate how conflicts were managed in the in- 
terests of the local, sub-regional and regional objectives. It also confirms that regional 
and sub-regional elites have a level of relative autonomy, but that the local and na- 
tional state has ultimate power and influence. 
Much of the good practice apparent in the partnerships and networks in the Siemens 
and VAs cases were absorbed, learned and transferred for a sustained effort. Forums 
I tor community and local involvement were already in existence during VAs but in St. 
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Peter's they became the useful stimuli to the formation of others. Specific events, such 
as these can be the trigger for alliances and improve social and cultural as well as 
economic performance. 
Some elites did not initially appear to be significant in St Peter's, but in actuality there 
was close contact and involvement. Different elites took the lead role in this initiative 
but nevertheless a regional focus was still apparent. The ability to manage regional 
and sub regional networks, to ensure that information is passed across and up and 
down the region, and the ability to harness institutional capacity between sectors, 
formally and informally, is a key to the sustainability and learning across the region. 
This is the social glue that holds regions together. It was strongly evident in St Peter's 
Development. 
By having a strategic overview of how regional projects such as FDI, VAs and St Pe- 
ter's Development elites were able to see how they dovetailed from community level 
upwards. Key regional personnel were in close and continuous communication at re- 
gional and sub regional levels, it was therefore possible to have a comprehensive and 
global picture. Over a period of time between projects regional elites redefined the 
strategic approach and improved the networking between the respective agencies. 
Chapter Eight: in this concluding chapter it is argued that the limitations of existing 
theory demonstrate that this synthesised research methodology is a more useful inter- 
pretation. There are also some final comments, which will be used to signal future 
research directions. 
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This illustration gives an indication of the theoretical influence on the final work. 
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Chapter One 
Globalisation, elite regimes and local and regional regeneration 
Introduction 
This chapter reviews some literature on elites, globalisation, regeneration and regions 
to set the context within which an elite regime in NE governance have identified 
projects on behalf civic society, to enhance cultural, social and economic growth, 
within wider socio-political structures and traditional hierarchies. It sets the backdrop 
in which regeneration strategies are formulated and implemented by reference to 
prominent definitional and theoretical debates surrounding urban and regional 
regeneration. This allows an initial assessment of elites in NE regeneration. 
The gaps created in existing institutional arrangement have created the conditions for 
elites to co-ordinate regional efforts to adapt national policies and global changes to 
regional needs, but highlights the continual negotiation and bargaining necessary to 
legitimise activities. The chapter demonstrates that elites in the NE have always 
operated formally and informally to decide upon strategies for regeneration, but over 
the years the composition of the elite regime has altered in line with external changes. 
Multi-agency representation has been absorbed into existing regime formations as 
new needs arose, and in line with societal changes. Legitimacy has been based on 
close proximity to civic society and the pivotal role played by central and local state 
officials. Elites operate on self-imposed codes of conduct, and use a mixture of 
political and managerial processes to draw in resources and information to identify 
appropriate projects to cope vAth unmet social and economic need. The autonomy of 
elites is contingent on the constraints imposed by external forces and it is relative 
rather than absolute. 
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Elites in regeneration: the power debate. 
There is a long-standing debate within political and social science that in an indirect 
democracy such as the UK system regimes of elites have always been involved in 
decision-making. In the late twentieth and earlier years of the twenty first centurý, it is 
generally accepted that multi levels of governance are faced with a multitude of 
pressures, not least a renewed questioning of the role and operations of the local state 
and multi-sectoral elites engaged in local political processes. Globalisation has 
challenged the power and capacity of nation states, European funding arrangements 
have forced regional partnerships to coalesce, and both have altered private and public 
sector agendas and activities within ever more fragmented decision-making forums. 
Moreover the intensification of global and national public sector changes have created 
the conditions for a new cadre of public sector entrepreneurs' expected to work in 
collaboration with traditional elites in identifying regeneration projects for growth 
potential. 
This broadening of coalitions to include new elite interests and new state forms are 
quite a recent phenomenon in British politics, but in this, and subsequent chapters it is 
argued that multi sectoral elites in NE governance have uniquely responded over time 
to change. Cousins et al (1974: 133-144), and Carney and Hudson (1976: 2) addressed 
political, institutional, commercial and capital backgrounds of regional elites, more 
recently Robinson and Shaw (2001a: 473-492) emphasised institutional and formal 
linkages, however neither fully captured significant informal and extra- institutional 
The term 'entrepreneur' is not used in the traditional sense, but as an amal-am of those tý 
public sector entrepreneurs who turn crisis into opportunities, champion causes. provide 
leadership, build nemorks, establish vision, goals and trust, and lever in resources from 
external sources (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). 
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linkages. Nor did they identify the historical and external forces considered by elites 
to of importance. 
In a UK context recent local and regional governance changes have emphasised the 
importance of leadership and co-ordinated efforts, but raise questions on the 
legitimacy, accountability and autonomy of elites operating in complex regeneration 
milieu. To understand NE regional and local change it is vital to show how elites 
create the conditions to facilitate information flow on tasks, and the interdependence 
between individuals and meta (or surrounding) institutions. Dynamics between new 
combinations of institutional capacities and individual entrepreneurship create 
adaptive, rather than allocative efficiency, and these in turn are the key to growth. 
Linkages are essential ingredients for creating strategic connectivity and knowledge 
building (Roberts and Benneworth, 2001: 150) and in chapter three we see how a 
regime has developed over the past hundred years, as a vital component of local and 
regional change. Acting in individual, organisational and civic roles elites gain 
legitimacy from close proximity to civic society. 
Writers on entrepreneurship have focused on the role of the individual (Schumpeter, 
1934: 3), or how societies were stuck in institutional settings no longer fit to confront 
new challenges and problems, but multi-sectoral elites in the NE with multiple 
accountabilities have always operated, formally and informally, within and out with 
official planning and policy arenas. NE elite governance is a unique blend of 
individuals acting entrepreneurially, with sectoral interests within a specific 
institutional setting, and unlike those elites in other regions, adopt their o,,, Nn self 
imposed codes of conduct and mores. This particular form of governance does not fit 
exclusivelv into existing regime categories as it combines a mixture of 
enti-cpreneurial. managerial political'public servants with politically minded business/ 
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other sectoral interests. Significantly entrepreneurial civil servants provide the pivotal 
link between national, regional, sub-regional and local levels of governance. 
There is considerable appeal to the view that decision making at any level must 
consist of a series of planned activities, organised in a given hierarchical framework 
with objectives formulated and actions implemented. This top-down style of decision- 
making, promulgated by management theorists is illusory because no matter ho,, N- well 
strategies are planned, administration and associated technicalities, implementation 
and outcomes are dependent on a myriad of subtle power relationships between other 
governmental and non-governmental agents. As the subsequent chapters show these 
power relationships are very complex, and have developed within a particular social 
and historical setting. Many of the inter-linkages in the NE are infonnal and secretive, 
but based on strong friendships forged in individual, organisational and civic roles 
over very long periods of time. 
Power has been viewed by political scientists as social or collectively organised 
whereas sociologists saw it in individualistic terms (Presthus, 1964: 3). It could also 
rest in the hands of a small number of political, bureaucratic and business interests, or 
be diffused between different, competing democratic interests (Clegg, 1989: 6). 
Theorists have analysed scope, influence, perceptions, images of power, or examined 
decisions to determine pivotal power, but the inability to establish the relationship 
between power and causation has been a recurring weakness. Moreover defining elites 
has proven difficult, due to restrictive criteria (Moyser and Wagstaffe, 1987: 7). 
Reputational approaches allowed sociologists to list individuals, and make 
judgements on power and influence. whereas political scientists used 'pluralist' 
decisional analysis, to identify events or non-events (Clegg, 1979: 46). Both failed to 
encapsulate time. chronology or socio-historical conditions, as suggested by Roig 
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(1973: 19-54). Pluralists and elite theorists also placed the legitimacy and autonom\ 
of the central state at the core. Thus, whichever theory of power was adopted, elitists 
would assert their will by being absorbed into the state machinery, or by lobbying 
government (Dowding, 1996: 79-85). Of even greater importance is the need to 
determine how certain elite groupings dominate or constrain decision-making forums 
and how open and contested, secretive or challengeable they are (Dowding, 1996: 87). 
The term 'elite' had been used in the seventeenth century to describe commodities of 
particular excellence, and its usage during the nineteenth and early twentieth century 
was extended to refer to superior social groups (Bottomore, 1964: 7). Pareto and 
Mosca, the foremost elite theorists rejected Marxian concepts of a ruling and 
bourgeoisie class. Pareto differentiated between governing and non-governing elites, 
whereas Mosca used parliamentary, representative democracy to include political and 
sub-elites such as civil servants, scientists, engineers and intellectuals with power, 
juxtaposed against the masses. In most societies a small elite of upper or aristocratic 
classes monopolise and enjoy the advantages of power, by enshrining power in legal 
mandates. Position was, therefore, based on wealth, intelligence, or special talents 
(Bottomore, 1964: 15). 
Mosca showed how the minority controlled the majority by a sub-elite of middle class 
bureaucrats and technocrats, differentiated by status and occupation (Bottomore, 
1964: 3 1). He introduced the notion of a' circulation of elites' to explain how social 
and technological changes led to new interests replacing established elite interests. 
Ftzioni-Halevy challenged the theories of Pareto and Mosca as simplistic, 
conservative, undemocratic and contemptuous of the general public. In his opinion the 
connections and struggles of elites were an essential precondition for stability and 
only in representative democracies could elites achieve relati\, e autonomy by having a 
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pivotal and egalitarian role in absorbing sub-elites into the political processes 
(Etzioni-Halevy, 1993: 33). 
Elite groups gained prestige on the basis of economic, cultural and political activities, 
however contemporary writers now accept that groups have multiple class affiliations 
and varied motivations for group activities. Crouch (2000: 57) argued that in a post 
democratic world, national politics were being replaced by private interactions 
between elected officials and elites, overwhelmingly business interests, and this 'new 
self referential ellipse' had positive and negative effects. Harking back to the 
Victorian period he asserted that archetypal capitalists instigated rules on how 
organisations should work, because of their profound understanding on the 
differences between public and private sectors (Crouch, 2000: 61). Presthus (1964) 
saw competing centres of power and influence, in which individuals challenged 
decisions by forming cliques and associations, as much healthier than elitism where 
individualism reigned. 
Elite mobility had, historically, been based on marriage, property interests, social or 
political positions, but in the NE functionality and instrumentality are critical factors. 
Functionality here is taken to be the roles assumed by elites in shaping, adapting and 
re-engineering national and European policies to suit regional needs. An elite regime, 
in a NE context is not used in a pejorative sense, but refers instead to a diverse 
mixture of multi-agency representatives whose positions arise through various means. 
It is a broader constellation than governing elites identified by earlier writers. as 
individuals are not involved in regeneration because of superior wealth, talent, 
ional objectives by intelligence or special talents. more on ho,,, N- they contribute to rep 
calling on resources, personnel and information. Mostly participation is by means of 
tI ricildship links. reputation or functionallv. such as lobbvin, -, or marketing the region. 
Most elite or community studies have failed to provide any real depth or 
understanding of a historical perspective. Little is known about hoýN- have elites atid 
their characteristics changed over time. but elite structures in the NE have evok ed 
from a period in which economic factors were the basis for involvement, to one in 
which other factors broaden representation. Project identification has created the 
conditions for innovative, multi-sectoral solutions to uranet need. 
Hunter's (1953) reputational approach, was a socio-metric analysis that confinned the 
social, cultural and economic inter-locking nature of the power and influence of forty 
community leaders from business, finance and industry, whereas Dahl's analysis ývent 
further to reveal a dispersed and competitive power system of organisational leaders, 
categorised on (i) political, (ii) economic (business, commerce, industry, finance) and, 
(iii) specialists, who were marginal until their knowledge was required (Dahl. 1961 a: 
201-5). The institutional method adopted by Wright Mills (1956), was criticised for 
not accepting contemporary complex polities, instead he identified only a triumvirate 
of government, business or military interests. Moreover Presthus combined decisional 
and reputational methods to determine overt power, but this method too had 
shortcomings as people mixed up personal preferences with objective judgements 
(Presthus, 1964). 
In contrast Lukes attempt to move beyond behavioural, institutional or outcomes 
approaches (Lukes, 1974a), was updated by later researchers-, adding a fourth 
dimension of power (Burrell, 1988, Clegg, 1989, Knights and Vurdubakis, 1994, cited 
2 
Fulop and Linstead, 1999: 126) . 
2 To be discussed more fully in chapter four. 
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In simple terms every community (according to Presthus, 1964: 5) has fairly stable 
sub-systems and networks of social, economic, ethnic, religious, and friendship ties, 
with discrete though overlapping constellations of power and overlapping group 
membership (Presthus, 1964: 6), and this is certainly a feature of the elite regime in 
the NE. Regeneration issues have allowed individuals in this sub-systems to co- 
operate, and at different times elites become more or less influential or powerful, in 
lobbying for regional interests. The elite regime has persisted, in response to external 
forces, and despite membership changes. Stability has been achieved within a 
complex milieu of overlapping constellations of power and overlapping membership 
on diverse forums. 
That being said there is no one avenue for elite involvement in the NE, as multi- 
sectoral elites over the years have achieved prominence by a combination of routes to 
upward mobilitY3 , but the questions 
for this research arising fi7om elite literature are, 
how is a circulation of elites put into effect and how are elites replaced in the NE? 
How are new recruits absorbed into the process, and on what basis is their 
involvement? Has the basis of leadership of the NE shifted from aristocratic, to a 
corporate form (local authority, central and local goverment) then evolved into a 
much broader church? What kinds of skills/ resources are needed for involvement? 
Fig 1.0. shows elite formation between the nineteenth century and present day. 
e. g. Ridley's industrial wealth; T Dan Smith's political connections: MIlls'TU; 
Denham, Grant . Bridge, 
Balls' Whitehall links; Wright's links with Tony Blair and 
arts groups, Holliday and environment; Wrigglesworth and Hall, business, sport and 
media. 
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Fig IA Elite regime development in the NE between 19th Century and present 
day 
I 9th Century Early 2 Oth Century to post 
2 nd World War 
1970s to date 
Individualistic (limited LA) Corporatist Multi -repre sentati on 
Landowner Local Authority Wider representation 
Coal owners Trade Unionists Representation of interests 
Factory owners Business representatives (Local, national state reps, 
business, service class. 
univers itie s, sports, arts, uti I iti 
es, media, TUs quangos) 
BASIS BASIS BASIS 
Class position/Civic Representation: Representation (wider) 
Limited LA representation Organisational Organisational 
Individual 
Civic 
Individualistic, Corporatist and Multi-representational groups 
largely excludes less advantaged groups. 
The NE elite regime is cohesive, interdependent, and sustained by friendships and 
mutual linkages within a state framework. Members of the regime have multi 
representative and multi professional roles but pool resources to achieve commonly 
agreed goals. Individuals suspend class, political, professional, social and other 
affiliations to respond to the challenges faced by globalisation and national state 
policies. Unlike elite groups identified by earlier writers, NE elites make pragmatic 
responses to externally imposed policies. Autonomy is contingent and relative, rather 
than absolute. 
Those technocrats, business. intellectuals, white collar workers, identified by Mosca 
are prevalent in the NE but the continued inclusion of central and local state officials 
provides a vital ingredient for adapting policies to local conditions. Information floý\ s 
horizontally and vertically between various levels of governance. on tasks to be 
achieved, institutional and individual resources are then pooled, to operationalise 
strategies. 
Changing social and industrial patterns, and improved education have allowed middle 
class politicians, bureaucrats, intelligentsia, quango heads, service class and other 
representatives to work alongside the remnants of the old aristocratic and elite regime. 
Changing economic interests between the end of the nineteenth and middle of the 
twentieth century meant that shipbuilding, coal owning, iron and steel and heavýý 
industry were replaced by a mixed economy. This changed the nature and 
characteristics of elites. Established aristocratic families and individuals whose power 
and influence were based on wealth were gradually joined, more significantly, after 
the 1945 War by regional civil servants, technocrats, planners, local politicians, trade 
unionists, business people, and multi-sectoral elites. Much later University VCs, 
media, sporting, artistic, and utility interests began to collaborate, and more recently 
inward investment company executives were drawn in. 
Poorly institutionalised arrangements within regeneration have allowed this regime to 
flourish, and plug the gaps where no mandatory guidance exists. Elites share 
experiences and a regional story, and transfer knowledge between generations, and 
across political and professional worlds. Thus the experiences of an earlier aristocratic 
elite regime have been absorbed into a much broader regime to draw in central and 
local state officials and other sectoral interests to cope with the demands brought 
about by external forces, such as those examined in the following section. 
Globalisation and the effects on the region 
'Globalisation' has become a clich6 of contemporary society. and writers have 
attempted to clarify definitional squabbles by describing the multiplicity and intensity 
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of linkages and interconnections between states and societies constituting the present 
world system, or by showing how events, decisions and activities in one part ofthe 
world have significant consequences for individuals and communities in quite distant 
parts of the globe (Dunning, 1996). The IMF (1997) definition is: 
'The growing economic interdependencies of countries world wide 
through the increasing volume and variety of cross-border transactions in 
goods and services and of international capital flows and also through 
rapid and widespread diffusion of technology' 
(Dunning, 1996, cited Hood and Young, 2000: 393-394). 
In simple terms there is a widespread perception that the world is rapidly being 
moulded into a shared social space by economic and technological forces, and that the 
life chances of individuals in regions of the world are profoundly affected by the 
actions of others. There is little hard evidence on the global impacts on cities and 
regions, or whether the world is fully globalised, not least because no one has 
attempted to measure international linkages and the integration of value added 
activities of industries, or attained a proper measure of the degree of 
intemationalisation'. 
The extent to which profound global change has taken place is highly debatable, but 
social unrest in Seattle and Gothenburg exemplified the rise of new social 
movements, this has less to do a diminishing state or individual activity, but more 
crucially because some nations have delegated sovereign responsibilities to an 
4 Three main competing views (i) Hyperglobalisers, either the Neo Liberal vleNN that 
markets and individuals will triumph and nation states will become powerless (Ohmae, 
1991 1995: 119-125), or the Neo Marxian view of the oppressive triumph of global 
capitalism and 'McDoiialdisation', (ii) sceptics see globalisation as a myth concealing 
the powerful, regulatory governments in three trading blocks (Hirst and Thompson, 
1996, cited Lee and Williams, 1997: 156), and (iii) transformational ists N01o sup-gest that 
the world is at a particular epoch, and unprecedented, and uncertain chan, -, cs 
have 
increased inter-connectedness, reshaped societies and altered production and financial 
systerns, but \\elded together communities in different continents(Giddens, 1998: 2) 
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emerging global order of the WTO, EU, World Bank (Swilling, 1998). A debate 
continues on whether or not nation states can control their own destiny'. or if 
transnational and financial markets have outstripped existing political systems and 
public policy mechanisms to solve economic and social problems. Arguably public 
policy has always been shaped by the political and economic forces. as states attempt 
to recapture regulation and control. 
Governance structures are in a state of transition and activities fonnerly carried out by 
state agencies are now being performed by public, private, national, European or 
international bodies. The need to share decision-making means states no longer have a 
monopoly but they are far from irrelevant, because even in the liberalised, market 
dominated economies still need public power to protect private property, civil liberties 
and regulate the social, political, economic and financial systems. Without stability 
social and economic exclusion could have disastrous consequences (Director of DG 
10, Regional Policy Directoratef Nation states have less control over macro 
economic policy but still have exclusive control over physical territory and 
population, so it might be argued that states have a much stronger role to play than the 
4anti-state' theorists would suggest. As some govemance structures have moved away 
from national to supranational bodies and market forces, nations states still need to fill 
the democratic deficit or vacuum between ordinary citizens and these bodies, as is 
evidenced by elite regime activities in the NE. 
In the aftermath of the World Trade Centre disaster of II 
th September 2001 . national 
and regional politicians and business leaders joined forces to raise the point: 
See the N\ ork of Dunning (1977) and Hood and Young (eds) (2000). 
6 Nleado\\s B, RP, DUIO, EC, in conversation \\ith author, May 2001, T\\ente, 
Netherlands. 
" 
'The economic consequences will be severe, because the global economy 
is integrated as never before. Trade, investment, employment and 
spending will be affected' (Mandel son, 2001). 
Perhaps it is not surprising that pessimism and optimism characterise regional views: 
'September II th will exacerbate the problems we have in the automotive 
industry. The strength of the pound, world-wide competition and the 
inability of the UK government to take the European dimension seriouslY 
is crippling us. Global investment and joint R&D activities will 
reverberatefor many years'(Graham, 2001) 
' ONE will have its work cut out over the next 18 months to build on the 
momentum we have created II th September and the farm crisis have 
affected not only the manufacturing secior but even parts of the service 
sector and high tech companies are feeling the pinch. '(Bridge, 2001) 
Foreign owned, indigenous regional companies and public organisations were 
crucially affected by the global economic downturn, but the impacts were more acute 
because FDI has long been a central to regeneration efforts. FDI has been an integral 
part of UK regeneration strategy since the 1980s, and supply chains, regional clusters 
and networks were regarded as powerful symbols of regenerating localised 
businesses. However, despite the significance of FDL the impact was still small scale, 
and reflected the power of global capital on local economies (Tomaney and Pike, 
cited Garrahan and Ritchie, 1999: 99). In all OECD countries over the past three 
decades FDI inflows and outflows grew, in association with globalisation (Stone, 
cited Garrahan and Ritchie, 1999: 3). The collapse of traditional industries in the NE, 
a lack of state intervention during the 1980s and a slow pace of indigenous 
development and entrepreneurial ism hampered employment growth. FDI did make a 
crucial difference to NE regional economy by partial replacement of some job losses 
brought on by 1970s and 1980s de -industrial i sation but the closure of some higli 
profile plants like Siemens and Fujitsu. Viasysterns made the reoional economv ever 
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more vulnerable'. These factors have galvanised the efforts of regional elites to seek 
autonomy and look for ways of ameliorating the effects. 
As the most successful region in the 1980s for winning inward investment, Stone 
suggested that the NE's pool of industrial labour, good access to continental markets 
and industrial sites were important considerations (Stone, cited Garrahan and Ritchie. 
1999: 4). Elites were then able to foster an FDI ideology, and they did this by 
continually pointing to Nissan and other companies as evidence of the rightness of 
their approach. 
Globalisation not only affected the manufacturing or commercial sectors of the 
economy, because public sector downsizing and reinvention of state forms confirmed 
that public administration had always been shaped by political and global shifts 
(Shields, 1998). Public sector globalisation intensified in the 1990s, and the 
seemingly intractable economic and social problems of decline and deprivation were 
manifest in multi-faceted 'wicked issues' with no obvious solutions (Hill, 2000: 1). 
Many of the problems facing deprived areas like the NE have their roots in failed 
national policies during the twentieth century, as local economies are more linked into 
global economies than they have ever been, as the following examination shows. 
7 Despite a commitment to the region. Nissan's '10% cost cuts threatened 1200 jobs and 
relocation to Paris was considered. 
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The Global Public Sector Context 
John (2001: 42) explained modem governance as variegated. independent and 
experimental forms in which politicians, bureaucrats, interest groups and the public 
operate within an emerged internationalised economy and Europeanised polity. This 
form of governance is far removed from legitimately accepted economic compacts, 
bureaucratic routines, party hierarchies and political traditions of the post Second 
World War period because flexible patterns of decision making and diverse, loose 
networks based on longevity developed. Four factors can explain these changes'910 
but in a UK context the retreat of the state has never been fully realised because the 
4output -focused 'politics of the Blair administration have continued, rather than 
decreased state involvement (Talbot, 2001: 281-303). 
Whereas hybridised public/private sectors in the 1980/1990s created mosaics of 
flexible organisational forms, and new architectures based on relational contracts and 
knowledge transfer (Jackson, 2001: 14), fragmented and fluid forms required different 
skills and competences, different cultures, and different performance measurement of 
multiple goals (Liddle, 2001: 313). 
As the UK central government decentralised some activities, it encouraged local and 
regional elites to be drawn together, to balance and co-ordinate functional policy with 
competing democratic demands (John, 2001: 115). The limitations on state 
8 (i)institutional reform created multi-levels of governance, (ii) privatisation created 
multiplicities of agencies and networks, (iii) long term coalitions were established, and 
(W) ideas were transferred between European states( John, 2001: 42) 
9 John restricts categories to public and private sectors. 
10 A regime, according to Stone, is ' specifically about the informal arrangements that 
surround and cornplement the formal %N orkings of government authority, but it is not just 
any informal group that comes together to make decisions, but an informal yet relativelý 
stable group \N ith access to institutional resources that enable it to have a sustained role 
in inakino ooverning decisions' (Stone, 1989: 82). 
intervention allowed NE elites to pursue projects, but choices were severely 
contingent on government policies, regional aid and global shifts. Nevertheless the 
elite regime sought legitimacy by appealing to civic society and incorporatino state 
officials into regeneration forums. The need to draw on resources and information to 
adapt national policies meant that the regime became a link between the state and 
civic society. As members of the regime of elites acted in individual, representative 
and civic capacities the proximity to their constituencies was a major factor in 
continuance of regime activities. 
Whereas John (2001: 41) included national and local politicians, local and central 
government bureaucrats, interest groups, media, churches and social institutions as 
constituting elite regimes, in the NE we must add elites from universities, health, 
utilities, and inward investment companies, as they are all core to understanding NE 
governance. In the US business and state power cooperated to achieve social and 
economic aims, because it served the interests of business who wanted political power 
and public officials and politicians who wanted influence on economic decisions, in 
the NE politically minded business representatives join business-like, and managerial 
politicians and bureaucrats in pursuing combined social and economic agendas. 
As well as the problems of legitimacy and accountability, co-ordination and levels of 
relative autonomy, cultural and professional differences emerge between managers in 
regeneration agencies and the recipients of regeneration projects. The boundaries 
between sectors become blurred with the formation of more complex networks based 
on clusters of relationships, and shifting constellations, across space and time. Kanter 
(1994: 97) sums these up as 'collaborative advantage', neither markets nor hierarchies 
but a basis of shared values. Few analyses reveal how these networks or regimes 
emeroe or are fon-ned, or the political struggles underlying their fori-nation oi- 
-1 -) 
operation. Also the skills needed are given scant attention " The ambiguity. fuzziness. 
and messiness of new arrangements call for risk taking regional management, 
involving actors who can activate networks, act as broker between diverse groups 
from dissimilar cultures and conflicting values. Mediation, arbitration and facilitation 
are perhaps the most challenging aspect of regional change and as the empirical data 
reveal these factors have been important in sustaining regime relationships. 
Central government changes to foster improved service delivery and joined up policý, 
making driven by ' new people with new ideas and new skills' (Gray and Jenkins, 
2001: 210: 213) has not led to risk taking and entrepreneurial zeal, mainly due to the 
lack of clear mandates or guidelines, and the Westminster model no longer provides a 
comprehensive account of how Britain is governed and with a maxim 'what matters is 
what works' New Labour has created new administrative arrangements at local, sub- 
regional and regional levels to regenerate areas like the NE, but much less attention 
has been paid to 'what works', and 'in what circumstances'. The NE has a legacy of 
decline with very specific problems and elites have therefore fon-nulated and 
implemented their own regional strategies, by adapting and working within centrally 
determined policies. 
Public policy has always been characterised by issues and problems that lie outside 
any one area of professional expertise, and barriers between administrative 
jurisdictions. Network imagery was used to illuminate complex, though subtle multi- 
agency linkages beyond formal democratically elected agents and agencies as top 
down strategies were not always be planned, given environmental turbulence, multi- 
accountabilities and technicalities in implementation and execution (Friend et al, 
1974). The fragmentation of the British polity is not a recent phenomenon. Rejecting 
A keN mana,, crial problem tOr the future (Bridge, 2000). 
previous unitary and integrated conceptions of the state (Stewart, cited Rhodes, 1998: 
18) Rhodes offered an alternative view in which elected members and state officials 
worked within networks, alongside - non local sources of policy change'. This messy. 
complex and differentiated milieu had no single organisational domination (Rhodes, 
1988: 3). 
The shift to a post bureaucratic state (John, 2001: 42), or post modem bureaucracy 
(Bogason, 2000: 8), in which mutuality, trust and negotiation over complex problems 
has given rise to multi-agency, multi -perspectives, multi-cultures and multi 
professionals (Taket and White, 2000: 4), exemplifying by elite decision making 
prevalent in the NE, and throws up new questions of how these individuals legitimate 
their activities. By appealing to a shared sense of history and by manipulating 
symbols and rhetoric elites are able to persuade civic society and justify activities, to 
regenerate locales as the next investigation reveals. 
Regenerating local and regional areas 
Regeneration in all areas has taken on new forms as regions, cities and local areas 
face continuing problems". Elites are now faced with integrating European, national 
and regional policies, priorities and resources, as well as managing the conflictual 
power relationships within multi-agency partnerships (Liddle and Apostolakis, 200: 
1). Southern (2001: 2) points out, the term 'regeneration' means many things to many 
people', but DETR proclaimed the primary objective since the mid 1990s has been to 
enhance economic development and social cohesion through effective regional actors 
12 Hie Local Government Act 2000 placed a dl. ltý' on LG to promote regeneration and 
overall social. economic and environmental N\ell-bein,, 
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and local regeneration programmes (DETR, 1998). Indeed elites in the NE have 
always placed social and economic cohesion at the centre of strategic aims; many 
activities to achieve these pre-date current legislation. 
NE elites have long struggled to struggled to reconcile social and economic concerns, 
and the UK govenu-nent, like its European counterparts, has long wrestled with Nvhere 
to target policies, how to achieve a balance between economic, social and 
environmental concerns, the efficacy of central or local action, and the appropriate 
mix of market, public or community intervention. No one has yet decided whether 
social or economic needs should drive policies, priorities and resources in providing 
integrated approaches to multi-faceted problems (Parkinson, 1996: 7-20). These 
perennial and unanswered questions in regeneration policy remain at national state 
level leaving regional decision makers to choose and implement appropriate 
strategies. 
Regeneration has few mandatory guidelines, which leaves elites some scope for 
innovation, creativity and entrepreneurialism, although this does present problems of 
where responsibilities and accountabilities lie. In the Blair Modernising Agenda 
regeneration is an attempt to break with the old style urban managerialism and 
resource allocation processes, but is not clear whether or not this new managerialist 
approach is capable of bringing about the necessary change process. Jessop argues 
that, 'All mechanisms for governing are prone to failure, because there are limitations 
to effective interventions in the market. Secondly partnerships operate on a scale and 
over time periods where objectives may be difficult to achieve and the difficulties in 
developing effective inter-personal , inter-organisational and inter-systemic co- 
ordination are considerable. Failure is non-nal rather than abnormal and requires 
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constant review of co-ordinating mechanisms, and greater legitimacy by participator)- 
politics to involve a wider group of stakeholders (Jessop, cited Stoker, 2000: 30). 
Without the vital and corresponding co-ordinating mechanisms, mandatory fusion of 
institutions, policies and budgets, or participatory politics Jessop (2000) suggest that 
elites will continue in their own particular way, but considerable difficulties lie in 
distinguishing the boundaries between the urban and regional, so xve turn to other 
bodies of literature for clarification. 
Defining the urban and regional 
Regions and sub-regions are difficult to define mainly because geographers, political 
scientists and management theorists have no agreed approach but also because a 
multiplicity of competing and complementary styles have arisen from co-existing 
epistemological, theoretical and methodological approaches (Hudson, 2000: 2). A 
trajectory of change began with the locational theories of the 1960s, then behavioural 
geographies of uneven capitalist development in the 1970s, and more recently 
evolutionary or institutional frameworks with learning, innovation and knowledge at 
heart. The latter are recent attempts at cope with theoretical weaknesses-, resolve elite 
hegemony versus pluralist dualism dilemmas, or the dichotomous economic 
determinism versus local and social constructionism. 
Limitations abound in trying to establish 'one' way of describing regions, as all 
ocooraphies have to be historical geographies because the same problems of 
deprivation and decline recur over protracted periods. The proliferation of tlicories 
seekino to shed light on processes of urban and regional regeneration range 1'rom 
broad, theoretical stances to particularistic studies fOCLIsed upon specific cities or 
regions. Studies have drawn in particular on notions of -collaboration', 'partnership'. 
network' and 'policy community", with much confusion and researchers became 
embroiled in definitional squabbling over levels of analysis, how to carve up political 
and administrative processes, and a confusion between structures and cause and effect 
(Mills and Saward, 1994: 271-292). 
The concept of 'region' requires clarification. Although the *region' was, up until at 
least the mid-nineteenth century the natural unit of economic activity and analýýsis 
(Sabel, 1988, cited Amin, 1994: 101-156) and it is now accepted that regions are 
'subjective', defined by selected criteria and used for a particular purpose. Selfs 
definition (1964: 55-70) of a region as 'some area intermediate between national and 
local government which is a focus for shared demands, common needs, or important 
issues of decision making' is a useful starting point. For Saunders (1983: 1-18) the 
regional state is dominated by corporate interests with decision-making apparently 
non-contentious and apolitical and with little opportunity for producers or consumers 
to have their views articulated, whereas Dunleavy suggests the importance of both 
local state officials and internal politics (cited Stoker, 1985: 21-22). For Keating 
(1985) a region is a political and functional space where different interventions occur, 
due to the weakness of political and institutional articulation. Regions are also 
characterised by a myriad of inten-nediate political and administrative systems with 
different purposes, roles and responsibilities (Keating and Rhodes, 1979) where fuzzy 
boundaries provide the opportunity for public/private actors to define their own 
(Mather, 1994). A region has no intelligible meaning if insufficient attention is paid to 
the way social organisation, customs. and institutions are distributed in space (Wirth 
cited Cousins et al, 1974: 136) 
A region is also a historical construct (Hudson, 2000: 55 and 'lived throuOh' as a 
social construct. which is created. reproduced and then finally disappears, it is 
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therefore time-space phenomena (Taylor, 1991a: 146-161). A composite definition 
developed for this research is as follows: 
ta political and social space, some intermediate area between national 
and local government, which can either be afocus of shared demands and 
common needs or a battleground over which competing demands are 
articulated It is not a chaotic set of groups cutting across structures and 
causal linkages, but a space occupied by decision-makers. It is the space 
in which elite decision makers assert regional distinctiveness, redefine 
their own democratic and non- democratic roles and interpret and adapt 
nationally determined policies. Common purpose has been achieved as a 
result of shared perceptions on historical, political and social legacies of 
decline'. 
Important aspects of how regions are governed are the interferences, interplays and 
interventions between pluralistic societal forces (Kooiman, 1999), or the decision 
making systems in which territorial and functional differentiation disaggregate 
effective problem solving into a collection of sub systems of actors with specialised 
tasks and limited competences and resources with independent participants working 
together and possessing bits of information representing different interests through 
separate, often conflicting course of action (Hanf and O'Toole, 1992: 163-180). 
Governance then does not emanate from a hierarchical norm or rule setting process 
but from voluntary agreements to play by a set of rules, which are binding in the sense 
that they create convergent expectations and govern behaviour (Rittberger, 1993) 
Governance, according to Marsh and Rhodes (1992) involves a powerful state with 
certain autonomy, but in pursuing its own interests it must engage with policy 
communities. The complexities of policy making create fragmeptation in policy 
doinains and blurred bounclarics. so states need to recognise the legitimacy of the 
interest groups, by granting various fon-ns of institutional access and exchange of 
information. llowcver, this perspective is flawed because net\vorks consist of a 
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number of distinguishable organisations that have a significant amount of interaction 
with each other (Benson, 1975: 229-249), and such an institutional view falls to 
capture informal inter-actions in extra- institutional spheres of regeneration. An inter- 
organisational network can be seen as a political economy where money and authority 
are distributed, it is not entirely autonomous and resistant to central authority, because 
historically, regional elites have never been in a position to act completely 
autonomously because of overarching central government constraints (Lee. 2000: 96- 
110). Elites can only negotiate and control arenas where they can exert power. 
Meso level analyses such as Regulation Theory, Urban Regime Theories and Growth 
Coalitions (Lauria, 1997), are useful, though still problematic for describing how elite 
networks are constructed in certain circumstances, but illuminate the need for diverse 
conceptual tools and frameworks for use in multitudes of circumstances (Bassett, 
1996, cited Jonas and Wilson, 1999: 127). Empirical data examined in future chapters 
provides evidence of the concrete social practices at specific times and in specific 
places that researchers have been called upon to provide (Lauria, 1997). Researchers 
seeking to bridge the structural (macro) and individual (micro) levels of analyses have 
found Regulation Theory an attractive, if abstract way of examining local state and 
political processes, within a mode of regulation and regime of accumulation (Painter 
and Goodwin 1995: 334-357). Not a fully-fledged theory of the state, nevertheless it 
shows that capitalist economic growth is dependent on wider social, cultural and 
political processes. It broadens capitalism out beyond economic forces and isolates 
the institutional forms, procedures and habits which coerce or persuade private agents 
to conform to its schemas (of reproduction); those that help to shape regimes of 
accumulation. These forces are dynamic, changeable over time and space, confined to 
a scries of national regulatory spaces. 
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Regulation Theory is too static to capture the historical dynamics of changing social 
formations,, nor does it adequately capture the important external changes in central 
government policy or capitalist investment flows (Lauria, 1997). Emerging as it did 
out of structural Marxian accounts,, it was a response to weaknesses of Fordist modes 
of accumulation identified in earlier categories of regime theory (Elkin, 1985: 1-27, 
Fanstein, 1995: 34-43) and is now firmly located in literature dealing with uneven and 
spatially differentiated post-Fordist accumulation regimes. Urban Regime Theories' 3, 
on the other hand offer useful typologies to show how local actors form regimes, they 
ailow an examination of governance capacities in the gap between markets and state, 
though are still relatively weak on explaining historical and external forces. In Atlanta 
Stone found regimes acting as coordinating devices within a complex system of urban 
politics involving city authorities, and coalitions of electoral and monied interests 14 
Regime theories became descriptive rather than explanatory, and failed to explain 
why one type of politics exists in one community and not in another. For Dowding 
(1996: 85) you cannot measure levels of power by concentrating on issues and how 
resources are deployed, it is vital to look at the context too. The real question is not 
how many competing groups there are, more about how policy was articulated in the 
interests of the elite grouping. 
Recent work attempted to bring together agency, structure and institutions to explain 
urban and regional learning (Amin, 1999: 365-378), while other stress the importance 
of social and civic capital (Gertler, cited Block, 1990: 50, Kanter, 1995: 152, 
Saxenian, 1994 cited Block,, 1990: 25). There is a growing recognition that as regions 
13 Urban Regime Theories are examined in depth in Chapter four. 
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compete with each other that the 'softer' non-market forms of interaction based on 
trust and co-operation, local institutional structures, networks of civic engagement, 
social glue, local cultures are equally as important as the *harder' aspects such as the 
type of industrial activity, the availability of roads, utilities or communications (Lee 
and Willis, 1997) 
The problem with fractured local political systems, within overlapping, complex and 
conflicting and contradictory policy arenas is the difficulty in placing them in a 
convenient ' regime box ' as Bassett's Bristol study revealed, instead he used a meso 
level policy network framework (Bassett, 1996: 540). Policy networks have been 
criticised by John and Cole (1996) for failing to recognise emergent interest groups or 
long-term dynamics of network exchange. The approach is further criticised as 
metaphoric, highly descriptive and lacking a theoretical basis. It also neglects policy 
outcomes and evaluation, and pays scant attention to power relationships (Klijn and 
Kopperijam, 1999). 
Growth coalition theorists (Harding, 1991: 295-317, and Molotch 1976: 309-332) 
attempted to move beyond structuralist explanations of power and capital towards a 
focus on the nature and extent of business attachments to locales and others (Cox & 
Mair, 1989: 137-146) argue that 'local dependency' and 'locality' theories can further 
explain the external, macro forces that shape the meso and micro level changes. 
The interest in urban regime theory was a move away from the community power 
politics models concemed withwho has power'or'who govems'The agency models, 
elite theories and growth machine analyses of Logan and Molotch (1987) underplayed 
He identified four types, (i) Afainfenance, to preserve status quo, (Ii) Development, to 
seek gro\\th and halt economic decline, (iii) Middle Class Progressil, e, to manage 
oro\\th and protect the environment and, (iv) Lower class mobilisation, to match 
resources to supporters needs (Stone, 1989: 3). 
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national and local interactions, whereas structuralist accounts of the political economy 
(Lukes, 1974a) underplayed community power. and how underlying power bases 
within society affected local decision making. 
Growth machine theories saw local property developers advantaged at the expense of 
local citizens. Growth was rarely contested and the conflict arose only over where to 
place development, rather whether it should be allowed at all (Dowding, 1996: 79). 
By promoting landed interests, capitalists and other business interests growth machine 
theorists neglected social power. 
Urban growth coalitions and local boosterism accounts usually have an agenc. v 
perspective with human activism at heart. Logan and Molotch's (1987) showed how 
human activism was a force in cities, but became the venue for property and asset 
acquisition. Logan and Molotch's work failed to articulate the mechanics of place 
bound interests, or who controlled state or corporate agendas. Wood contends that in 
the UK rentiers or localised capital had little influence in growth coalitions, because 
activity took place beyond the state apparatus, unlike the situation in the US. He 
preferred to use the term local dependence (Wood, cited Jonas and Wilson, 1999: 
163). 
Cox took the growth machine concept further by theorising on local community 
ideologies but it was still too US centric, and too localist in interpretation (Cox and 
Mair, 1991: 269). By failing to account for non-locally based relationships and taking 
the power of local elites for granted, the broader framework is ignored (Cochrane, 
cited Jonas and Wilson, 1999: 109). Added to this, the findings in the NE support the 
idea that social relations stretch across space. time and regeneration initiative. 
Writers in the 1990s began to focus on the region as the new locus of decision-makin 9 
(Morgan, 1996: 4223, Amin, 1994a: 1). associationalist principles replaced the 
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traditional market/state dichotomy, by concentrating on co-operation, trust and 
institutional thickness to reproduce social relations; all were critical elements of NE 
regime activity. Amin and Thrift (1994) argued that institutional thickness, with 
formal and informal collaborative arrangements, left the gaps to be filled by 
associationalist alliances and networks as stronger bases for learning, innovation, and 
economic development, and NE regime activities are directed towards learning and 
continuous improvement. Elites have a determination to create formal and informal 
linkages based on collaboration, consensus and associational principles. 
Clustering and innovation have moved beyond the firm or the inter-firm relationships 
and into the environment, and much emphasis is now placed on the embeddedness of 
social networks and interactions, between firms and around firms (Lundvall, cited 
Dosi et al, 1988: 25. Storper (1995: 191-221). The concept of ' untraded inter 
dependencies'captures relationships other than those in a market relationship between 
firms, shows that trusting relationships lubricate processes, and create shared 
conventions, norms and values. Furthermore Herrschel and Newman (2000: 1185- 
1202) examined the interactions of constitutional structures, formal regions and 
informal institutions in West Germany and England, and found that English regions 
displayed widely differing arrangements at governance levels, typified in the NE, 
where an absence of a constitutional settlement sustains elite occupancy in extra- 
institutional political and administrative spaces. 
Many of the aforementioned writers, bracketed under the term 'New Regionalism' 
have been challenged because theories are regarded as a an incoherent, descriptive set 
of ideas with little substance (Lovering, 1999: 379-395), and it is argued that by 
normalising regional decline elites have been able to legitimise a flawed system. More 
especially, decline is exacerbated by dwindling central state funding, a belief in 
43 
competition, and inappropriate local and regional industrial strategies to combat 
macro exchange rates cause, rather than by attacking the root causes (Hudson, 2000). 
It is suggested that even the apparently economically successful regions, haý, e 
experienced problems created by conditions outside of their control (Hudson et al. 
1997: 365-373). Given different histories and prevailing economic and political 
conditions, the adoption of recipe books or mechanistic approaches to regional 
development is unwise (Hudson, 1999: 59-72). Each region is unique, and the 
capacity to regenerate is governed by its past history, and political, economic and 
global factors over which elites or other actors have little control. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has conceptualised elites, globalisation and some of the theoretical and 
definition aspects of regions, to set the context within which regeneration takes place, 
and within which a regime has evolved over the past hundred years. 
It is argued that, despite global, European and national changes to economies and 
public services in the NE an enduring regime of actors has evolved, adapted, shaped 
and re-engineered policies towards local and regional needs. A cohesive regime of 
elites, much broader and quite different to those identified by earlier writers, has 
coalesced around the identification of specific projects. The regime aimed for 
adaptive efficiency rather than allocative efficiency, and social rather than purely 
economic aims. 
The problem with existing theories is that they neglect history, external forces and the 
interactions between elites. We can turn to urban regime theories but they are still 
\\eak on explainino the types or politics or the ways in which elites engage or 
circulate. They do raise questions on the rise in managerialism within public and 
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private agencies, and gaps in coverage but fail to fundamentally examine the 
relationship that business has with state forms. Some recent writers on associationalist 
alliances have recognised the importance of regions as a locus for decision-making 
and included mobilisation of resources to fill gaps in coverage but there is still little 
concrete empirical data to operationalise many abstract theories. Elite interactions. 
social milieu, political and economic context all affect the power relationships, which 
then govern shared values conventions and norm of behaviour. Whereas some recent 
researchers have criticised the obsession that some elites have in accepting regional 
decline as a given, the following chapters provide concrete evidence of a NE regime, 
with subtle interactions that continues to articulate a regional voice and demand 
attention. 
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Chapter Two 
Methodological Approach 
Introduction 
Most analyses of decision making are based on an assumption that the gap between 
policy intentions and agency outcomes can be narrowed down to positivist, objective 
approaches, when in fact there is a social and human dimension that needs to be 
interpreted. There is no single correct solution to policy problems or perceptions on 
what the problems are. An interpretive approach shifts the focus from discovering a 
set of objective facts to one where actors create, interpret and share meanings. Given 
the variety of human beings, there are multiple meanings and interpretations. Too 
much policy analysis is shaped by assumptions that human actions are literal, rational 
and instrumental. 
There are many existing studies of public leadership in the US, but relatively few in 
the UK; longitudinal analyses of who was involved, how issues were formulated, who 
defined them, and so forth (Bell et al, 1961: 37). The three different cases presented 
here have been used to deal with some of the flaws in existing work. By analysing 
relationships between a group of elites from multiple agencies, at a time of 
devolutionary history, the aim was to confirm that local and regional change couldn't 
be isolated from national and global forces. NE history evokes images of dependency. 
despair and irreversible decline, but the findings show a situation more complex than 
traditional histories suggest and illustrate that, even in the face of a multitude of 
forces, elites remain optimistic that things will improve. 
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The research is reputational, to identify elites who possessed, or could realise, power 
or influence. It is also positional, in ascertaining those people in individual, civic or 
organisational positions who made decisions on behalf of the wider community. 
Thirdly a detailed analysis of the issues surrounding three separate projects (Siemens, 
Visual Arts, and St Peters) gave a richer picture of the inter-relationships. The cases 
were chosen to obtain specific data on regime operation, purpose, aims, interactions 
and power relationships, as well how effective they were. The research, therefore, is 
concerned with causal social interactions and events in the course of the daily lives of 
a regime of elites. The way in which elites informally communicate and their 
attendance at both formal and informal gatherings is a key aspect of the research. 
Using a reputational analysis was considered the most appropriate way of identifying 
elites who were central to regeneration, those who regularly shape agendas and 
develop strategies in response to global and national shifts. These activities are carried 
out by business, public agencies, quangos, and loose networks of broader interests and 
the research aim was to gain a strategic understanding of ways that individuals and 
agencies became involved in, and understood, regeneration. The sample was chosen 
to reflect the elite leadership in each sector and drawn from individuals in a cross 
section of regional agencies. Stoker and Mossberger's composite Urban Regime 
Theory (1994: 195-212) and Bennett and Kreb's cross national study (1994: 119-140) 
of thirty-three localities proved useful in structuring the research. 
The research method also mirrored Lee's (1963) survey of County governance in 
Cheshire from 1888, and Birch's (1959) study of political life and governance in 
Glossop. Both attached importance to social, economic and political changes in 
specified territorial units of British political and social life. The work was also 
inforined by Chapman's (1968) study of the decision in 1957 to raise the UK bank 
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rate. which is one of the most influential and comprehensive accounts of managerial, 
political, administrative and social processes surrounding decision-making. 
Adopting an inductive, anthropological approach, the data was mainly qualitative and 
based on the view that a social scientist does not just gather facts and measure hoNN- 
often pattems occur, or search for external causes and fundamental laws to explain 
behaviour, but appreciates different constructions and meanings that people place 
upon experience (Easterby-Smith et al, 1991). Qualitative approaches study 
phenomena using general descriptions to describe or explain, and researchers use 
narrative descriptions of persons, events or relationships Mark (1992). In this way 
findings are presented in the form of categories or general statements about the 
complex nature of persons, groups or events. In this context the researcher contributes 
to the very construction of social objects and social worlds (Gouldner, 1975). 
A qualitative approach was deemed suitable because it allowed the researcher to act 
as the primary instrument for data collection and analysis. The research design chosen 
was compatible with the nature of the quality of the data to be collected. Bryman 
(1988) suggests that the most fundamental characteristic of qualitative research is its 
express commitment to viewing events, actions, norms and values from the 
perspective of the people being studied. Miles and Hubennan (1984) believe that 
qualitative data are well-grounded, rich descriptions and explanations of processes in 
identifiable local contexts. They help the researcher to get beyond initial conceptions 
and to generate or revise conceptual frameworks. 
Few researchers enter the field of study in an atheoretical state, -ývith a set of formally 
constructed hypotheses. as the), become part of the research process within aný- 
particular social. economic and political circumstance and there are many conflicting 
vie\\ s on how the research act is conducted. with a Cartesian emphasis on knowledge 
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as independent from the conditions of its production. Knowledge is regarded as a 
separate, objective entity devoid of the social relation and social processes. However. 
others regard the researcher as creating concepts, composing and fashioning ways of 
looking at, thinking about and talking about the captured by the interactionist 
approach but it remains rooted at the micro level. Interpretation of the facts is not 
achieved by a mere accumulation of data but by an active and involved understanding 
and representation of the social world (Schutz, 1963). This research therefore needed 
to be grounded in an overall social and historical perspective. 
The final outcome has been a reconstruction of the social world inhabited by the 
elites. The difficulties within any social or political milieu of delineating the agent (or 
subject) from the objective, measurable structures within which he/she operates and 
the linkages between structure and agency have been recurring difficulties for social 
scientists. There is the added difficulty in ascertaining how much action is determined 
by social structure and how much voluntarism each actor has within that system. 
Because, in Marxian tenns, subjects actively construct their daily lives and reproduce 
their social relations, they are always shaped by overriding social forces of which 
there is little control. 
Adoption of methods and rationale for choice 
The decision to research across a range of agencies and individuals was taken in order 
to supplement existing factual data with perceptions, meanings and attitudes. 
Triangulating interviews. questionnaires, case studies and non-verbal observations 
supplemented documentary data. The research process is not a clear sequence of 
procedures following a neat pattern but a messy interaction between the conceptual 
and emphical world. deduction and induction occurring at the same time (Bechhofer 
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and Paterson, 2000), and this messiness can be understood more fully by intensive 
field work, by means of interviews and case studies. Using a mix of open ended and 
closed questions allowed more spontaneity in thought processes and sequencing and 
wording were changed to suit particular respondents. The rigidity of a structured 
schedule of interviews, and lack of prior knowledge, would have hampered data 
collection and led to a failure in discerning important variables. 
Rigour was achieved by using theory to drive the research, by choosing as 
representative a sample as possible and by gathering data in widely varying situations 
among dissimilar persons from dissimilar organisations at different points in time. 
Interviews and case studies enabled the researcher to speak with the most appropriate 
people who could furnish the most logical sources of information. Interviews and case 
studies can make statements about aggregates of individuals clustered in social units, 
but may not necessarily provide clues to interactions (Denzin, 1970). A totally 
structured approach would have rendered the researcher ill equipped to capture 
meaningful interactions and causal inter-relationships. Interviews give the opportunity 
to probe deeply, uncover new clues and dimensions on a problem and secure accurate, 
vivid and inclusive accounts based on personal experience (Burgess, 1994). Reason 
and Rowan (1988) advocate critical subjectivity, recognising own views and 
experiences but not to be overwhelmed by them and Becker (1967) contends that 
research ideas evolve in an incremental way, hence there has to be a continual process 
of negotiation. 
A mass of original data may provide the essential raw material for subsequent 
analysis but too much detail can be a nuisance. It is necessary, therefore, to bring 
some order to the data by classifying, grouping, summarising and presenting the more ý 1. ) c 
systematically organised data. With this in mind, the risk involved in adopting a 
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qualitative approach was well known. Such a mess of data can o-, -erN\helm a 
researcher and analysis can prove difficult. Despite these concerns the researcher 
wanted to adopt these methods rather than use tried and tested quantitati-ve methods. 
The intention was to develop a framework where concepts could be examined and 
tested out in the real world, then interpreted and given meaning through joint 
negotiation. 
For the past fifteen years the researcher has worked in the Neo Taylorist world of 
business and management where the disciplines of mathematics, economics, 
accountancy and engineering have crowded out politics, and in which quantification 
was deemed more valuable. Organisational and social life is much more about the 
subtleties, and where individuals informally negotiate and bargain. As a consequence 
it was thought that extra-institutional dimensions of regeneration could only be 
understood by adopting flexible and qualitative methods. Grint (1997: 2) referred to 
the binary logic found in Business Schools where everything is black or white, and 
complications, uncertainty and fuzziness negated. It is this author's contention that 
any understanding of the world must neither simplify reality nor impose certainty, 
rather it must focus on ideas, and the interpretation of those ideas. 
The research was not intended as an institutional 'counting of heads', determining 
who sat on various boards (previous researchers have done this very well) and the 
sample reflects this. Using individuals in personal, organisational, civic representative 
roles appeared to offer an effective way of analysing and explaining some of the 
complexities of both fon-nal and informal inter-actions, and extra- institutional 
conncctions. Initially a snowballing method was used to establish a list of 
stakeholders. 
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The research had four macro stages: literature from branches of political and 
management sciences, geography and Urban Regimes helped to define a frameý, vork, 
was supplemented with broader literature from economic history, systems theory and 
official sources. The analytical framework allowed interviews to be used for 
conceptual elucidation as well as highlighting questions to be tested out in more 
detailed case studies. By relating empirical data to a theoretical construction 
inferences were drawn from data. At the micro methodological level six key concepts 
were isolated (globalisation, elites, the NE, region, regeneration and regime) to shape 
the analytical framework, as well as collecting data of a more general kind on how 
global and national policies affected interactions and linkages. Subordinate data 
obtained in interview helped criteria development to select relevant cases. 
It was accepted that case studies are one of the weakest forms of research method 
because of difficulties in demonstrating typicality, generalisability, replication, 
selectivity and comparability. The method can be time consuming, difficult to 
organise and difficult to quantify with variable data but the researcher's long 
experience as a commercial and academic field researcher was used to overcome such 
problems. 
Questionnaire design 
See Appendix 2.0 (copy of questionnaires). 
The research questions arose from literature (analytical and empirical) and the 
researcher's own perceptions, intuitions, feelings and observations. It allo\, N, ed 
ordinary perceptions to be clarified, challenoed. or redefined and the deeper meaning's 
and critical factors explored. Spontaneous and rich data of a hard. factual and 
perceptive nature was gathered in response to a mixture of closed and open-ended 
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questions. Having a mix of broad and specifically focused questions allowed flexible 
patterns to emerge and certain lines of enquiry to be discarded or followed up. 
Having prior knowledge of the subject matter was not a disadvantage. rather it was 
advantageous. Credibility, access and political control of interviews were maintained 
by a continual re-negotiation and redefinition in meanings. Objective measurements 
of regeneration do not allow an analysis of the shared meanings, perceptions, and 
values that are essential. Problems such as bias, generalisability. representativeness of 
sample were at the forefront of the researcher's mind but the key to good research is 
not distancing yourself too far from the subject. Questionnaire design was important, 
as it was vital to isolate the key variables and look for correlations, causal links and 
patterns. 
Interview questions were based around Stoker & Mossberger's (1994: 195-212) and 
Bennett and Kreb's (1994: 119-140) typologies (on URT and broad patterns of local 
leadership) but supplemented with many others developed from empirical and 
analytical literature. The research was purposive, rigorously designed and 
systematically conducted. Although the chosen methods can be problematic, as they 
may not share the precision inherent in experimental methods, it was possible to 
triangulate methods to achieve as rigorous and systematic a process as possible, given 
the subject matter. The researcher was aware at all times that the question of internal 
and external validity, isolation of key variables, and how to treat and record the causal 
relationships would present problems, but theory driven and representatively sampled 
methods minimised some of them. 
50 respondents Nvere intervieNved formally (with a lengthy and structured 
questionnaire) and 23 N\crc interviewed informally (the questionnaire was used more 
liberally when the individuals in question were able to provide richer data beyond the 
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formally, structured questions) across the region, and as individuals or representatIN es 
of their agencies or civic society. Formal interviews were considered to be the most 
appropriate for individuals who were representing their agency at a very senior level 
and who were more constrained by time, and informal interviews/semi structured 
questionnaires adapted from the main schedule were administered with people NN-ho 
were relatively well known to the researcher, and whose views on certain topics under 
enquiry are well recorded in other forms. This approach was adopted for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, the researcher did not want to go over old ground when rehearsed 
responses could be guaranteed (more or less). Time could be better spent in getting 
respondents to identify the key elements of regeneration, their perceptions, elite 
activities and power inter-actions at different levels of governance and across 
territories and projects. It would have been a waste valuable time to hear the usual 
regional hype of either those who 'sing from the same hymn sheet', or the non- 
believers, resistant to a 'managerialist' agenda. If, as the researcher believed, the 
regime was a mixture of formally constituted elements and informally brokered ad- 
hoc arrangements, underpinned by non democratic and democratic elements, then the 
overall objective was to move regional hype, the doom and gloom merchants or 
cmono-causal structuralist' arguments and gain clarity. Sceptical voices allowed a 
more realistic picture to emerge. 
Case studies: Siemens, Visual Arts UK 1996, St Peter's Development 
The case studies were chosen for their diversity, and to test out hypotheses emerging 
from the earlier interviews. Using three diverse cases within regeneration was 
beneficial for testing, out how the same actors became involved in local, sub-regional I- 
Oonal projects at different points in the rcý glonal history. The objective was to and rcol tý 
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provide evidence of linkages and power relationships. By collecting detailed 
chronological data on critical incidences, a comprehensive picture emerged on the 
formal and informal socio- political, administrative and managerial processes between 
elites and agencies. 
After carrying out the survey of key stakeholder elites and agencies, important 
connections and linkages between them were drawn. In the third stage, a methodology 
to discern how elites operated in specific cases was developed. Secondary data was 
used to understand the roles, purpose and functioning of each agent and agency. 
Siemens was a traditional FDI regeneration case but the others were quite different; 
Visual Arts was a regional initiative with a sub-regional dimension, whereas St 
Peter's was sub-regional with a regional dimension. 
Each case provided evidence of both conflict and consensus, but also allowed an 
examination of the extra- institutional aspects of regeneration, in which the democratic 
and non-democratic connections became evident. The formal institutional linkages 
and the informal connections between individuals were drawn. It was important to use 
cases that were not necessarily Tyneside-centric, and by incorporating other locales it 
was possible analytically to draw boundaries around 'the region', in other words find 
out what respondents considered to be the region, by allowing them to tell their own 
regional story. 
Visual Arts and St Peter's were regarded as strategically importance examples of 
boosterism and entrepreneurialism, so the aim was to ascertain whether either of the 
chosen cases showed multi-agency consensus or conflict, how social and economic 
objectives were reconciled, and whether and how resources and capabilities were 
pooled. Each case Nvas chosen to demonstrate connections and learning across time. 
space and project and initiative. They Nvere indicative and distinctive facets of NT 
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regeneration, to illustrate how regimes are formed and operate between varied levels 
of govemance. 
Other cases could have been chosen, such as formal, institutional regimes, NDC 
(before 1999), or ONE (after April 1999), or those which were a mix of formal, 
informal and civic connections such as NECC, CNEA, NBF, NE Assembly, but all 
were discounted because their primary concern was not regeneration. Sub-regional 
partnerships such as East Durham Economic Development Partnership or South 
Tyneside EDP, both hailed by regional actors respondents as successes were also 
discounted because none appeared to have the vital mixture of conflict and consensus. 
Initial exploratory pilots were used to synthesise empirical data with theoretical 
models to critique existing knowledge and identify gaps in literature. Although 
existing typologies are powerful, descriptive and explanatory tools, the aim was to 
develop a novel framework. It was accepted that the chosen approach might not be as 
precise as experimental and laboratory methods, but factual and attitudinal perceptive 
data gave a rich data set. The importance at all times of maintaining internal and 
external validity, isolating key variables, and recording causal relationships was vital 
and by developing systematic, theory driven and representatively sampled methods 
some of the problems were overcome. 
Interviews were used to provide data on commonly agreed understandings, opinions. 
attitudes, and feelings. By using a mix of open ended and closed questions, probing 
helped to establish nuances, connections, and inter actions between them. Initial 
interviews explored the distinctive features of the regime, and showed how situations, 
events and beliefs might impact on individuals or sub-cultures. Rather than seeing 
reoinie activities as characterised by chaotic groupings, the research was designed to 
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test out how it flourished as a sub culture in which individuals shared common 
understandings. 
Interviewer bias, though important, was less important than creating a mutually 
trusting environiment in which respondents were able to answer questions as honestly 
as possible and for systematic recording of verbal and non-verbal responses. 
In the initial stage of interviews, some lasting up to three hours, respondents were 
asked to identify the most powerful and influential people. The questionnaire was 
semi-structured with closed questions aimed at gathering descriptive data and more 
probing, unstructured questions to obtain subjective and perceptive data. Probing 
allowed the questions to deviate from the set questions, as and when necessary. 
General themes and topics were covered, but there was no attempt to impose a 
structure, in the hope that spontaneous responses would ensure valid and reliable data. 
None of the interviews took place in natural environments as most were held in 
sumptuous hotels, theatres, large offices, or council chambers. This meant that the 
researcher could abandon the detached observer status of natural scientists. Initial 
general stakeholder mapping allowed data gathering from as wide a range of people 
as possible, given the time factor and financial constraints of interviewing such a large 
number of people. Verification of interview data (with respect for anonymity) was 
achieved by cross checking information by other means. As an example, when a 
certain person was identified as a key player other sources of information and contacts 
across the region were used to refute/support these claims. 
It could legitimately be asked whether respondents were telling the truth, but we can 
never knoxv this with certainty. Validity is always questionable and all that can be 
hoped is that respondents are sufficiently interested in the topic to engage with 
integrity. If the interviewer maintains professionalism, is knowledgeable and has done 
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the preparatory work, the correct probes can reveal good quality data. Questions must 
always be related clearly to the overall hypothesis otherwise validity may be 
questionable if memories of events are hazy, or if respondents (as in this research) all 
supported a regional success story. The former was overcome by asking a mix of 
simple and complex questions twice and in different forms, cross referencing 
responses with other sources, and choosing a selection of respondents with contrary 
views. 
Conceptually the literature on regions and regeneration is diverse and contradictory, 
whereas literature on the NE's political geography is abundant. By synthesising 
literature on economic history, public policy and administration with systems theories, 
a more effective framework for analysis was created. Literature was used to isolate 
critical elements for empirically testing through case studies. The research had two 
main foci, firstly conceptual development and secondly empirical establishment of an 
elite regime. 
Systems theories offered a more rigorous and formalised method to examine the 
innumerable and multi-faceted aspects of regeneration with the mess of interacting 
organisational, technical, social, political, and environmental frameworks within 
which the role of institutions and the motivations of individuals interact. Systems 
metaphors have been so generalised as to be almost meaningless but they do offer 
useful insights, and they allowed the region to be conceptualised as a bounded entity, 
with richly interactive elements, separated from its external environment. Vertically, 
governmentally and politically, a region sits between the international, national. and 
local tiers of govemance. however horizontal analysis is muddled and obtuse with 
politic s/governance seen as spheres of influence rather than vertical tiers. 
A 
Lesson drawing in public policy gave useful pointers to developing a conceptual 
framework because of the emphasis on thinking across time, space and regeneration 
initiative. RosCs (1993) four-stage model for policy learning was usefully adapted, 
and included (i) policyrnakers search for successful programmes in another time and 
space, (ii) abstract a cause and effect model on what has been obsenýed. (iii) create a 
programme based on what has been learnt, and (iv) evaluate and estimate the 
consequences of adapting those lessons. This staged model of policy learning 
infon-ned the case studies as each provided a chronological examination of critical 
incidences. System Theories and policy learning models helped to develop a macro 
level conceptual framework to aid meso and micro understanding. 
Mapping the elite regime over time proved difficult because existing secondary data 
had been gathered to establish institutional affiliations, rather than social connections. 
Literature on nineteenth century central/local government relations, social and 
economic history, public policy administration, and regional development was useful 
to set the context within which elites interact. In the period's 1920-1970s, what data 
was available was rather limited, whereas literature of the post 1939-1945 War period 
contained a preponderance of views that a corporatist state incorporated other 
interests. This research was undertaken to challenge such received wisdom, and based 
on the opinion that they fail to show the significance of business and other elites as an 
enduring feature of regeneration. Little evidence exists to demonstrate who were the 
main drivers, and this research set out to reveal that incorporatist accounts could be 
simplified versions of a more complex situation. More recent literature has focused 
motivations of regime actors and extra-institutional linkages, but nevertheless past 
researchers did share a view that the state incorporated other interests. This research 
challenges existing N, iexN, s. 
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The growth of empirical work on regimes over the past 30 years began in the US. but 
it is only recently that researchers such as Peck (1995), Bassett (1996), Garmise and 
Rees (1997) have tried to adapt them to the UK situation. The difficulties they 
encountered illustrate how differently state structures, politics, economics, and the 
role of business operate and how problematic it is to attempt to transfer frameworks. 
Given the problems that other writers seem to have experienced by adaptation of US 
models to the UK, it was decided that the composite URT model developed by Stoker 
and Mossberger (1994) and the local leadership typology developed by Bennett and 
Krebs (1994) could act as useful guides. It was decided to augment some of the 
evident gaps in URT with some elements of the management science literature, in 
particular strategy and stakeholder models of power and influence. It was felt that the 
NE region had a sufficiently identifiable boundary to warrant its use in developing a 
composite framework. 
The UK political science tradition has drawn on US, as well as from systems theory, 
town and country planning (Friend et A 1974), geography and public policy (Benson, 
1975), power (Lukes, 1974a), networks (Rhodes and Marsh, 1992), partnerships 
(Lowndes et al, 1997). All have improved our understanding, however, this research 
draws on more recent literature in the field of strategy and stakeholder power, because 
there have been few attempts to bridge the politic s/management dichotomy. The aim 
is for this research to be of value to an academic and policy-making audience. 
Regeneration as a multi level domain is ill defined and problematic in operational 
terms, and as DETR, DFRA, DTI and other public servants seek to introduce new 
administratiVe arrangements, they have few models and frameworks on which to base 
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their decision making, and this adds to ambiguity, mess and confusion. 2ý 
Policyrnakers need to understand the mechanics of regimes activities in practice in a 
multi factor policy area, especially at formation and implementation stages. 
Stakeholder Mapping 
A preliminary stakeholder analysis of the key personnel and agencies (with an 
influence or view on the regeneration) was drawn to identify relevant respondents. 
The sample reflects the importance, or lack of importance, in each sector and is 
stratified to provide a horizontal picture. Strategic understanding of the region and 
perceptions on regeneration, as well as the individuals/ organisations responsible for 
initiatives and projects and how outcomes were achieved. The first six piloted 
interviews helped to refine the questionnaire, identify key personnel within patterns of 
local and regional leadership. Individuals were drawn from the Stakeholder Map, both 
sectorally and cross-regionally. The intention was to build up an image of the region, 
profile actors and agencies and their interlinkages, with the objective of selecting 
further interview respondents and cases. This established the criteria for selecting 
cases. Respondents were chosen on the basis of individual, organisational, civic 
representation and questions were framed around (i) elites, (ii) perceptions on 
regeneration, and (iii) their partnerships/networks and interlinkages and inter-actions. 
The underlying basis was regeneration and the whole sample population consisted of 
an aggregate of all the people who conformed to specifications such as seniority, 1-n 
profile, reputation and centrality in regeneration initiatives or projects Respondents 
not necessarily in senior positions, as Nvell as sceptics, Nvere included in the sample 
22 This \\ as confirmed in conversation \\ ith Dr Bridge, Chair of ONE on 6 th Sept 2000. 
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The lack of a comprehensive sampling frame proved an initial difficulty but this was 
overcome by choosing as representative a sample as possible from specific or related 
agencies. The sample was not a convenience or quota sample but a purposi,,. e sarnple. 
designed to get the best possible data. 
There was no difficulty in identifying well-known agencies and individuals. 
Concentrating solely on interview data would have biased data so it was necessary to 
broaden the sample. Vertically the aim was to draw a stratified sample of 
international, national, regional, sub-regional and local agencies and individuals, xvith 
a presence, influence or views on regeneration. Horizontally, respondents in various 
agencies and networks across Northumberland, Tyneside, Wearside, Teeside and 
Cumbria were included to show the strategic and operational linkages and networks. 
The large sample was used as an attempt to generalise but it is not always necessary to 
do this in all cases as it is more important for the respondent to trust the integrity and 
experience of the researcher and make their own general i sations. By developing a 
systematic and rigorous research design, the aim was to instil confidence in both 
respondents and findings. It was also critical to recognise that historical power 
relations in this field, permeated social relations. Details on respondents were 
obtained from the secondary sources: wide range of literature (theoretical and 
empirical); official documents; national and regional press; company literature; 
telephone research for preliminary material and to establish contacts; network analysis 
of key i nd ivi dual s/agenc ies; compilation of a 'Who's Who' in the NE; preliminary 
N, isits to some of the agencies; involvement in political campaigning; data from an 
extensive network of MBA students at the Business Schools at both Sunderland and 
Durharn Universities. research links Nvith the Universities of Durham, Northumbria, 
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Sheffield Hallam, Aston and Warwick: Regional Strategy documents: and initial 
exploratory interviews. 
Between December 1995 and January 1996 eight pilot interviews lasting up to two 
hours were carried out with business leaders (Durham and Sunderland on Wearside). 
a public sector professional (Tyneside), politicians (local and national), a universitN, 
representative (Teeside), a quango representative (Northumberland). and 
church/voluntary representatives (Newcastle and Sunderland). Case studies xvere 
chosen on the basis of face-to-face inter-views, and after obtaining as much relevant 
information as possible. Snowballing identified other interviewees. 
Negotiating access 
Breaking into the enclosed world of regional regeneration in the NE is a negotiated 
process. The institutionalised and personal linkages that have developed over many 
years mean that it is helpful if the researcher is relatively well versed in the past 
history of the region. Anyone not au fait with existing and past regimes is regarded 
with suspicion, so it is beneficial for any researcher to be embedded in the regional 
story.. This researcher had a lifetime of knowledge about aspects of the regional story, 
but also healthy scepticism. 
Interviews were negotiated with a traditionally parochial and patriarchal group of 
elites, so it was vital to establish credibility. Each initial contact was made by having 
prior information on inteniewees such as their age, role in organisation, biographical 
data, profile in the region. This helped in deflecting any possible rejection at the first 
point of contact by drawing on a bank of small talk, regionallv focussed knoNN'led(-, e or I- 
anything else that could allow access" 
At many points in the initial telephone conversations, interviewees were on the point 
of rejecting an interview until the researcher drew on past acquaintances, past 
experiences and knowledge of regeneration or regional for-ums and events (e, -, 
Riverside Park (Don Robson), Durham Graduate Link (Sir Fred Holliday), DUBS link 
(John Bridge), "my father, the trade unioniSt,, (MilIS)24 .A lot of name-dropping was 
vital! This tactic worked on every occasion and, indeed, interviewees began to ask 
who else of importance was being interviewed. Such is the informal networking in the 
region that on three to four occasions when the researcher rang a prospective 
respondent the response was: 
"Oh, I've been waitingfor you to call. I gather you interviewed so and so 
last week and I knew you would get round to me. " 
In some cases access was negotiated and brokered by elites on behalf of the 
researcher. For example, Gill, Leader of Gateshead MBC, was a very reluctant 
respondent, but Robson, Leader of DCC, was a good friend and he persuaded George 
to agree to an interview. 
The fear that a lot of data would be anecdotal, subjective and politically sensitive was 
bome out in practice, but all interviewees appeared to engage transparently and agree 
to be quoted. No respondent was reluctant to have information disclosed. " Becker 
(1967) discussed whether it is necessary to sit on the fence during field,, vork or in 
writing up. This researcher was acutely aware of the role as inten, iewer, as an 
23 Tile terms 'insider' and 'outsider' regularly cropped up in interviews. 
2.4 Some data was very sensitive but all interviewees N\ ere happy to be quoted. 
25 Maintaining Integrity is essential as it possible tO have over-rapport (Moser, 1958). 
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academic but also as a NE inhabitant, with a strong knowledge base in the field. Many 
of the interviewees were individuals in very senior positions, so it was necessary to 
gain confidence, so that they might reveal nuances about their inter-relationships and 
inter-linkages. 
The issues of class, gender and race, or the need to establish who had reputational and 
situational power, the researcher or the mainly white, middle class males interviewed 
was a consideration too. Some female interviewees were powerful women in their 
own rights, but fewer in number. The paternalistic culture of the region cannot be 
under-emphasised and it was vital throughout the entire interviewing phases for this 
female researcher to maintain credibility. Trust was a key component of the 
relationships built up over the months and years of fieldwork. At the outset of each 
interview, interviewees were told the aims of the research, how the data would be 
used and the areas to be covered in the interview. Confidentiality and anonymity were 
guaranteed unless agreed otherwise. Absolute detachment as an interviewer would not 
have elicited the richness of data and it was a positive benefit (and had novelty value 
for the male interviewees in a macho region) to be a female who possessed a level of 
prior historical and political knowledge of regional affairs. Age, class, culture and 
race can create a barrier or solidarity, but in this research the level and extent of each 
category coincided between interviewer/interviewees. 
Social science research, according to Harvey is complex, messy, various and 
interesting (1994: 139). Women researchers have the opportunity to pursue 
methodologies, which enlighten and emancipate themselves. They should not allo, ýN- 
themselves to be objectified into an instrument of data collection - forced into an 
alienated male form. Oakley (1981) talks of the male mN-th of hygienic. scientific 
inter\ iexvs with the accompanying mystification of the researcher and the researched 
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as objective instruments of data protection. In the writing up phase there is the 
dilemma of 'Whom are we writing forT There is, as Harvey (1994: 146) says, is a 
danger that the researcher can lose control over data and the way it is used. In this 
research the interviewees were trusting the researcher to respect their views. and this 
allowed valuable insights to be gained on personalities and interactions of others 
(Harvey, 1990). 
Conclusion 
No single research method is 100% accurate, and this was recognised at the outset. 
The decision to use case studies and interviews after a thorough literature review and 
extensive use of secondary material allowed triangulation and cross-reference of data 
from many different sources. The objective throughout was to ensure as accurate and 
valid a data set as possible. 
A qualitative method was deemed appropriate because its usefulness is not with how 
many interviewees are interviewed but what is being said and how it is being said. By 
using an array of interpretive techniques, the researcher was in a better position to 
describe, decode, translate and otherwise come to terms with the meanings that elites 
place on interactions within regeneration. 
The methods showed how national strategies were adapted, and more importantly 
understood by elites, because the regional story is grounded in a social, historical and 
external context where ideas are continually constructed and reconstructed. 
The problems associated with these methods such as time, access, confidential ity and 
reliability of resources were all overcome. but this was not without many difficulties. 
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The research design and line of questioning, within dynamic situations. allowed 
discretion and judgements to be made on how the research should be paced. 
Finally, there is never any guarantee that what is said in interview be reliable but 
every researcher has to trust her own instincts, and assume that those being 
interviewed are acting with honesty and integrity. By adopting a professional 
approach throughout, the seriousness of the engagement can be maintained, but 
humour was also essential in this research. No research would be ever worth doing if 
The hard work could not be matched with a lot of fun. In this last respect, the research 
was informative, as well being a lot of fun. 
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Chapter Three 
The North East Region: Regional Policy, Regeneration and Regime 
Formation 
'Central government's appalling lack of knowledge and how to prioritise 
was evident when they hived off our Euro money' (Robson) 
'Local politicians can only have a minimal influence as most decisions 
are still taken by civil servants. '(Bridge) 
'We challenge authority more than ive did before the War, we have the Pit 
manager mentality' (Howard) 
'There are no Ministers interested in the plight of the North'(Gill) 
Introduction 
The main argument of this chapter is that a changeable regime of elites has responded 
to national policy and global changes over a protracted period. In particular they have 
adapted, and implemented policies to a specific NE situation, but none have funda- 
mentally altered the relative economic position of the region. Despite a series of fo- 
cused regional policies, the persistent legacy of regional problem leaves the NE in the 
same deprived position that it has been in for many decades. As a consequence, there 
are orowing demands for regional autonomy, stemming from the frustration that elites 
and others feel at the inability of central government to solve the seemingly intracta- 
ble problems. Elites attempted to 'go it alone' in the quest to transform the image of 
the region, and considerable energies go into looking for innovative projects that can 
improve the quality of life and physical conditions of the local population. By draw- 
in,, in national and local statc actors. elites have sought to legitimise activities. 
68 
The problems for those individuals in the NE faced with -managing ' local and re- 
gional change have been an issue for public debate for many years, and as was shown 
in chapter one, the escalation and rapidity of global restructuring has exacerbated the 
need to act more entrepreneurial ly and in wholly different ways to cope ývith its dam- 
aging and pervasive effects. There is a general acceptance that neither public nor pri- 
vate sector have control over economic decisions affecting communities, or that no 
one agency (such as a local authority) can respond, so partnerships have become the 
holy grail. 
In this chapter each phase of regional policy is shown to create the conditions for the 
formation of a unique type of elite regime, based on enduring relationships, and sus- 
tained by a sense of regional identity and common purpose. The regional story has 
evolved and synthesised over the years despite changes to composition and personnel. 
In this post democratic age, when forms of represented democracy are being chal- 
lenged, the NE regime offers a useful model, capable of dealing with a messy and 
complex policy environment. From the class based regime of aristocrats and commer- 
cial interests in the nineteenth century, through its various manifestations or stages to 
present day multi -representative, post democratic forms, this chameleon group of el- 
ites has attempted to fill the gaps where state intervention failed, by identifying re- 
gional specific projects. 
It concludes with a brief examination on whether or not existing political and admin- 
istrative systems, in particular the more recent 'quick fixes', unaccountable and non 
democratically elected Regional Development Agency, One North East. the four Sub- 
Regional Partnerships and Local Strategic Partnerships will prove to be any more ef- 
ICctlN, e in regenerating the region, than the informal regime of democratic and non- 
deiliocratic, regime of elites that has always plugged the democratic gaps in coverag'e. 
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Firstly a profile and an examination of the effects of regional policy are introduced, 
before chapter four presents a more detailed analysis of activities. power inter- 
relationships and effectiveness. 
The North East: a profile 
In this context, the NE, a compact post industrial region of 2.6. million population, is 
seen as one of those unfortunate regions, a boom area of the coal age with an enor- 
mous legacy of obsolete human capital, a slower rate of economic growth, an accom- 
panying higher rate of unemployment, a poorer standard of health and social services, 
and a not unrelated outward migration of population (Cullingworth, 1970: 10) See 
Appendix 3.0 for details. It is widely recognised as a distinctive region with a strong 
regional identity, as the quotes at Appendix 3.1 reveal, despite being a diverse region 
encompassing urban sprawl, towns and villages, and industrial and commercial cen- 
tres with different characteristics (Chapman, 1985: 4). Newcastle holds the title as the 
centre of region. "" 
However, the following reflects a contrary view, shared by elites in other parts of the 
region; 
'Newcastle councillors are always posturing, it's not the only city in the 
region' (Lennox) 
The difficulties prevalent in the region are not new or unique to the NE, where a col- 
lapse in traditional industries is now an enduring feature, as this has been a recurring 
29 Elites in Middlesbrough and Sunderland challenge this, GMB worked NECC on the bid 
to become European Capital of Culture in 2008. 
30 Hostility between Tyneside elites and local authorities can be traced back as 1840. over 
the Port of TN tic (NIcCord and Thompson, 1998: 256). N/I iddleton (1985) found examples 
of'I'N neside and Teesside rivalry in the 1930 s Nvhen Special Areas \ýere designated. 
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problem since the mid-nineteenth century. The NE has been an experimental testing 
ground for different, mostly unsuccessful, policy measures, directed towards symp- 
torns rather than underlying causes. Ministers and civil servants were accused of pro- 
ducing: 
'Remote control (policies) carried out by disinterested and ill-informed 
individuals, thatfailed to the desired outcomes as local needs were lost 
(Bray, 1970: 149) 31 
Local agencies were expected to make up the shortfall, but in turn, they were criti- 
cised for failing to deal with long-standing decline, notably those affecting residual- 
ised and dis-empowered poor" ". Communities, and other under-represented groups, 
have been excluded from decision-making forums and concern has been expressed at 
34 35 
the domination of certain interests. Communities often fail to understand what is 
required of them, or are unwilling to participate; at the same time they become useful 
validating mechanism for regional strategies (Stephenson and Poxon, 2001: 109-124). 
The uniqueness of the industrial structure partly explains the legacy of decline, more 
acute than any other region. Nineteenth century expansion of large scale industries 
were not the result from state intervention but promoted by private capitalists, how- 
ever, the social consequences of rapid growth led to the formation of a regime of el- 
ites who lobbied central goverment for aid. 
31 Bray was MP for Middlesbrough, but resigned when his controversial book was pub- 
lished. 
32 Byrne recently challenged Newcastle City Council over Goingfor Groii, th, JUIN 2000 
(Byrne, 2000: 3-16) 
33 1900 hornes were built, 1500 newjobs created, and a 16% decrease in burglaries (Robin- 
son and Shaw, 1998: 24-32) 
34 See the work of Robinson and ShaN\ (1998: 24-332), Liddle (2001: 312-323). 
35 In an initial assessment of RDAs. most regional RESs \\ere criticised for this (Roberts 
and BenneN\ orth, 2001: 142- 159). 
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The region is below UK average in most areas such as GDP per head. earnings. ex- 
pencliture, employment ", as Appendix 3.2. And 3.3 show. In terms of industrial 
structure the region is: 
'Still public sector driven, but we are getting a sharper business focus' 
(Bridge) 
Furthermore it : 
' No longer dominated by monolithic large firms, but lacks the middle 
corporate range of companies that the Germans have'(Bridge) 
And 
'Our greatest achievement has been the diversification of the industrial 
base, but the service sector dominates' (Balls) 
'Neii, jobs are often low paid andpart time'(Howard) 
Despite regular regional and financial assistance, a bleak economic landscape has 
been made worse by recent job losses and declines in farming and chemical industries 
(Cockerill and Southern, 2000: 35-52). Inward investment has increased the economic 
diversity of the region, but it is still an economically weak region (ONE, 1999)", cru- 
cially affected by the whims of global capital shifts, and national Policies. 
The region did well in inward investment, until quite recently, but regional strategies 
now highlight knowledge businesses, indigenous growth and entrepreneurship as key 
grovAh aims. Despite claims and counter claims of the economic benefits accrued 
from inward investment successes, the region remains approximately where it was in 
the 1970s, relative to other English regions. However, the recent economic downturn 
has led Nissan executives and suppliers to voice concerns on the state of the economy: 
36 Falls in unemployment figures in the last decade haNe been less in the NE than in any 
other remon. 
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with threats to relocate, in spite of declarations of commitment to the rev , 
ion. Attempts 
to attract foreign investment have dominated regional discourse for the past tweiity- 
five years, thus: 
'There's hot competition, companies left to themselves want to go south 
(Denham) 
'We got the construction surfaces for Nissan, and did a thorough review 
of suppliersfor Siemens and Samsung' (Robson) 
'We're held in regard in London because we drew in Siemens' (Sir Fred 
Holliday) 
'Inward investment if fluid capital with a life cycle of 10 years, and 
though on paper this isn't a region to invest in, Siemens and Samsung got 
huge subsidies because their products and processes were important' 
(Richardson) 
'We had no history of car making but they had no pre-conceived ideas 
about us, the incentives helped' (Lennox) 
'We've had Yanks, Japs and Koreans coming, so we've spent a vast sum 
of money in doing our homework. We did the same as the Japs, they won't 
go anywhere without researching' (Mills) 
'I was drafted in by IBB to go to Japan, individual LA s were wooing in- 
vestors, unlike the Scottish and Welsh, so we decided to set up the Brus- 
. 
fice qfNEA to have co-ordination' (Robson) sels Of 
'We've got to concentrate on indigenous companies, and the stakes are 
higher because we've got to sustain the levels of inward investment' 
(Mills) 
'Some regions may reflect on the past but we don't, we want to go for- 
Ivard, (Mills) 
I The Japs, Yanks and Germans are underpinning the democrat isation in 
Eastern Europe, so we lose out '(Mills) 
37 Bemeen 1981-6.3350,000jobs were lost in the primary and manufacturing sectors. 
F-, 
'We're better than other regions, just look at 1993 award to NDC as the 
best inward investment company'(Mills) 
At the same time jobs created have been in low paid and mainly female occupations. 
or in the inward investment service class. Tourism, art, sport and other creative indus- 
tries have been recognised as prospective income and employment creators (Thomas 
and Long, 2000: 313-328) but Hudson, Sadler and Townsend caution against an un- 
critical interest in the former (Hudson et al, 1992: 633-646). Limited research exists 
on the types of jobs created and impacts of such economic activities. " "" 
Despite these doubts, there is a growing recognition, nationally and regionally. of the 
potential importance of creative industries to economic development (Department of 
Culture, Media and Sport, 1998: 3 )41. Small businesses, typified by those in the crea- 
tive industry sector play a key role in employment creation (Storey, 1994), but despite 
a 17.5% growth since 1981 and a plethora of policies, the NE is still relatively weak 
in small to medium enterprise development, See Appendix 3.4,3.5 and 3.6. Manu- 
facturing remains part of a branch plant economy, as the following quotes testify: -. 
'Our manufacturing has all but gone'(Lennox) 
'We are losing company HQs like Northern Electric, and some like 
Northumbria Water are going overseas, to France. '(Beecham) 
38 Tourism was worth f 75 bn in 2000,4.7% of GDP (Guardian, 31.12.0 1). Gateshead M 11- 
lenniurn Bridge has attracted 250,000 visitors (Journal, 26.12.01) 
39 Wynyard Golf course, owned by Sir John Hall was recently the subject of a management 
buy out; Durham has first class county cricket, Sunderland and Newcastle are bidding to 
have the first Olympic swimming pool (Journal Newspaper, 26th November) 
40 Losing the bid to host the Ryder Cup in Golf in 2010 (backed by Brendan Foster's Nova 
International) lost the NE fI OOM in lost revenue (Journal Newspaper, 26th November). 
41 At European level culture is seen as a major social and economic force (DCMS, 1998: 
34). In the UK the vast majority of the sector comprises micro businesses employing less 
than ten people. The creative industries generate revenues of F-60, billion per annum and 
employ 1.4 million people (DCMS. 1998: 3) and government has set up a Task Force as 
a cataIN st to raising awareness. 
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Much less attention was paid to the switch in emphasis in regional policy, during the 
1990s, from attracting inward investment to embedding existing investment with after 
care and other services. Nowadays regeneration agencies are urged to develop exist- 
ing indigenous and foreign owned firms, but fundamental policy questions still prevall 
on promoting inter firm trading, encouraging collaborate linkages, addressing the di- 
verse and fragmented needs of SMEs, and encouraging job creation in disparate min- 
ing and rural communities (Tomaney and Pike, 1999, cited Garrahan and Ritchie, 
1999: 99). 
The persistent and growing North-South divide led to a proposed reviev, ý of regional 
funding 42 43 . Foreign investment has not made up for the shortfall in indigenous job 
creation or growth, and the high costs involved tend to negate any long-term benefits. 
Official regional development indicators, which cover both economic and social di- 
mensions, show that in many measurable indicators the NE is still among the poorest 
performers in the England. The region has the lowest economic activity rate at 72.7%, 
compared to the rate for England of 78.6% and has one of the highest rates for long- 
term unemployment. The lowest regional GDP per head in England is recorded for the 
North East. The figures also hides some serious indicators of deprivation and poor 
42 Robert Huggins Report, 2001; Henley Centre Report, 1997 predicting that the gap would 
widen by 2002; TUC Report, 1998 on a two speed economy. A Cabinet Office Report in 
1999 played down the divisions, but a Joseph Rowntree in 1999 found the highest pro- 
portion on low incomes; Audit Commission Report, 2000 showed NE councils received 
less than the London Boroughs. Cardiff University Report likened the NE to Chile and 
Hungary; an Employment Committee of MPs called on government to do something, and 
a RSA Report predicted that Labour policies would take 35 years to close the gap (all 
documents cited in Linford and Woods, Journal Newspaper, 20th November: 18). 
43 The Barnett Formula gives E4837 per head of population to the NE. whereas Scotland 
receives E5217, N\hich represents a fl. 2bn cross border divide. 'Bridging the Gap', a NE 
Assembly document, Xrnas 2001, was a response to the pre-Budget promise of a rc\ i'c\\ 
of regional spending. In 2000 elites delivered afI bn shopping list that influenced 2000-2 
spending plans. It resulted in measures to cut employment, boost regeneration, and extra 
cash for ONL for housing and business start up (Linford, Journal Newspaper. 3ist De- 
cernber: 16). 
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performance within the region. such as the highest proportion of men drinking double 
the amount of recommended daily rates of alcohol. 
More significantly in some parts of the NE GDP per head is arguably loxv enough to 
qualify for Objective I funding. For example, in County Durham, three local autliority 
districts of Easington, Wear Valley and Derwentside had scores of deprivation that 
ranked them in the first quartile of most deprived places in England. The urban cen- 
tres of Newcastle, Sunderland and Middlesbrough record deprivation scores amon(-lst I 
the highest in England and one of the major challenges facing the region is to develop 
strategies to support economic growth and social inclusion. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, and despite a plethora of national and regional policies and 
initiatives to encourage enterprise the NE still has the lowest SME base per capita in 
the UK (50% of the average) after Merseyside and Northern Ireland (Macnamara, 
2001), business start up rates are 2% below UK average and survival rates are 4.8% 
lower than the rest of the UK. Only 1.5% of graduates enter self-employment, as op- 
posed to a national figure of 3.1%, which is still pitifully low (Davison, 2001). 
ONE Regional Innovation Strategy is aimed at generating hubs of growth; start up 
companies and clusters of expertise and innovation (Peck and McGuiness, 2001). 44 45 
The following quote demonstrates how bad the situation is: 
44 A Treasury Report (2000) indicated a low enterprise culture in the NE. Measured by 
VAT registrations per 10,000 resident adult population Wansbeck (at 12 new registra- 
tions per 10,000), Redcar and Cleveland (14), Easington (15), South Tyneside (15). and 
BIN-th Valle) (16) NNere the five poorest performers in the UK in terms of neýN business 
start tips (IINI Treasury, 2000). Despite modest success in SME growth, the relative posi- 
tion has staýed virtually unchanged. 
45 There is a plan to replicate the f200m venture capital and loan funds for SME deNclop- 
nient In Oýjectl\e One and Two areas to improve SME development in deprived areas 
(Regeneration and Rene\\ A 200 1: 1 
-6 
'Most chamber members are SAIE owners, we have start ups but many 
more deaths' (Richardson) 
Undoubtedly the region is less prosperous and significantly more disadvantaged than 
most other parts of the country (Robinson and Jackson, 2001: 38-55). A recent geo- 
graphical analysis of deprivation using the Index of Multiple Deprivation showed 
deprivation at ward level on all indicators. Current government policy is targeting 
resources under Neighbourhood Renewal, New Deal for Communities and commu- 
nity economic development within EU Objective 2 funding'6 . 
Local government remains stubbornly and tribally Labour dominated and democracy 
in the NE is at a very low ebb, election turnouts are low, with widespread indifference 
to local government, and many services delivered by un-elected bodies not account- 
able to local people (Robinson and Shaw, 2000a: 473-492). This democratic gap has 
been convenient for elites, because local people rarely challenge decisions, because 
there are problems in penetrating and accessing informal and secret forums where 
decisions are made. A poorly instituted field of regeneration and the lack of account- 
ability have increased the demands for self-determination to fill the democratic deficit 
now occupied by elites. Before examining this, and the effects of regional and global 
shifts on the NE more comprehensively, a general appraisal of regionalism sets the 
broader context. 
46 Easington will receive E9.975m, of the overall f3.986b NRF, Communm Chest and 
Cornrnunitý Empo\\ernient Fund (NRU, March 2001) and f3.846 under Priorit-v Four of 
Objective T\\o funds as tweiit\, -t\\o of its N\ards are designated as target communities 
(NE Objective Two, 2001). 
7-, 
Regionalism 
Regionalism has ebbed and flowed throughout the twentieth century, but Geddes 
(1988: 322-325) believes that its re-emergence owes more to the run down of public 
expenditure during the Thatcher administration. He found that most researchers 
strongly advocated increased regional policy, but only the RTPI (Royal Town Plan- 
ning Institute, 1986) called for any form of regional government (RICS. 1986, NR 
Councils Association, 1986, Armstrong and Taylor, all cited Geddes, 1988: 322-325). 
Stoker et al (1998) summarised the political, economic development, European, and 
technocratic imperatives of regionalism, but even protagonists continue to disagree on 
the purposes, methods, boundaries to be drawn and powers to be given to regional 
institutions. 
That said a strong regionalist movement in the NE has always drawn together multi- 
sectoral elites to demand a more equitable distribution of resources, decentralisation 
of decision-making and the creation of an elected regional assembly. This has been a 
response to a nation state's inability, since the nineteenth century to manage the econ- 
omy of its most northerly and persistently left wing region, and the persistence of 
governance by corporatist elites, or appointed boards of colonial odds and sods 
(Byrne, 1993b: 27-34). The region has a distinctive civil society, distinctive social 
structures vividly portrayed in the novels of Catherine Cookson and other television 
drama series, a vibrant and different folk culture including the Northumbrian bag- 
pipes, as well as an accent and regional dialect which cannot be found in any other 
region (Elcock, 2001: 57-64). The regional issue had, until recently, been sidelined 
from the national political agenda. During the 1970s, elites from a very, wide set of 
sectoral interests pressurised central government to do something, and these demands 
continue as the region is noxv at the vanguard of the Campaign for English Regions 
(CFER). The current government has agreed to hold referenda. in re, _, 
ions xvhere there 
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is public support for the idea, regionalist campaigners have, therefore, stepped up 
their activities. 
Recent demands for self-determination have grown in parallel with an increasingly 
volatile and shaky NE economy, with over 6000 job losses in 1998, and ominous pre- 
dictions of more to follow (Cambridge Econometrics, 1999a). The debate on the effi- 
cacy of indigenous growth and entrepreneurship at the expense of foreign investment, 
and where the fault for economic decline lay, dominated regional politics and height- 
ened devolutionary demands (Linford, 1999a, Journal Newspaper, editorial). Some 
academics and business leaders remain unconvinced that demise is entirely due to 
global changes, claiming instead that national policies were to blame (Tomaney, in 
conversation, November 2000). The scale of job losses led both PM Tony Blair and 
Mandelson (then President of the Board of Trade) to visit with the promise f 100m, 
for Task Forces to find buyers for plants facing closure (Pike, 2000: 1-3). The spate of 
redundancies also hastened the establishment of NECC (NE Constitutional Conven- 
tion), a body representing a broad spectrum of regional life. NECC was a natural fol- 
low up to CNEA (formerly CNA, Campaign for a North East Assembly), which has 
campaigned since 1992. NECC carried out wide spread consultancy before a blueprint 
for regional government was placed before the PM in November 1999. The proposal 
considered powers, finance, and boundaries of an elected body. 
CNA has been relatively successful in placing devolution higher up the national po- 
litical agenda, but is a' top-down' pressure group, with largely existing political ac- 
tivists. Campaigning has raised its Profile, though it has excellent media coverage, 
and high profile elite support". NECC is a non party political gathering of church, 
The business community declared Its support for a YES Campaign (Journal NeNNspaper. 
20022,2nd September: 2) 
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business, voluntary sector, academics. regional politicians, CNA, trade unionists. cul- 
tural organisations that was set up in 1998 with the aim of achieving consensus 
around a blueprint for a democratically elected assembly. Neither CNEA. NECC or 
CFER have had much success in engaging grass roots support, but they ha,,,, e been 
more successful in engaging government Ministers. " Individual business elites. nota- 
bly Bill Midgely, of the NE Chamber of Commerce, has long campaigned for a revi- 
sion to the Bamett formula. 
A historical examination of the different phases of regional policy demonstrates how 
elites have coalesced to lobby and demand government intervention, more especially 
how each phase of national policy within a dynamic global environment enabled them 
to strike the balance between structural constraints and collective agency. It shows 
that inter-organisational power relationships have been a critical factor in shaping and 
adapting policies. Elites have recognised that national govenu-nent has lost the power 
to influence local and regional domains, or to engineer solutions to economic and so- 
cial problems. This has left gaps where intra and inter-organisational power relation- 
ships have evolved. 
Regional policy 
British central government's influence on disadvantaged regions has a very long his- 
tory, with evidence of policies in the late nineteenth century having an impact the NE, 
but regional economic policy has waxed and waned. It has been seen as an important 
way of reducing regional economic differences, and at the same time reducing the 
IS Caborn attended the inaugural meeting of NECC, and lost his Cabinet position; Derek ? -I 
Zý 
III 
Foster addressed meetings, and Aas remo, ýed as Chief Whip-, Joyce Quin is a ferýent 
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harmful effects on the efficient operation of the national economy. The arguments for 
regional policy remains strong (Armstrong and Taylor, 2000: 207-208). but despite 
the tensions of prioritising economic or social objectives, or central governirnent's per- 
ennial attempts to either 'bring work to the workers', urge long term unemployed 
workers to 'get on their bikes' or let the market decide, disparities remain constant. 
Politicians and civil servants still have difficulty explaining why areas like the NE 
remain at the bottom of all league tables, but the situation continues despite regenera- 
tion polices. There are still tensions between efficiency and economic goals and set- 
ting conflictual rather than complimentary multiple objectives. Furthermore European 
policies towards the regions have exerted a strong influence on the priority of social 
inclusion and equity between regions, and regeneration initiatives are affected by 
global agencies such the IMF, The World Bank or OECD. 
Nevertheless regional policy is still an important component of UK economic policy, 
because persistent regional disparities prevent the attainiment of national objectives. 
Its purpose, therefore, is to achieve specified national targets, as well as reducing 
harmful consequences like unemployment and social hardship in disadvantaged re- 
gions (Armstrong and Taylor, 2000: 206-231). It is generally regarded as having been 
an ineffective means of addressing long-standing inequalities; moreover existing ma- 
chinery of government is seemingly incapable of achieving overall aims. " Early stud- 
ies of the origins and development of regional policy were focused exclusively on 
how it was perceived in central government circles, rather from the disadvantaged 
regions themselves. The benefits of all forms of regional policy are highly contested. 
supporter, and gave up her Cabinet position to support the cause. Blair and Armstrong 
are fervent opponents, but Mandelson is a recent convert. 
49 As far back as 1918 tile Haldane Committee questioned the effectiveness of the state 
machinerý (Chapman. 1985) 
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Healey (1993), however, Ball (1995) sees regional policy as a much-maligned token 
gesture. The fact that it is top down and central officials set criteria for assistance has 
created a high level of resource dependency, but has nevertheless allowed elites to 
develop very close relationships with regional civil servants. Together they have con- 
tributed to planning and other forums over a protracted period, and this has created a 
core of individuals who sought legitimacy as regional spokespeople on the basis of 
reputation and experience of decision-making. 
Some EU attempts to reduce regional inequalities have been successful (Halkier and 
Danson, 1996: 1-38) but overall the picture is still gloomy". The persistent disparities 
have serious economic and social cost implications, such as rising poverty, crime, 
health and social exclusion. Elite attempts to have direct access into Brussels have 
been limited apart from the somewhat embryonic developments of NEA (the North 
East Association of Local Authorities) there has been a failure to have a substantial 
orientation towards Europe. 
Regional planning, as the outcome of regional policies, has never been an end in it- 
self, nor has it been an exclusively technical exercise as it exists to influence and ma- 
nipulate the power and political influence between central and local administrations. 
At the core it is a particular view of when and when not to intervene, and choosing the 
policies to solve specific problems. By its very nature then it is political and not some 
deliberate, intellectual and objective form of decision making. It is about criss- 
crossing relationships that change in strength and direction with alterations in the 
power and standing of interests of interests, both organised and disorganised (Friend 
et al, 1974). Few of the relationships are directly controlled by the plan or the policy 
so Bet\Ncen 1975 and 1988 the NE was the second most assisted region in the UK. 
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originators themselves and it is a complex process of analysing, intervening and re- 
solving the conflict that accompanies change. It has been described as the art of the 
possible (Bristow, 1978: 5-13) and elites have seized opportunities to legitimise their 
activities by working in close proximity with civil servants and civic society, to adapt 
national policies to regional needs. Civil servants were pivotal in helping to define 
projects to stimulate changes, as they coped with a myriad of problems.. 
It might be argued that the multi-dimensional problems cannot be left only to formal 
or informal interactions (Mawson and Skelcher, 1984), and the lack of a real and last- 
ing solution to the North-South divide has led NE elites to believe that: 
'Too much decision making is made by civil servants, Nissan proved we 
could overcome parochialism' (Beecham). 
I 'We've gone ftom begging bowl to a self help philosophy, we're a fast 
changing region, but rooted in old habits' (Balls) 
'We took the initiative when the pits were closed, especially after Nissan. 
We said 'lets set our own agenda', make it workfor us without too much 
central interference. It was the only way we could make the region fertile 
groundfor investment' (Mills) 
'Central government set the backcloth but local politicians get down 
themselves to the nitty gritty of regenerating industries' (Lennox) 
These quotations beg a historical explanation as they raise questions on how elites 
have developed such a mindset, as the following discussion explains. 
1850-mid 1920s: Laissez Faire, municipal trading and self-help? 
There is littlc doubt that earl), regimes formed in the late eighteenth and early nine- 
teenth centuries as linkages and contacts were forged between re,,, ional capitalist and I 
aristocratic elites. Nvealthv because of minerals underneath their land, and enhanced 
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social and political prestige followed (McCord, 1979). It was a period in which free 
market ideas of supply and demand coupled with a detestation of trade unions led to 
cyclical instability and crisis (Carney and Hudson, 1978: 66), and a combination of 
national policies and changes in the international division of labour ripped the fabric 
out of old industrial economies and the local communities (Hudson. 1986). 
At the same time local authorities took a keener interest in the social and economic 
conditions, and philanthropic aristocrats and industrialists joined in lobbying central 
government assistance. " Wide ranging business and commercial interests led in 1788 
to the Ridley and Lambton families creating their own private banks, and they also 
served on regeneration bodies such as Improvement Commissions, Poor Law Boards, 
Boards of Guardians, and Police Authorities (acting as magistrates). " Typically a Lo- 
cal Act of Parliament (granting novel powers)", or a Public Works Loan through the 
Local Government Board (LGB) would be grudgingly awarded, but only after good 
case was made and it was established that philanthropic efforts would fill the shortfall 
in central funds (Liddle, 1988)". Loans were approved for creation of employment 
opportunities, and school and hospital construction projects. 
At this time officials worked in partnership for the overall benefit of their locales". It 
was thought improper for government to intervene, which influenced the activity of 
industry (Mackintosh, 1982). The growth of the mass electorate and the election of 
51 Mawson (1992) argues that local government has a longer history in the NE than any 
other reoion in economic development, however this research argues that its genealogy 
began in the mid I 800s, rather than later. 
52 The pioneering 1842 Leeds Improvement Act, 1847 General Towns ImproNement 
Clauses Act, and the 1853 Special Improvements Commission oversaw all civic im- 
provements. 
S3 'Novel' powers \\ere granted through a Private Act of Parliament for the building of 
theatres. libraries, piers (Blackpool) or a racecourse (Brighton). 
54 CcntrA/local government conflicts are not a recent phenomena. 
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the first Independent Labour MPs led to demands for intenýentionist legislation". El- 
ites constituted a relatively small, coherent group of families with connections based 
on friendships, intellectual and cultural life, and sport and recreation controlled re- 
gional industries (McCord and Thompson, 1998: 256). Town and country elites came 
together through shared schooling or church and chapel attendance. " 
At this time Tyneside Chamber of Commerce formed in 1911 (Teesside had been 
established in 1863) to look after commercial interests and the power and influence of 
capital cascaded into the political system. Inter-connections between regional capital 
were extended during this period as newer industries allowed capitalists to fix prices, 
and increase their influence on employers and trade associations. Profits boomed up 
until 1921 with amalgamations, cartels and closures of pits, aided and supported by 
the Bank of England in the interests of shoring up the provincial banking system 
(Carney and Hudson, 1978: 64-78). The National Strike during the 1920s had a pro- 
found effect on the region", and as we shall see also influenced regime formation. 
Pre Second World War (1920s-1930s): Interventionism 
It follows that as industrial troubles deepened and national unemployment rates 
soared, regional policy took on a recognisably modem form, and elites continued to 
55 This was known as The Era of Municipal Trading (Walton and Wavin, 1983) 
56 Kier Hardy campaigned from 1892 for central government to take responsibility for alle- 
viating regional imbalances in prosperity. Lloyd George's first budget used taxation to 
redistribute the nation's wealth to less fortunate communities 
57 In the mid nineteenth century a thriving community of scientists had strong links to in- 
dustry in Newcastle (McCord, 1979). Durham University . N-as the first English Univer- 
sitý to offer engineering courses to satisýy practical needs of industrý (Chapman, 1985). 
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pressurise government. In 1925 the Tyneside Industrial Development Board (TIDB) 
evolved from the Tyneside Industrial Development Conference. Interested parties 
from local corporations, utilities, local authorities, landowners and Tyneside Im- 
provement Commission focused their efforts on industrial revival. TIDB was similar 
to a Chamber of Commerce with a co-ordinating role not unlike NDC (Northern De- 
velopment Company in the 1980s). Its major aim was to persuade industrialists to 
locate on Tyneside, by putting them in touch with the right people, and it marketed 
the region abroad. Although enquiries came from around the world it had relatively 
limited success. 
Teesside District Development Board (TDDB), created in 1931 had a similar role 
with the added responsibility for trading estates. Sunderland Development Board, its 
Wearside equivalent supported by the Chamber of Commerce had little success in 
attracting new industry at the 1934 Birmingham Industrial Fair in 1934. Hartlepool, 
South West Durham Development Board and the NE Development Board followed in 
1935. All were voluntary, had no powers to invite agencies to join or to provide funds, 
but provided a forum for information flow, sharing, lobbying and promotion. Mem- 
bership of NEDB was cross-sectoral and contained elites from a wide range of busi- 
ness, trade union and local authorities. '9 See Appendix 3.7. and 3.8 for membership 
As a regionalist cross-class alliance, NEDB was replaced during the 1940s by a more 
powerful regionalist movement of the 'great and the good', headed by Lord Ridley 
and known as the Northern Industrial Group (NIG). Its aim was to manipulate state 
58 The labour transference and land settlement appalled elites. The 'agrarianisation' of the 
unemployed was particularly vilified; the 1922 Labour Party Opposition forced a House 
of Commons debate on the issue, and forced government to commit to state ownership of 
some industries and to greater state action (Kelf-Cohen, 1961: 4). 
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intervention (Hudson, 1986). None of the aforementioned bodies had much success. 
but they facilitate networking opportunities within and outwith the region. 
Between 1928-38 a quarter of a million workers were moved around the L'K by the 
Industrial Transference Board, and the NE, as well as Central Scotland, West Cum- 
berland and South Wales, became designated as a special area. " Commissioners., ap- 
pointed mostly from an Officer class of Captains, Rear Admirals and Colonels who 
had served in the War, had the power to grant subsidies. These powers were extended 
in 1936. 
Grants and loans for relocation, a new factory building programme to develop light 
industries and five trading estates were developed in deprived areas across the UK, 
managed by a multi-sectoral representative Board, and. despite the fact that small im- 
provements were made in overall industrial performance, it was still recognised that 
more needed to be done. The Barlow Commission Report" published recommenda- 
tions in 1940 but the Second World War interrupted the implementation phase, ý, vhich 
had to wait until 1945. Barlow advocated a central planning authority, and these ideas 
were incorporated into the 1945 Distribution of Industry Act, but never fully imple- 
mented. 
The 1945 Labour Government committed to regional government, but unfortunately 
regional policy was a low priority for conservative govenunents during the 1950/60 s 
and economic policy remained centralised. The industrial crisis in 1960s exacerbated 
the calls for intervention and a nationalisation programme, and planning became a 
59 Hudson and Carney (1976) questioned the exact natUre, recruitment and influence of the 
x\orking class, which they recarded as more to do \Nith creating an appearance of non- 
partisan consensus, than any other reason. 
60 In the 1934 Special Areas De\clopment and Improvement Act. 
61 A Roval Commission on The Distribution of Industry and Population (1945) 
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very signi icant element of regional policy, involving a very broad ranue of elites. -Mr 
Tyneside'.. himself.. T Dan Smith, became a central figure ý, vho agitated for inter-ven- 
tion and his activities were a prelude to future development of the elite regime. 
Post Second World War Planning: the era of T Dan Smith 
This period characterises the high point of corporatism and elite collaboration. Plan- 
ning in the 1960s was a tripartism between civil servants, local authorities, and re- 
gional economic planning boards (Shaw, 1993: 251-259), but other elites Nvere drawn 
into the process and this fine blend of political and managerialism sustained the re- 
gime. 
Although NEDB more or less ceased to function during the War, despite the presis- 
tence of regional problems, Lord Ridley and a voluntary and self appointed group of 
sixty industrialists elites formed NIG (Northern Industrial Group). " This elite group 
enjoyed good relations with the Board of Trade and made convincing arguments for 
state intervention, but then, as now, resources proved to be elusive. In tandem with 
NEDA (North East Development Agency (established in October 1944) which had a 
broader representation, these bodies became known as the democratic voice of the 
region, sharing the rhetoric of 'all regional interests suffering together'. 63 
NEDA and NIG were merged into NEIDA (North East Industrial and Development 
Association) in 1953, with even broader representation, open to all companies, TUs 
and private individuals. NEIDA was transfonned in 1961 into NEDC (North East 
62 NIG, financed by industry, produced a ýýidely supported report calling for slum clear- 
ance, diversification of the economy, factory building and promotion of the region. 
(13 NEDAs membership included NIPs, local authorities, Chambers of Commerce, \FU. 
NIG, River and Harbour Authorities. 
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Development Council), further broadening the representation to include LA Planning 
Authorities, industrialists. trade unionists and MPs. NEPC (Northern Economic Plan- 
ning Council), established in 1965 had membership by personal 'Ministerial invite. 
These bodies created a complex network and web of power and influence. with a core 
group of elites, who all, apart from NEPC, relied on sponsorship from bodies other 
than central government. The interconnectivity between local and central state offi- 
cials could arguably be seen to take on a more robust shape in this period as a major 
restructuring of the NE Economy was underway (Evans et al (eds) (1995). The Reset- 
tlement Scheme of 1946 and the Town and Country Planning Act of 1947 marked a 
new epoch in regional policy and planning, and highlighted the fact that technical 
fixes on their own would be insufficient to solve multi-faceted and large scale prob- 
lems. Membership of regional decision making regimes had initially included labour, 
local state and business representation but were broadened further to include univer- 
sity academics, heads of utilities, financial agencies, and others. 64 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, rising unemployment and poverty led 
Macmillan to appoint Lord Hailsharn with responsibility for region. In 1963 his Plan 
was popular, by some accounts, because: 
'Hailsham's efforts on behalf of the region were better than any Labour 
government. He wore his flat cap and appealed more than the Labour 
Party. You would think the Labour Party would be more sensitive to its 
natural support base but the Tories seem more well disposed to us' (Len- 
nox). 
Regional Economic Planning Councils, established in 1965 by George Brown. to im- 
plement NN'llson's National Plan. had members from local government industry, trade 
64 Intervic\\ N\ ith Professor AIan Townsend, September 200 1. 
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unions, and academics. The REPC was advised by REPB (Regional Economic Plan- 
ning Boards), consisted of regional civil servants and the Northern REPB for NE and 
Cumbria chaired by T Dan Smith, Leader of Newcastle CC (Smith, 1970). Smith had 
been Chair of the City Labour Party in 1953 and instigated a report entitled Teril in 
the City' to highlight the number of slum dwellings, as a first attempt at strategic 
planning for housing. In his own words 'we introduced the first hint of mana, -, ement 
methods into the debate in the City on the housing programme' (Smith, 1970: 62). 
Political management was food and drink to Smith" and he organised a debate be- 
tween local government, business, trade unionists, educationalists, MPs, the local and 
national press, Government Ministers and others on the need for a University, in the 
firm belief that the NE would remain a backwater if education was not the primary 
force in development. As a self-taught man, he was passionate that education could 
give working class kids social mobility, and his quest was to 'carry out a sociallý, jus- 
tified exercise' because his opponents 'lacked a clear appreciation of the educational 
deficiencies of the NE' (Smith, 1970: 41-44). This was the first of many issues on 
which he would lobby at local, regional and national levels, or use his connections to 
further a cause. Networking, and bringing together the various sectoral interests was a 
prevalent feature of T Dan Smith's political career, and at every opportunity he put 
social rather than profit motives forward. 66 
Smith and Professor Joe Allen, head of the country's first Department of Town and 
Country Planning at Newcastle, became firm friends, as a result of their shared belief 
65 This author met Smith. after his release from prison, and shortly before his death. His last 
fe\N years were spent public speaking. 
66 T Dan's Smith's subsequent imprisonment for corruption does not alter the many so- 
cial]v drk en and ciN Ic achievements during the period of his office. Many fine examples I- 
remain. 
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in the importance of people in planning decisions. The City Planning Department was 
an excellent example of cross-sectoral exchange of ideas and expertise. In 1962. 
Smith suggested a Festival to celebrate the centenary of the Blaydon Races, with art. 
music, drama, sport, theatre, and recreation, the primary aim was to attract people to 
the region. Newcastle CC bought the Palace Theatre, but before doin(-, so T Dan 
Smith brought together Tyne Tees Television and the VC of Newcastle Uni\ýersity. to 
lobby central government for arts and sports to be at the core of regional develop- 
ment. As a result, NE Association for the Arts (which became Northern Arts), the first 
Arts Association in the country, was established, and Smith then involved Newcastle 
United Football Club in discussions with Government Ministers on the role of sport in 
regional development. He was invited as a member of the body, later to become 
Sports Council, and was as passionate on sport as he was on education and the arts. 
He is quoted as saying 'at all times we knew that the issues of jobs and prosperity 
were undisputed but there was still a need for enriching leisure' (Smith, 1970: 41 ). 67 
Moreover, he brought the best architects from Sweden to build a new city, and regu- 
larly travelled to Westminster and Whitehall, because he firmly believed that the SE 
had exploited the NE. One of his favourite stories was the claim that Nash Terraces in 
Bath were built with money made from the coal and iron mined in the NE, and the 
government therefore owed the region something in repayment (Fitzwalter and Tay- 
lor, 1981: 49). 
Smith still has legendary status, for good or ill, and despite the fact that the property 
scandals and his eventual imprisomnent put a blight on Tyneside politics, he never- 
theless made a tremendous impact on town planning, architecture, education, housing 
67 Smith NNas behind the setting up of NE DeNelopment Company (later to become NDC), 
Repional Association of L. As (later to become NEA). He also lobbied for a s,,, mphonN 
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and local image (Todd, 2000: 7). Like Chamberlain before him, he was a joined-up 
thinker, passionate visionary and engaged , vith a broad range of individuals, organisa- 
tions, within the region, and beyond at national and international le'vel. much the same 
in the same as past and contemporary regime elites. He was a critical elite in NE his- 
tory , as he was renowned for his powers of persuasion to negotiate and bargain with 
Ministers and state officials. 
Lobbying has a central place in NE history, as the following quotes; contemporaries 
of Smith, and later elites, confirm: - 
'Jim Callaghan sent up Peter Shore, George Arnold of AEIV and Sam 
Short, the Miner's leader up to speak to me when we were campaigning 
for regional government. Jim knew that Gateshead councillors didn't 
want it, and the idea was killed off in '78. When I saw that it didn't appear 
in the 1979 Manifesto, I cornered Alex Kitson, who was on the Exec o the 
TWGU and the Exec of the Labour Party, and I told him to tell Kinnock 
we wouldn't campaign for him unless we got a commitment to regional 
government. The result? Four sentences in the 1983 Manifesto. Neil 
wasn't in javour of devolution, so we (the Northern TUC and Northern 
LP) decided to spendf2500 on our own Northern Manifesto, which el, en- 
tually became the blueprint for NDC, with 10 public sector, 10 private 
sector and 10 TUs but we wanted professional bodies such as HEIFE on a 
consultative body. Neil got caught up on the quango idea, much the same 
as Tony (Blair) has so that legislative ideas would come from regional 
civil servants, and we would not have any democratic control. He didn't 
carry it out, as he didn't get into power' (Mills) 
Or 
'ff I'm unhappy with something, policy wise Ijust phone Tony (Blaii) and 
he'll sort it'(Robson) 
orchestra and a , uper sports stadium. 
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It would be hard to generalise about the scale and ferocity of elite lobbying from these 
quotes, but they represent examples of the countless quotes offered at intenýiew. 
Both Labour and Conservative governments during this time were keen on a Mod- 
emisation Programme, and regional decline became an accepted feature of the perlod. 
despite the efforts of Smith and other visionaries. There were limited attempts to relo- 
cate some civil service jobs out of central London", but Townsend felt that moderni- 
sation offered few opportunities for redundant miners and shipyard workers, in re- 
training or technological advancements. Furthermore there was a strong correlation 
between the low investments in sporting, leisure and housing facilities and low at- 
tairanent at school and a need for greater levels of funding based on quality of life 
indicators at school and a need for greater levels of funding based on quality of life 
indicators (Townsend, 1993: 24). 
The Labour government used traditional regional policy instruments as financial in- 
ducements for relocation in deprived areas but the falling demand for products ham- 
pered these efforts. The number of men employed in NE coalmines declined from 
97,000 in 1961 to 38,000 in a ten-year period, whereas in shipbuilding in the corre- 
sponding period numbers fell from 48,000 to 30,000. The problems were so acute that 
the whole of County Durham was designated as one area for employment assistance 
(Mawson et al, 1992). 
69 
More significantly light industry and white-collar jobs could not make up dramatic 
shortfall in traditional industries (Goddard, 1987) and existing 'global outposts' were 
subject to the vagaries of international capital, and therefore short lived (Beynon et al, 
68 PO IIQ Savings Bank relocated in Durham and DHSS NNent to Longbenton. 
69 Durharn CC applied for a Private Parliamentary Act to extend the po"vers of the 1963 
Local Authority and Land Act to enable it to pay companies more to locate in the countý. 
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1991). The period was described as 'the politics of despair' (Hudson cited Chapman. 
1985: 57-99), and when Courtaulds withdrew, elites lobbied government in the hope 
of setting up a Task Force, but the company withdrew and job losses grexv. Indi(-, e- 
nous industries were unable to absorb redundant workers. SMEs then, as nowadays. 
played only a minor role in the regional economy and, as Storey (I 982a, 1992b. 1994) 
suggested, it is unwise to believe that SMEs can create sufficient employment \vithin 
an acceptable time frame to offset large plant closures in the region. 
Spending allocations tripled in this period, but despite the work of RPCs their plans 
were never realised, due to competing aims and lack of co-ordination between central 
and local state agencies (Mawson, 1992, Elcock, 2000). Intermediate Areas created in 
deprived areas were followed by the 1970 Local Employment Act, then the 1971 
Heath White Paper heralded a free market approach, with RSA (Regional Selective 
Assistance) and Regional Development Grants automatically paid to re-locating firms 
(Mawson, 1992). 
The creation of Scottish and Welsh Development Agencies, and regional assistance, 
at this time, accounted for over half of the DTI total budget, but as regionalist de- 
mands and planning ebbed away the government's top priority became managing the 
national economy and consequently the NE was as depressed as ever. Despite contin- 
ual pleas from elites, budgets were deflected to urban areas. 
Urban Programmes between 1968-1976 were targeted on inner cities (Parkinson, 
1996). It was at this time that the corporatism identified earlier, and based on state 
welfarism, was broadened to involve business and other interests. In this period the 
Northern Regional Strategy Team, involving academics, planners, business people 
and civil servants drexv up a Strategic Plan for the North, based on a comprehensive 
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data set (Townsend, in conversation, November 2001"). The Strategy was variously 
described as a definite advance, the most brilliant strategic planning document in En, -, - 
land (Mawson, in conversation, 1999), or a fine balance of idealism with realism 
(Mercer et al, 1978: 5-13). Quality of Life Indicators were develoPed. but the docu- 
ment was criticised for ignoring the impact of national and international forces. ac- 
cepting service and SME sector growth at the expense of traditional industries, and 
the strongest criticism was against the abandonment of full employment as a core aim 
(Hudson, 2000). 
Despite ideological differences, the 1977 Report was hailed a success, nevertheless 
this success did not eradicate persistent problems and there were still gaps in institu- 
tional, political and administrative coverage. The continued uncertainty on how to 
achieve regeneration left a role for entrepreneurial elites to mobilise and co-ordinate 
advocacy coalitions to shape and penetrate official policy networks. The lack of state 
intervention, continued into the 1970s, as we shall now discuss. 
Mid 1970s to mid 1980s: Critical and rapid decline in traditional 
industries 
In the 1970-1980s period of welfare contestability. national and local government 
conflict and a national economy in free fall, the Chancellor of the Exchequer was 
forced to go cap in hand to the IMF to save the UK from bankruptcy, and the country 
becarne known as the sick patient of Europe. The 1979 Thatcher goverment sig- 
nalled the end of a post War settlement around a mixed economy and the Welfare 
70 Professor Townsend, a colleague, was a key figure on NSRT. 
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State; the NE was bound to suffer given its essential character as a state managed re- 
gion. Regions like the NE experienced serious structural problems. deregulation of 
markets, privatisation of nationalised industries and the promotion of the free market 
placed the SE at the centre of economic activity, serving to widen existing disparities. 
At the time a combination of an international recession and the world Oil Crisis led to 
unprecedented rises in national and regional unemployment, much higher than those 
experienced in the 1930s. A rapid decline in manufacturing and mining and heavy 
industry was matched by increases in service sector jobs. " Stone (1984: 2-12) identi- 
fied the irreversible decimation of shipbuilding on Wearside and little evidence of 
service sector or SME development to replace losses. The entire removal of industrial 
activity, and the lack of strong skills base made recovery much slower. 
During this period elites such as Holliday, VC of Durham University, and Mills and 
Howard, prominent trade unionists, called on the Thatcher government and the Oppo- 
sition to do something for the region, and the following revealing commentary gives 
an insight into the discourse: 
'The University was neutral ground, because we were a region divided I 
gave a speech in 1982, on the 150th anniversary of the University, and in- 
vited the great and the good The City Of Durham Council sponsored it. I 
drew on my experience of the Highlands and Islands of Scotland Durham 
(the University) was no threat to the government because I was a link be- 
iween Scotland and England Most Cabinet Ministers send their kids here, 
and there was talk of a University of the NE. We got Dame Margot Fon- 
teyn as our Pro VC, - she was such a coup because of her close ftiendship 
with Princess Margaret. 
I turned this to our advantage because I knew that Mrs Thatcher knew 
about Durham as Hesletine and other . 1finisters had kids here. I hadAli- 
chael and his iiffie, Ann, upfor dinner a couple of times, to discuss 117C tIVO 
I The coal mdustrN NN as eliminated in the I 980s. 
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girls'progress. We'd had aftustrated attempt to set up aNorthern Region 
Economic Agency but because of infighting we lost it, we were divided 
and things looked bleak. Silicon Glen in Scotland was having money 
pumped in. In the early 80s, Paul Nicholson and Nigel Shellock both 
Northern CBI and conservative supporters went to see Leon Britian about 
the position, just at the time, I as a committed regionalist came to the AE. 
There was a lot of talk and my contribution was an academic-, because I 
had an interest in the machinery of government. The general consensits 
was that the region was at a low ebb and the movers and shakers were de- 
spairing. We invited Mrs Thatcher through Sir Paul Nicholson and the 
party machinery. Paul's a goodfiriend of mine so I suggested we ought to 
meet her on neutral ground We wanted a mix of bankers, industrialists, 
trade unionists, councillors and academics so I sent out a guest list. I also 
phonedpeople one to one. The atmosphere at the time politicallYwas hor- 
rible, the Miner's Strike and a deepening of the Northern Ireland situa- 
tion. I'd done a lot of workfor the Labour Party, though I'm not a mem- 
ber and invited Bob Howard, iiho I knew. It put him in a very difficult po- 
sition but Jack Cunninghamfixed it (I owe him one). Bob'sjob was on the 
line. I have ftiends in the Scottish Labour Party and knew lVillie Ross and 
Bruce Millan so the pressure was taken off and Bob was alloived to come. 
Bob's presence was vastly influential and I sat him alongside Mrs T She 
was given a warm welcome, I chaired the meeting and she deferred to me 
as well as chatting to all the domestic staff She set the pace but comple- 
mented me on my chairing skills, for which I was flattered She said any- 
thing she said would have to be under Chatham House rules and that she 
had come to discuss with a representative sample of the various communi- 
ties in the NE what could be done. She said we'd been too reliant on cen- 
tral government, then we said we'd like to work with the government to lift 
the regionftom the doldrums. The question was how could we deploy cen- 
tral government resources and our own, we really needed her stamp of 
approval as well as a Secretar of State with regional responsibility. y 
There was hostiliti, ftom Durham councillors who said she was making a 
paqj, political speech, and Terry Harrison (bravely, in my view) said 
'PAI, we are not getting the support from overseas, especialýi firom the 
Aliddle East wherc they wanted military equipment. Well, she wcnt. for her 
gull 117CII, andS17C was so angtýv because she retorted b-v saying the gov- 
crnment had done evei-ohing possible in the Ifiddle East to create mar- 
kets. She then turned to one ofher aides and chan, ý,, ed her iack, thus, 
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$I r- I hure we go again' she said, you wimps! ' and she threw down a chal- 
lenge. 'If you can demonstrate your innate ability, as a great and proud 
region, then prove it. If you can prove that you might get some help'. In 
the debriefing when she had gone, I ivas so fired up, and poor Terry had 
to take paracetamol. This meeting led to the roots of NDC, with Yorthern 
Venture Managers headed by Michael Denny leading the drii, e to engage 
all the great and the good of the region, with them all on board' 
(Holliday, interview, plus a review of Holliday archives/personal papers) -' 
Mills had a slightly different version of the same event: 
'We were told that there was a regional meeting in Durham Castle, were 
sworn to secrecy, but knew it was something big. We didn't know what the 
menu was going to be to who ii, as going to be there. You could hal, c 
knocked me over with as afeather when Maggie, the Iron Laýv, walked in 
followed by that Wet, Jim Prior. We had been pressurising both Neil Kin- 
nock and Michael Foot to get something done. I knew when she didn't eat 
much, and when instead of her usual tipple of whisky, she drank only wa- 
ter, then listened patiently to regional demands. Then shestarted hammer- 
ing on the table, and telling us we were all wimps, and that her govern- 
ment wouldn't help a region that wouldn't help itself Fred Hollida - I, 
would tell you that this was the start of NDC, but the trade union and la- 
bour movement had been lobbying about this for years. It was a Labour 
invention, nothing to do with Thatcher' (Mills) 
Howard's view diverged even further: 
'We had been seriously hampered by Thatcher's stance on tripartitism, so 
we had to be seen to push the business agenda, even though ii, e all knew 
that we've always done our own thing anyway, regardless of government 
dictat. Relationships built over the years can't be destroyed by a remote 
Wesoninster and Whitehall. When Maggie arrived we agreed to keep our 
traps shut and see what she had to offer. It is the way we I ve alwaYs done 
it, and it's stood us in good stead'(Howard) 
What these memories confirm is that business, university, utility. and financial repre- 
sentatives worked fon-nally and infon-nally with state officials. The business commu- 
nity may not have been Nvell represented by specific associations. but individual busi- 
ness elites Nvere central plavers. as they had been in previous regimes. The business 
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voice grew in tandem with other demands. to ,, \, ork alongside local and central state 
officials to adapt policies. As the discussion that follows reveals, these demands are 
no longerjust about intervention, but are now centred on self-determination. 
Mid-1980s onwards: New forms of governance, a growing democratic 
deficit and demands for an elected Assembly 
Thatcher's abolition of both the REPCs and REBB, together with an evaporation of 
regional economic planning, left a poorly institutionalised formal framework for re- 
gional decision-making, and consequently informal mechanisms and personal rela- 
tionships replaced or, at least augmented, what limited formal arrangements existed. 
Key elites were uneasy about wholesale acceptance of the New Right ideology of 
unfettered market solutions; unsurprising in a region with limited private sector, a 
legacy of planning and managerialism, and a heavy preponderance of public agencies. 
Elites placed wider social and economic aims above land use, unfettered competition, 
profitability and property development (Elcock, 2000: 59-64). Those who had served 
as members of planning forums continued to meet, on environmental and Euro fund- 
ing panels, and this inevitably led to the passing on of regional knowledge to the next 
generation of elites, " Local and regional consortia met to decide on regional priori- 
ties, attract FDL and bid for Euro funds continued, thereby enhancing elite collabora- 
tion. NDC (Northem Development Company) was an excellent example of how elites 
collaborated on regional priorities, and NEA (North-East Association of Local Au- 
thorities), prepared the Case foi- the North, in collaboration with business, trade un- 
ions, academics and other sectoral representatives. 
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The persistence of regional decline led Rhodri Morgan, first Minister for Wales. on a 
visit to the region on 13 July 2001, to rally the devolutionists (including some busi- 
ness elites): 
'You share with your Welsh compatriots, a common view that an. v ,,, ov- 
ernment a long way away in Westminster, whether led h, v Thatcher or 
Blair, that tries to tell us how to govern our own affairs is mistaken. ' 
It should be recognised that local authority consortia were never entirely populated by 
local members or officials, but conversely always had regional civil servants, trade 
unionists, academics and other representatives on advisory panels or other forums. 
Planning forums, in particular, used personnel and expertise from the region's univer- 
sities, and academics also have long experience on business, tourism, arts and sport- 
ing forums. The disappearance of traditional industries and the incapacity to replace 
them with newer industries forced elites into seeking more entrepreneurial, re,, ionally 
specific and non-industrial projects that might encourage growth. There has also been 
an acceptance that in the absence of economic growth, or direct central intervention, 
at least the population of the NE might enjoy a relatively comfortable social environ- 
ment. The notion of balancing social and economic growth is a pervasive feature in 
regional discourses, confirming the view that a strategy of realistic pragmatic has en- 
tered the elite psyche. 
The Brussels Office and the Committee of Regions became important avenues for 
elites to connect with other regions. and learn from their experiences"., and individu- 
als were invited to join bodies such as Northern Venture Capital Forum. 
72 Numerous connections remain to this day. 
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Gill \\as the NF. member ot'the Committee of Regions. 
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GONE co-ordinated regional policies previously delivered through four central de- 
partments at regional level'74 and the Regional Director, or Regional Commissar as 
she was referred to, Denham 75 .a native of the NE had long service in Whitehall. It 
was alleged that she went native on returning to her roots, and interview data confirms 
that she was viewed by a combination of affection and distrust. ' Denham had overall 
responsibility for regional policies, allocation of SRB budgets, which pooled thirty 
existing programmes, and co-ordination of regional policies, but importantly she had 
a key role in bringing elites together for specific purposes. ' Both Denham and her 
replacements were highly regarded as entrepreneurial civil servants who helped to 
channel national policies to regional needs, by having a strategic overview of eco- 
nornic, social and cultural needs. Elites also joined other sectoral interests, local and 
central state officials on Boards to consider RDG and RSA applications". In this way 
it was possible to have a regional overview of levels of industrial activity and the in- 
vestment needed to facilitate growth. 
NDC (Northern Development Company) had been formed sometime after the historic 
Durham Castle meeting, as a non-quoted company, limited by share capital, and 
brought together local authorities, trade unionists and business representation from 
160 major industrial and commercial companies. The overall objective was to pull 
together elites in search for new investment (Nissan was the best example) but it also 
74 DOE, Transport, DTI and Employment. 
75 Dobbie, who in turn was succeeded by Blackie, formerly Director of Strategy at One 
North East, replaced Denham. 
76 Respondents were largely men over 55. 
-n Wright and Grant regularly met informally with Denham to discuss educational matters, 
Bridge and Howard met with her on unemployment and labour issues, and she met with 
female elites on a specific female network. 
78The Industrial Development Act, 1982 created miscelleaneous and discretionary powers on 
Regional Development Grants and Regional Selective Assistance. 
101 
develop supply chains, encouraged innovation and SME growh. promoted the region 
and looked for export opportunities. NDC's work did not pass without criticism as the 
local press initially took a jaundiced view about its claims of winning in-vestment and 
job creation: 
'We didn't sing the inward investment song, because here in Darlington 
we have more important things to deal with. There are so many villages 
requi . ri . ng attention, we mounted a campaign on behalf of our readers to 
get NDC to stop the Samsung investment' (Kelly, Northem Echo) 
Frequent battles such as this were fought over where to site new companies. NDC was 
never dependent upon a democratically derived local or regional mandate, and was 
more a continued forum for the long established corporatist approach, but it did ce- 
ment broader, multi-sectoral relationships. 
In general inward investment Agencies such as NDC were never able to facilitate self- 
sustaining and innovative economic development (Young et al 1994: 143-159), nor 
was there much comprehensive data on size, numbers, expenditures or effectiveness 
of the operations of the European IlAs. " Regional policy became underpinned by cost 
effectiveness, competition and selectivity in grant regimes. Improving managerial 
skills and strategies of local business was seen to be the way to enhance growth, and 
the 1981 Industrial Estates Corporations Act and the 1983 White Paper confirmed 
these principles. The 1984 Industrial Development and Co-operative Development 
Agency Act allowed grants to awarded on projects rather than on an asset basis, and 
although Regional Assistance remained as a policy instrument Special Development 
Areas were abolished and companies had to compete with others for assistance. 
79 See Halkicr & Dansen. 1996 on the activItles of European RDAs/IlAs. 
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It is interesting to note that the 1988 White Paper and Enterprise Initiative was aimed 
at comprehensive self help packages for regions to develop their own capacities and 
4go it alone', and Northern Venture Capital Company was responsible for fostering 
enterprise. Elites were still able to lever in resources from mainstream public sector 
programmes, notably European and Urban Programmes, as regional policy was all but 
dismantled (Mawson, 1992). Total financial aid was not reduced, it simpIv came 
through other streams and urban authorities received three times more than the shire 
counties. 
Tyne and Wear and Teesside Urban Development Corporations were formed in 1987 
with budgets of f 150 m for the first five years of operation, and as the findings shov,, 
later, each had a different approach to dealing with civil servants and communities. At 
the same time the need to attract inward investment meant that competing local au- 
thorities had tacit agreements to collaborate rather than compete, which became more 
complex with the creation of UDCs. 
Mawson (1992) argued that adhoc and unplanned shifts in national policies towards 
urban areas was detrimental to the NE, and many of the gaps in coverage continued 
the cordial and informal relationships between elites. The Labour government of 
1997, following the Thatcher and Major legacies, continued the policy of competition 
between regions, and Beckett (then DTI Minister), in response to NE elite demands 
(notably Sir George Russell, 1998) promised to have a moratorium on the Barnett 
formula but this failed to materialise. As the regional economy continued to slump. 
regionalist demands grew. 
Partly to appease regionalist demands One North East (ONE) %A-as created on I April 
1999, charged with the task of improving the economy of the region by co-ordinating 
the eftlorts of regional, sub-regional local partnerships to create a sustainable econ- 
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OMY. 81 RDA s were seen as importance means to customise space (Peck, 1996: 327- 
337) but received a cautious reception as they were thought to be unaccountable su- 
per-quangos with questionable effectivene ss (Corcoran, 1998). The Regional Eco- 
nomic Strategy, which was drawn up after consultation with multi-sectoral a(, -; encies I 
across the region, had the main objective of achieving sustainable economic groAih 
over the next ten years (ONE, 1999). See Fig 3.0 for membership of the RES Strategy zg ý 
Group and Fig 3.1, the first ONE Board membership. 
Fig 3.0 Regional level: ONE Board membership 
Rural Development Commission 
Century Inns 
North East of England Assembly 
of local authoi 
I 
GMBATU 
Freelance joumalist 
Ex-Rolls Royce 
executive 
North Týneside MBC 
Canford Group PLC 
Chair :J Bridge 
CEO: M Collier 
The Universitv Sector 
Teessclale District 
Council 
Norcare Ltd. (vol sector) 
80 It fused NDC. English Partnerships, the Furopean Programme and SRB sections of GO 
and the Rural De\clopment Commission 
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Fig 3.1 The Regional Economic Strategy Task Group 
University of 
Durham (x 2) 
Regional Industrial 
Advisory Board 
TUC 
Barclays 
Bank 
Tyneside TEC 
Government Office 
for the North East 
Northern Business 
Forum 
RES Task 
Group 
Tees Valley Joint University of 
Strategy Unit Newcastle 
This main group was supported by secondmentsfrom a ivide range of other regional agencies 
RDAs were created within an emerging consensus on the need for a strong strategic 
approach to regeneration (Lawless, 1994: 1303-24), and as a framework to allow re- 
gional strategies to give guidance to lower levels of governance, thereby ensuring co- 
ordination and coherence (Danson and Lloyd (1992: 46-54). Initially envisaged as 
powerful executive agencies of democratically accountable regional bodies, they were 
created, however, as non-departmental government programmes, with many pro- 
grammes central to economic development outwith their remit. Legislation allows 
them to evolve and take on additional functions, but their primary role is to give stra- 
tegic direction to lower levels of governance, to facilitate partnership development 
and to regenerate regions. They are part of a very complex institutional framework 
and still little resolution to their role vis a vis local authorities, but Sub Regional Part- 
nerships (SRPs), are resolving some, but not all concerns. 
Much of the work of NDC was absorbed into ONE, and their mechanisms on consul- 
tation with a number of 'partners' and other elites, led to the fon-nation of the RES - 
This was a small strategy task group, invited on an individual basis but with an expec- 
tation that each member would engage actively and objectively in strategy develop- 
ment. it NN as stressed that they xNere not to see themselves as representatives of par- 
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ticular communities or constituencies but as individual actors xho held particular de- 
grees of expertise in specific fields relevant to the region's development. The com- 
mon notion of 'pulling together for the region' was important to hold the group to- 
gether, and characterises the traditional style of elite collaboration. 
A report on the regional economy (NDC 1998) had been published, but the limited 
time frame set by government meant to develop RES, a task group was re-formed, 
reduced somewhat in size, and met under the chairmanship of an academic from one 
of the region's universities. " This raises several questions on how elites were selected 
to join, when they met, and more importantly on what basis was legitimacý' derived. 
The decisions being made could have such implications for the whole population, 
however respondents felt that the scale of work needed to produce a detailed strategy 
and to carry out widespread consultation, as recommended by government, would be 
beyond its own capacity, so there was a recommendation that regional partners, now 
operating as a shadow agency of a putative RDA, should appoint consultants to pre- 
pare a draft strategy. The first document identified the requirements for competitive 
advantage, and set out the challenges facing the region. Representatives from busi- 
ness, individuals and communities were invited to take part in two consultation exer- 
cises, and the invitees were those whose names were already on record. A task group 
of invited individuals, not representative of any agency, was also invited to confirm 
the strategy. In the event the consultation exercises and task group meetings were seen 
as a channel for ONE executives to raise their profile and explain the process. After a 
short review of regional strengths and weaknesses, a set of scenarios was open to 
Nvider consultation. and before the final strategy would be submitted to the Board of 
the RDA. After due consideration and revision the document Nvas appro,, ed. 
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RDAs operational from April 1999. individual RES were presented to Parliament in 
October 1999 and received Ministerial approval after January 2000. The whole proc- 
ess rested on "pre-existing relationships and common modes of working which have 
affected what is necessary in order to achieve regional consensus. " (Benneworth. 
2000a: 53-68). 
It is no surprise to find strategy was developed top-down and then opened to widei- 
consultation for legitimisation and approval. This has long been the style of elite col- 
laborative regeneration in the region, where there are only limited opportunities to 
challenge choices and direction in strategy. The mechanisms and processes militate 
against any fundamental challenge to strategic formulation and implementation and 
fostering an ideology of growth and transformation it is difficult to challenge. The 
style of decision- making is a legacy of earlier regimes, and illustrates how elites 
make choices in the belief that they are operating for the public good. 
RDAs were given a significant role to play in regional policy and ONE was initially 
awarded f 150 million to spend on initiatives; this has since been increased. (See Ap- 
pendix 3.9 for total regeneration expenditure). There remains a question mark over 
just how much autonomy RDAs have, and on the appointment of Bridge as Chairman 
elites were disappointed to hear him say that he was accountable to his central gov- 
ernment paymasters rather than any regional interests. His comments came as no sur- 
prise in a region with long experience of 'managing ' space, because it exemplifies 
the delicate balance between competing managerial and political demands, ývithin 
traditional hierarchies and wider socio-political structures. Bridge. as a quasi- 
private/quasi public sector individual is very adept at managing the tensions, as Nvell 
as working alongside national and regional civil servants. He Nvas able persuade re- 
81 Professor Cockerill, Director of Durham Business School. 107 
gional elites of the importance of getting an RDA, and more importantly he was also 
successful in securing a greater level of resource that RDA Chairs in other regions. 
Regional elites were convinced that the RDA was a step on the way to self- 
determination 
Bridge is supported by a CEO, Michael Collier (who -ývas head hunted from the 
Higher Education Funding Agency in York). Prior to the announcement of the two 
key people, and in keeping with business demands for a greater 'managerialist' 
agenda for the regions, it was thought that high profile business people would be ap- 
pointed as Chair (notably Llew Avis of Siemens or Hugh Morgan Williams of the 
Northern CBI). Interestingly enough and in contrast with the other regional RDAs, the 
government appointed Bridge, a 'safe pair of hands', who had successfully been at the 
helm of NDC for over ten years, and who is regionally very popular with pub- 
lic/private and trade union representatives. 
Collier, an unknown surprise appointment, with a public sector background Nvas re- 
garded as an 'outsider'. The conclusion reached by some elites about two important 
posts being taken by a quango and a public sector head was that it was to be expected 
in a region with a strong public sector base. Unlike other regions, where a pro- 
business dominated, there was some agitation about Bridge's position, but not enough 
to cause too much conflict. The usual pragmatic consensual approach overtook any 
real opposition, and elites became resigned to Bridge at the helm. His appointment, 
therefore, was not seen as anything too unusual in a region famed for its corporatist 
and tripartist responses to regional decline. 
ONI, 'l took over the SRB budgets and other sources of finance from GONT and Eii, -, - 
lish Partnerships, and were expected to prepare Draft Re ional Planning Guidance for 9 
approval by the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State nominated RDA Boards and 
108 
membership caused a furore. Of the twelve members, none -were under forty, only two 
were female (one from an ethnic minority) and none represented other excluded 
groups. 
ONE could be accused of simply being a re-fashioned NDC. but whereas the latter 
body was led by a public/quango leader (Bridge) and representative of the business, 
public sector and trade unions, it is clear that membership of ONE was an attempt to 
broaden representation, albeit still limited. NDC had no females on its board, no one 
from the voluntary sector, nor anyone from the university sector as ONE has. Though 
ONE is quite unlike other regional RDAs, in that both chief officers have public sec- 
tor backgrounds, the business sector has the majority of representation, in keeping 
with central government dictat. ONE's blueprint for the region attempts to be consul- 
tative, and give business an opportunity to influence the regional agenda. 
RDAs have limited resources, limited democratic involvement and limited executive 
decision-making powers. This means that the dilemma of developing a strategy that 
inevitably conflicts with issues concerning whose agenda, whose priorities and how 
accountability and legitimacy can be maintained. ONE is facing much examination 
and critique as it attempts to be inclusive and achieve holistic solution. There are 
many points of contention still to be addressed and ONE is struggling to gain credibil- 
ity for its action in the face of growing demands for a Regional Assembly. 
The existence of RDAs has raised many questions, not least how to measure regional 
success and what the key indicators should be. There are issues here concerning ho, ýv 
to measure competitiveness, inclusiveness and sustainability, as as monitoring 
and evaluating partnership processes (Hastings and McArthur, 1995 cited in Liddle 
and Overton, 1999: 20). ONE is currently engaged with multi-agency groups (aca- 
dernics, consultants and practitioners) to identifv NA-hat type of evaluation and per- 
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formance indicators should be monitored. " The six general ideals on which the strat- 
egy was built are, became a mapping exercise of the region's future and Loals to 
achieve it. It was, however, a continuance of negotiation and contest on regional pri- 
orities and the levels of accountabilities of those making decisions on behalf of the 
whole region. 
RDAs appear to be a typically English 'administrative fix' but amid the changing em- 
phases of governance, all is not so negative as Benneworth, during his monitorim, of 
the RDA experience to date, noted: "the process itself appears to have encouraged 
working in partnership in those regions where it was not already common, it may rep- 
resent a genuine improvement on the current situation, particularly if, as increasingly 
seems the case, that RDA constitutionally, offer no more decentralisation of powcr 
than the previous, highly clecentralised, situation. " (Ben-neworth, 2000b: 53-68, 
2000c: 9-2 1) 
NERA (North East Regional Assembly) is monitoring the activities of ONE, but has 
no powers over it. Composed of appointees from the various sectors, such as business, 
trade unions and the voluntary sector, it has mainly local authorities representatives. 
Prescott, Cabom and Armstrong were dismayed at the in fighting that accompanied 
the choice of membership. As a consequence, the region, which should have been the 
first in England to establish a Chamber. lagged behind other English regions. Z! ) 
It is too early to say whether or not NERA is proving to be an effective check on 
ONE because of the ambiguity and lack of clarity on the relationshiP between the two 
agencies. There is the added question mark over ho,, N, much GONE (Government Of- 
'SI A RevieNN of the RES is currently underwaN. 
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fice North East) will be involved in monitoring and reviewing the work of ONE 
(Bridge, in conversation, September, 2001 )83 
Four Sub Regional Partnerships have worked in collaboration with ONE to agree 
broad strategies, an action plan and detailed implementation programmeS. 8' Further- 
more, the regional debate has become embroiled in the community debates since the 
establishment of Neighbourhood Renewal funding, as regeneration is now a multi- 
level responsibility. The need to fuse polices and budgets is imperative as RDAs still 
do not have universal respect, especially from the business community. " Moreover, 
despite these more formalised arrangements, elites continues to operate informally in 
the gaps left between the bewildering array of institutions, where accountability 
mechanisms are weak, and credibility and legitimacy are questionable. There is a very 
real question about how much autonomy ONE can have, given that it is ftinded by 
central goverrurnent. 
Conclusion 
One can only speculate on what current administrative arrangement might mean in 
this post democratic or post bureaucratic age. The NE remains a region facing consid- 
erable economic and social challenges. The question arises, therefore. how will the 
83 In a PIU Report(2000) Reaching Out, The Cabinet Office suggests that the accountability 
expectations from ONE upwards to GONE may given a higher priority than accountabil- 
ity to the region. 
84 Each RDA has signed Public Sector Agreements to achieve II key targets, and future 
funding will be dependent on hitting these targets. The Treasury has announced the Sin- 
gle Pot of funding from I' April 2002, and set a series of floor targets for regions. ONE 
has, devolved 75% of its budget down to the SRPs. 
85 This author attended the HOC, when David Lennon of the British Chambers of Com- 
merce spokesman, was scathing about the ineptitude of RDAs, and urged the Minister, 
Nick Raynsford to have strong business voice on proposed Regional Assemblies. NE 
business articulated a similar message in September 2002. 
new regional policies seek to address this? As can be seen from this discussion, the 
administrative arrangements now unfurling in the NE to achieve regeneration are al- 
ready starting to show signs of strain, despite the short history and operations of ONT. 
Already demands have been placed on central government for a xvider remit, more- 
over, the democratic demands for an elected Assembly remain unsatisfied, and the 
membership of the main campaign groups are unrepresentative of grass root opinions. 
Regional activists are still demanding an elected Regional Assembly to fill the democ- 
ratic deficit created by exiting administrative arrangements. This gap is still filled by a 
self appointed group of elites, and the gap between them and grass roots is as Nvide as 
ever. The gaping hole between political/institutional and the social/individual arenas 
will still continue to be filled by a group of elites acting on behalf of, but without de- 
mocratic legitimacy or clear lines of accountability. 
The region, with a long history of decline, has had numerous elite attempts over the 
last one hundred years to cope with internal and external forces. Elites from multi- 
sectoral agencies have sought political and managerial solutions to unmet needs. The 
nature of the elite regime has altered over the past hundred years and membership is 
now much broader than the ad hoc and more or less individualistic efforts of aristo- 
cratic and local government partnerships of the late I gth and early 2 Oth Century, or the 
corporatist and tripartite grouping in evidence after the Second World War. The cur- 
rent regime operates in the decision vacuum where administrative and political ar- 
rangements are not capable of plugging gaps in coverage. Broader sectoral representa- 
tion of individual, civic and organisational interests of the region are now involved in 
a multitude of ways. Some are democratically elected, some are appointed. some selt'- 
appointed and still others remain outside and beyond institutional boundaries. It is a 
very broad and complex systern of elite interests that has emerged to fill the regional 
decision space. 
112 
The evidence presented in this chapter reveals that neither European nor national im- 
tiatives aimed at remedying inequalities between regions have achieý'ed this, and no m 
matter how well elites lobby, the region's fortunes have been aligned to the cyclical 
nature of industrial activity. Top down policies imposed from central goý-emment tý 
have not been advantageous to local communities and the lack of a real and coherent 
approach does not facilitate an articulation of interests of the whole region. ONE, the 
RDA, is too recently established for its work to be effectively evaluated, but alreadv 
there is concern that accountability will be upwards to GONE and the Minister of 
State rather than downwards to regional interests like the NERA, and it will be inca- 
pable in the long run of achieving the regional economic and social chanoes it has 
been created to achieve. 
RDAs are a peculiar 'English Fix', a compensatory measure to ameliorate the lack of 
a co-ordinated democratic system, and are perhaps a genuine attempt by central gov- 
ernment to plug the ever more apparent gaping in institutional coverage. 
Many programmes that can affect social and economic development of the region 
remain outwith ONE responsibility, whose primary role is to give strategic direction, 
and to facilitate partnership development. Many problems now surfacing need to be 
overcome before RDAs can redress regional imbalances. Sub Regional Partnerships, 
the newest administrative arrangements peculiar to the region, have added to an al- 
ready complicated and messy terrain. Added to this hesitation on reviewing the Bar- 
nett formula, and absence of effective mechanism to regenerate regional prosperity. 
means that elites will continue to foster'self help' and adoption of national policies, by 
formal and informal means. 
Many English regions are seeking alternative forms of arraný,, ement to address Indus- 
trial decline. attract ne,, v industries and encourage indigenous growth. They. like the 
III 
NE, are seeking to change the image of regions but this requires co-ordinated. planned 
and strategic responses. In the NE, the regime of elites has identified the best condi- 
tions for choosing projects to implement changes. 
The legitimacy and accountability of present arrangements are being questioned more, 
as they fail to represent excluded groups. The processes through which strategies are 
developed and debated are nor transparent and are generally secretive and infon-nal. 
New administrative arrangements around a complex set of interactions between new 
and reformed institutions of GOs, RDAs, and NERA, means that the regional agenda 
is loosely defined, and institutional capacity to deal with economic, social and envi- 
ronmental pressures is unproven, and incapable of providing a framework to solve the 
problems. 
Having considered in this chapter the conditions that led to regime formation, the re- 
maining chapters explore the nature and the role of the regional regime, which has 
evolved, from the 19 th century to its modem day manifestation. The following chapter 
contains a detailed analysis of activities, power inter-relationships and effectiveness. 
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Chapter Four 
The North East Regional Regeneration Regime: Activities, Power 
In te r-Relations hips and Effectiveness 
'Success does not depend on formal, constitutional mechanisms it 
depends on the space occupied between the formal and the informal. The 
risks you take in that space is what makes a region succeed' (Catalonian 
Minister for Industry, BBC Money Programme, 13 September 1998) 
(without an understanding of power there can be no understanding of 
politics' (Dowding, 1994: 79-85) 
Introduction 
Earlier chapters evaluated a broad range of literature on local, urban and regional 
governance and offered partial and particularistic insights but failed to capture the 
complexity, fluidity, flexibility, advocacy or external forces on regional regeneration. 
In this chapter broader literature is adapted in conjunction with selected management 
and political theories of strategy and power to provide a richer explanation of the 
empirical findings on the NE elite regime. Using selective comparative regional data 
to provide a more rounded explanation, it is recognised that the unique nature of 
regimes within regions and locales render direct comparisons difficult. 
Tile multi-faceted nature of urban and regional change and linkages bet,, veen the 
levels, require typologies that allow isolation of key elements, and omission of those 
of little explanatory value. Therefore, having already considered the usefulness and 
IIý 
limitations of some literature, other literature is utilised to explain elite re, -, ime 
activities, power inter-relations, and effectiveness. 
Theories from political science and management are employed to develop further the 
concept of a regional elite regime, in particular to understand the complexities of 
decision-making and inequality of power relationships characteristic of 'managing' 
regional space. In particular there is consideration of the exclusion of disadvantaged 
groups from decision-making. 
The chapter explores some definitions of 'strategy' and 'stakeholding', and the 
concept of regeneration is broadened to appreciate cultural, political and historical and 
external dimensions of change. In this way those vital micro and macro elements 
omitted by regime theories are incorporated. Many hidden elements of powei- and 
influence remain, because observable and non-observable aspects are notoriously 
difficult to discern and secrecy and informality lubricates elite decision-making. 
Wider social influences are claimed to be open to debate, but in reality elites are 
rarely challenged by excluded groups, because of the difficulties in penetrating 
regeneration forums. 
Partnerships at the Region Level 
Recent research has moved away from macro and micro analyses and it is argued that 
partnerships within regional regeneration, capture the flavour of 'the highly 
fragmented, networked shape of the present local power structure' (Pike. 1997: 3). and 
important institutional forms of governance (Collinge and Hall, 1995). The idea of 
having a regional overview is not ne,, N, (MaNN-son, 1997) and the empirical data show a 
poorly institutionalised context, an increase in non-democratic input, and a patch-vvork 
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of governmental and non-governmental elites tried to regulate space. There is a 
general consensus that a regional focus must have business input (Davies, 1995). 
Adapting existing Partnership models to a regional level of analysis 
Partnerships at regional level are ripe for investigation because existing literature is 
conceptually vague, but the term is so popular that it might be thought of as a 
universal or global phenomenon, synonymous with complex policy initiatives to solve 
regeneration all over the world (Greer, 2001: 219). Partnership literature uncriticaliv 
accepted that elites willingly collaborate, and is flawed in minimising power 
relationships and history, expectations and in-built professional assumptions, and 
inevitably conflict must be managed for effective working (Darwin, cited Montanheiro 
I et al 1999: 125-138, Diamond, 2001). The size of resources are important, the type of 
people involved, discretion they have, whether or not the relationships are formal 
through contractual agreements, or informal and based on trust. 
Diversity of multi -organi sational relationships has led researchers to develop 
numerous typologies and classificatory frameworks; located on a continuum, with co- 
operation, as loosely coupled arrangements at the lower end of the continuum, co- 
ordination located at the centre, and collaboration at the high end (Huxham & Barr, 
1993). Very little research has been focused on improving partnerships performance 
and it is rare for partnerships to explicitly evaluate their work, but European and 
national funding regimes have placed evaluation centre stage( Diamond, 2001). 104 
104 See Liddle and Overton (1999), for an e\alLiation of Regional Air Quality partnerships. 
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There are 'how to do guides' on setting up regeneration partnerships (Vangen and 
Huxham, cited Mitchell and McQuaid, 2001: 395-496). and models on processes of 
partnership operation (Mackintosh, cited Mitchell and McQuaid, 2001: 395-496). In 
the context of the NE, Robinson and Shaw argue that regeneration partnerships 
struggle to involve communities because local agencies traditionally failed to shed or 
share power, or accept that mature communities can develop their own ideas and 
implement their own visions (1998: 24-42). Task forces, arguably the latest 
manifestation of the partnerships have become an integral element of an emergent 
form and of adaptable and entrepreneurial organisation, that can thrive in uncertain 
conditions, as it develops, dissolve and reconstitute as new needs arise (Pike, 2000: 
3). 
UR Theories offered useful guidance, but because of contested terrain the partnership 
model developed by Lowndes et al (1997: 333-343) provides a set of criteria for 
adaptation to a regional context (Fig 4.0). Like earlier writers, Lowndes et al (1997) 
claimed that the fluidity, diversity and informality made boundary drawing difficult, 
old decision making systems became obsolete as new networks emerged. Urban 
regeneration is dominated by networks and partnerships so it was important to 
distinguish between them, thus networks were defined as informal relationships 
within a distinct mode of co-ordinative governance, whereas partnerships were formal 
inter organisational arrangements (Lowndes et al , 1997: 340). 
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Fig. 4.0 NetworkJpartnership model adapted to a regional regime 
Source: Adapted from Lowndes et al (1997: 333-343) 
Network Partnership Regional Regime 
Focus Individual Organisation Indiý'idual 
Organisational 
Socio-cultural 
Civic role 
Motivation Voluntaristic Imposed Main1v 
Voluntaristic also mandatorý' 
and civic conscious 
Boundary Indistinct Clear Flexible and adaptable 
Composition Fluid Stable Stable over time space. Ad 
hoc and dynamic, as 
necessary 
Membership Defined by self Defined by formal No formal agreement but 
and others agreement clearly defined membership 
Formalisation Low High Low. Primacy ok'en to 
relational and infon-nal links 
Differences remain at regional level because fragmentation gives rise to questions of 
legitimacy, accountability and autonomy, some argue for an enhancement of local 
authority leadership roles (Pike, 1997: 3), whereas others for more democratic 
accountability and legitimacy (Mawson, 1992). Calls for representative democracy 
are not universal (Moore and Pierre, 1988: 169-178), given that categories of capital 
versus labour are inappropriate because of educational, social and industrial shifts. 
Class based, collectivist support has been replaced by diverse, individual forms of 
protest (Cox and Mair, 1989: 137-146), so in seeking new ways of explaining urban 
and regional change, the following section moves forward the discussion. 
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Urban Regime Theories 
Adapting, or developing new models to describe emergent local and regional decision 
making in the UK is a recent phenomenon, allowing researchers to move beyond the 
narrow emphasis of city government and representative politics to a broader concern 
on how collective decisions were made through conflict or collaboration, beyond state 
actors and agencies (Stoker, 1996). Regime theories focused on leadership capacity, 
partnership operations, who benefited from regeneration, encapsulated broader agency 
and civic society into a political economy, to understand how were tasks achieved 
(Stoker, 1996)'0' 
Most adaptations of US theory to the UK have been unsuccessful (Bassett, 1996: 539- 
555) as they identified how consortia with place dependent interests developed, and 
derived direct or indirect benefits from urban growth. Typically rentiers. property 
owners and development companies, worked with local government agencies, the 
media, trade unions and educational institutions to boost the image of a locale. It is 
not inevitable that business will achieve a privileged position, and the empirical data 
that follows shows, this has been far too simple an analysis. There is a substantial 
literature from the US; much of it infon-ned Stoker and Mossberger's later typology 
(Fanstein, 1995: 34-43, Elkin, 1985: 11-27, DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1993: 137- 
158). 
Studies in the UK have suggested that business interests are assuming a greater role in 
growth coalitions, but are still less influential than in the US (Harding, 1991: 295-317, 
10' Four forms of power NNere discernible, (i) systernic power, or position in the 
socio. econornic systern, (ii) command, or social control power to mobillse resources. 
finance, information, reputation or knowledge, (Iii) coalition poNNer through bargaining 
and negotiation, and (i\, ) pre-emptive, or the power of social production, 
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Harloe, 1990: Lawless, 1994: 1303-1324). This ý, veakness of business is seen as a 
result of a more tenuous tradition of involvement. the leadini role of local 
govermnent, party politicisation of local issues, dominance of professional 
hierarchies, and limited local tax revenues to fund partnerships (Bassett, 1996: 539- 
555). 
The overriding concern with interests, processes and outcomes of elites at the expense 
of the relations between dominated and dominant groups, led researchers to call for a 
Gramscian historical perspective of hegemony, where dominant factions of capital to 
subordinate classes and other social interests can be more clearly articulated. Critics 
do not herald universal rejection, because regime theories offer lessons that should not 
be dismissed lightly because of an assertion of US exceptionalism (John and Cole, 
1996b: 26). 
Suggestive as they all are, when applied to a regional level they present difficulties, as 
Bassett found in Bristol (1996: 539-555). Regional regeneration does not easily fit 
into existing categories, though they can be deployed to construct questions and 
gather empirical data. Harding (1991) believed that Urban Regimes and Growth 
Coalitions were on more fertile conceptual ground at local, rather than urban levels, 
but it is clear that their significance can only be tested with empirical data. 
Furthermore subtle nuances and informal inter-actions between elites, development of 
capacities and leadership, cohesion of organisational resources, are located at the 
micro levels, whereas regime theorists had restricted analysis to the meso level. This 
concentration at micro-level, though valuable is weakened. 
It has been usual to explain business dominance by the fact that local government 
relied on property taxes to redistribute to the disadvantaged; therefore capital 
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accumulation was a prerequisite. The importance of external forces on regime 
formation has been weakly articulated (Elkin, 1985: 11-27) but regimes can be the 
mediating factor between external forces and locales (Stone, 1991: 289-298). Stone's 
three categories of corporate, progressive and caretaker, were challenged because they 
lacked external focus (Harding, 1991: 300), but in response he suggested that 
coalition building was informal, uncertain, and actors were more concerned with 
maintaining a regime, than considering countervailing powers (Stone, 1991: 289-298). 
In the absence of conceptual clarification, Stoker and Mossberger (1994: 195-212) 
developed a composite typology to isolate internal and external variables, within a 
bounded geographical area to facilitate the story of each urban area. Organic, 
instrumental, and symbolic regimes, with various sub-divisions such as caretaker and 
progressive were categorised. Goals, motivations, common sense of purpose, internal 
relationships and congruence of interests, as well as relationships with wider local and 
national political environment were analysed. An acceptance of decentralisation of 
state responsibilities, financial constraints and increased privatisation increased 
complexity and improved public/private co-operation. Urban regimes were 
characteristically co-operative, had strong collective action and elite co-ordination, in 
this sense state and non-state elites took on enabling roles to develop mutually 
beneficial relationships, and business became core to shaping the urban terrain. 
Business was categorised as one of the three key participant groups with the others 
being elected officials and community representatives. To these, technical/ 
professional officials such as local goverm-nent officials, quango officials or the local 
agents of central/local government, were added as a fourth category. Stoker and 
Mossberger's composite typology Appears at Fig 4.1 
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Fig 4.1 Characteristics and 
Mossberger (1994) 
defining features of regimes: Stoker and 
Defining 
characteristics 
Organic Instrumental Symbolic 
Maintenance of Proj ect Redirection of Purpose 
status quo realisation ideology/image 
Main motivation of Local Tangible results Expressix, e politics 
participants dependency 
Basis for common Tradition and Selective Strateoic use 
purpose Social cohesion incentives of symbols 
Quality of coalition Political Political 
(congruence of 
Communion partnership 
Competitive 
interests) 
Relationship with environment 
Local Exclusive orientation Exclusive orientation Inclusive orientation 
Non local Independent Dependent Dependent 
NB. - There is a diagnostic rule for using the typology, thus 'it is unlikely that an , 1, 
regime will conform exactly to the listed characteristics' and 'may not fit exclitsivel , I, 
in one classification because regimes are dynamic so there may be movement between 
classifications as circumstances change' 
The research observed that the NE does not readily fit into any one classification, but 
the framework did improve explanation collections of disparate and distinct 
phenomena. The composite framework acted as a useful classificatory model to test 
questions empirically, and in spite of its limitations the concept of an urban regime 
combined with other theoretical frameworks was used to develop a useful synthesised 
framework. Drawing upon concepts developed by managerial and political theorists 
the remainder of this chapter therefore considers the key characteristics, activities, 
membership, power-inter relationships and effectiveness of this elite regime. 
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Coherence of coalitions 
UR theory placed considerable importance on the quality or coherence of a regime. 
and these were sub-divided into (i) political communion; (ii) political partnership. and 
(iii) competitive agreement. Regional regimes are likely to include much wider range 
of interests than local networks, partnerships or urban regimes, boundaries are less 
well defined and motivations more varied. The data showed a high degree of 
congruence, very strong sense of regional identity, with a common interest in 
regeneration. At the same time the lack of formal mechanisms or institutional 
frameworks could create difficulties in holding a regime together, but the strength of 
multi-agency leadership, the informal interactions and longevity of relationships 
provide a historical cohesion. 
Co-operation and morality were recognised as the underlying principles in leadership, 
because multi -dim ens ional co-operation is not a natural act (Barnard, 1938), so social 
purpose as well as material gain and individual interests were crucial. Added to this 
regimes had broad agendas, a shared a vision that location was more than 
profit/investment based activities, and non business elements of community 
governance were equally important. Co-operation, it was argued, does not necessarily 
depend on altruism, personal honour, common purpose, internalised norms, or shared 
beliefs but in a set of values embodied in the culture. 
At all levels of governance there were examples of conflict in the NE, much the same 
as those found in other regions. In Devon and Comwall, County Councils had to be 
propelled into collaboration in the interests of attracting inward investors (Stanyer, 
1997: 85-89), whereas in the NW conflict arose from environmental and economic 
development issues. In the NE tensions were overcome by fostering a regional vision 
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and informality lubricated the processes, as the following quote from Sir George 
Russell, former Chair of NDC, demonstrates: 
'in a networked regions such as the NE there is no need for formality' 
(Business Contact magazine, 1998). 
The need to create informality, and the inevitable conflicts found in Manchester (Peck 
and Tickell, 1994: 57-78) were minimised in the NE, because informal networkin, -, 
has become a socially embedded feature of NE political and cultural life. It would be 
wrong to deny that conflicts are completely absent, because there are maný, examples 
of institutional turf wars or highly publicised fracas between business and 
public/political elites'O'. In Bridge's opinion these represent no more than: 
'a squabbling family that presents a united ftont to the neighbours 
(Bridge) 
Party political congruence or communion cannot be assumed because of the Labour 
Party domination, and the business community contains many prominent 
Conservatives. Despite party political differences elites share a political partnership 
based around articulation of regional interests, and energetic lobbying. The regime 
shares remnants of earlier regimes, in seeking new solutions to perennial and 
intractable problems, but the overriding objective is to regenerate the region, and 
choose appropriate projects to facilitate this. 
Elites co-operate on the basis of relational contracts, based on trust, mutuality. and 
collaboration dependent on a series of repeated transactions over the long term 
(Kay, 1993). There are no explicit rules, regulations and formality, because 
106 Sir John Hall and NeNNcastle CC over the new football stadium; Sir Ron Norman had 
countless battles NN'th Cleveland CC, Watkin was denied planning permission for a 
leisure emporium. 
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commitment and flexible responses are critical, and achieved by free flo'ws of 
information. There is also an implicit, rather than explicit understanding, that the 
partners must continue to co-operate in a series of repeated transactions for mutual 
benefit Kay (1993). The following quote demonstrates this, in a NE context: 
'Trust had to be built up by all partners. You cannot measure trust in 
output terms but it has to be there to succeed' (Richardson) 
Localdependency 
Stoker and Mossberger found that tangible results such as public support, getting 
things achieved, advancing careers guaranteed participation in urban regimes, and the 
level of dependency each interest group had on a locale were important factors. 
Business people were seen to participate for profit, politicians depended on votes, 
public officials had career motives and community representatives normally wanted 
community gains. In the NE , all elites claim to want to 
improve local conditions, and 
everyone, without exception, confirmed that local dependency was more than self- 
interest. It is cautionary to note, however, that interviews do not always reveal true 
feelings, and actors may be pursuing their individual goals at the same time as 
furthering the interests of the region. Nevertheless these quotes illustrate the 
prevailing view: 
'We mix the social and community desirability with the need to create 
jobs' (Frankish) 
We're proud to be Northern but we think it importantfor politicians and 
thinkers f0gelhff to dream up initiatives to aid communities'(Mills) 
In this way reocneration policies are formulated and implemented to pursue proýjects 
aimed at meetinc, unmet economic. social and cultural needs, even though it would be 
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interesting to examine more deeply beneath the rhetoric and hype to investigate real 
motives Obviously business people have employment and inward investment 
uppermost in their minds, and all elites are concerned with their career paths but the 
findings suggest altruistic motives. In the absence of further research to refute these 
claims we must accept the veracity. Even the lost vehement critics have a strong 
commitment and civic pride in the region : 
'All people get around the table now, instead of being just public sector 
dominated' (Watkin) 
But the comment reveals the latent tensions between sectors, and calls for clear 
leadership. It was encouraging to find that all elites saw leadership as important as the 
following discussion shows. 
Leadership of regional regimes 
Leadership is a crucial element in regeneration, and it is generally agreed that 
entrepreneurialism in all sectors is beneficial. The need to turn external stimuli into 
internal responses, and secure collective goals is central to explanation (Bennett and 
Krebs, 1994: 119-140), but we currently lack a proper understanding of the ways in 
which business people develop a 'civic consciousness' or the diverse motives that 
drive people to become involved. Existing research failed to recognise the complex 
interplays between state and non-state actors, added to confusion in spatial entities, by 
describing partnerships some with similar objectives, operations and personnel, others 
Nvith quite different compositions and objectives but increasingly overlappino (ýVood, 
Valler and North: 10-27) 
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In Manchester local business leadership had limited autonomy because of' wider 
economic and regulatory relations. and a language of growth not matched by reality 
(Peck and Tickell, 1994: 57-78), whereas in Bristol, 25 main activists led b% John 
Savage, CEO of a local company social and economic goals prevailed (Bassett. 1996: 
539-555). A much broader constellation of interests is evident in the NE, albeit led by 
Bridge, who is regarded as: 
'A safe pair of hands, open, pragmatic, concerned with social needs, 
totally committed to the region, a clear understanding of the history of 
decline'(a view articulated in various interviews) 
And in his own words: 
'I operate at a rarefied level so get to be in contact with senior civil 
servants andpoliticians a lot'(Bridge) 
Civil servants and other regional officials have always been drawn into elite activities 
to legitimise their activities, purposes and rationale. Uncertainties and ambiguity in 
policy directions have meant that elites have used these individuals to clarify, and 
help to adapt policies to regional needs. Elites recognised the context and space for 
collective action has become enlarged, with an increased potential to influence 
regional civil servants. In doing this they have sought to increase their autonomy to 
act through a grapevine, informality and loosely coupled arrangements (Kanter 1994: 
96-112). There are many examples of business lobbying e. g. Sir George Russell on 
the Barnett formula, Watkin dramatically jumped on a train (and was photographed 
by the regional press) to lobby the then PM, John Major about the decline in 
manufacturing, Sir Ralph Iley pressurised Neville Trotter, then Conservative MP for 
North Tyneside about the plight of the region. This lobbying has its orioins in the :D 
aristocratic regimes of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. and then durnig 
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the in the 1930s and 40s, and T. Dan Smith in the 1960s and 70s, up to present day, as 
reflected in the range of activities no,, \, presented. 
Regime activities 
Elites were asked to comment on their main activities to achieve regional objectives, 
and Fig 4.2 provides a composite list. Broader empirical data is synthesised in the 
remainder of the chapter to examine the power inter relationships and effectiveness of 
activities, by way of explanation of the co-ordination and negotiation as pre- 
requisites, within the wider socio-political system and traditional hierarchies. 
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Fig 4.2 Regime activities (identified by interviewees) 
Strategic decision-making 
Leadership and unanimity of purpose 
Uses strategic techniques. 
Strategic Intelligence and environmental scanning. 
Maintaining a Regional Data Base 
One Stop Shop, Skills Directory and Procurement. Focal Point for FDL 
Research. 
Links with external world (lobbying) 
Links to other regions 
Links SMEs and inward investors to other sectors 
Links cultural, artistic, sporting to economic development objectives. 
Links between local, sub-regional and regional levels. 
Arbiter between urban and rural 
Minimises conflict. 
Facilitator of information flow 
Enabler of resource pooling 
Network facilitator and facilitator of rotation of personnel between sectors. 
Fosters prominence of elites 
Task force facilitator 
Rhetorical, PR role and image change 
Ideas exchange forum 
Plugs democratic gap. 
Project identification. 
IA 
Strategic decision- making 
Elites have pursued innovative strategies but the uncertainties and ambiguous 
mandatory guidance has left a vacuum for entrepreneurial action to fill. Flexibility has 
been crucial in formulating and elaborating a strategic agenda, drawing on 
organisational resources and infon-nation to implement chosen strategies. At the same 
a need to manipulate symbols and images of growth to foster an ideology of 
transformation. 
No agreed definition on strategy in either private or public sectors has been 
established, and differences exist between the sectors despite strategic planning being 
used successfully in the public sector (Dodge and Eadie, cited Bloom, 1986: 235- 
259). There are problems in applying private sector ideas in public sector 
environments, but Danson and Lloyd (1992: 46-54) advocate a more 'strategic 
approach' to regeneration suggesting that strategy at regional level can guide lower 
levels and act as a co-ordinated, coherent and responsive framework. The words 
ýstrategies', 'plans', 'policies', and 'objectives' are often used interchangeably in 
either public or private settings (Bennett, 1996). 
There are many competing perspectives, thus strategy is about; structural elements 
(Channon, 1973), strategic leadership (Leavy and Wilson, 1994); culture (Stacey, 
1993); or industry analysis (Porter, 1980). Mintzberg challenged pre-determined 
definitions of strategy, believing it to be emergent and conditional (Mintzberg, 1987) 
by identifý'ing schools of strategy, thus, the design, planning, positioning, 
entrepreneurial, cognitive, learning, power, cultural, environmental and confi, -, uration 
schools (Mintzberg, 1998) 
1-31 
On a general level the NE 'strategic approach' reflects elements of all strategic 
schools of thought. The design school approach matches regional capabilities xvith 
external opportunities, the planning school emphasises quantitative analysis: the 
entrepreneurial and cognitive schools show how visionary elites choose projects to 
engender competitiveness. The evolutionary model is confirmed by continual 
reference to regional learning, long tennism, sustainability and the need to pass 
knowledge to future generations. Top-down models partially explain some elite 
activities, but cannot explain micro level power relationships, history. culture and 
informal networking. Nor do they show how environmental forces affect strategic 
choices. Cultural explanations help to explain collective action, and show how elites 
act on behalf of civic society; what they fail to show is how excluded groups can 
penetrate elite decision making to influence direction. The informality and secrecy 
surrounding elite activities means that decisions are rarely challenged. Added to this 
strategies are rarely articulated in advance because of the continued uncertainty on 
missions or of finding correct solutions. Elites claim to act on behalf of disadvantaged 
groups, such as the disabled, the poor, the ethnic minorities, and all believed that they 
represented civic society but in actuality, - legitimisation of the mechanics and 
processes involved are never challenged. Access and control of relevant policy 
networks allow elites to maintain control of the regeneration agenda. 
Power, cultural, environmental and configuration perspectives are all critical to 
understanding elites. Enviromuental forces have shaped the region, and elites have 
been forced into making strategic responses. They do this by manipulating symbols 
and continuously struggling for legitimacy and autonomy. To this they have always 
had to concentrate on the future. The adapted schema at Fig 4.3 shows how elites 
became the crucial meso-level link between the micro decision makin, -, level, and the 
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national government and the global world. This is achieved by incorporating ci,,,, il 
servants and local state officials in to forums, in particular those in strategically 
significant positions. By matching resources, knowledge and information to the 
challenges of the competitive environment, they not only legitimise activities but are 
able to adapt policies to regional needs by choosing appropriate strategies. Decisions 
are made on future action, on behalf of the total population, and elites manage the 
complex interaction of informal and formal power relationships interactions over 
time. By striking the correct balance between structural constraints and collective 
agency, through contingent means they harmonise economic, social and cultural 
activities. 
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Fig 4.3 Model depicting the combined macro, meso and micro levels within NE 
regime strategic process. 
I 
MACRO-LEVEL 
I 
Links to external world 
(International, national, regional) 
Analysis of political- 
economic context - 
I 
MESO-LEVEL 
I 
Data gathering 
Identification of agencies to 
pool resources 
MICRO-LEVEL 
NB 
STRATEGY BY 
RIF, GIMEACTORS 
Linkages to sub-regional & loca 
awareness of local needs 
Benchmarking against 
I-- other regions 
Identification of pro- 
jects to boost image, 
Identification of individuals 
(Task Forces, Forums etc) 
THIS IS ACHIEVED THROUGH A MIXTURE OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL 
MEANS BY TACIT INFORMATION FLOW 
I Lobbying 
Westminster, Whitehall, CBI, TUC 
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External forces, normally neglected in UR Theories, and critical to strategic analysis 
are recognised by elites as they assess the competitive domain, and benchmark a, -), ainst 
other regions. To avoid duplication of efforts, information is gathered at all levels of 
governance so that available resources are widely known. If, for example a task force 
needed to be established there is readily available data on who and what can be 
pooled. 
The regime has no mandatory or democratic legitimacy, but all elites, when 
questioned did believe that they were plugging the democratic gap and acting with 
responsibility on behalf of the majority of the regional population. The regime is 
voluntaristic, with no evidence of the processes used to recruit new elites, other than 
through personal contacts. The growing regionalist demands, are in part, a response 
to this elite management, but also to the growth in non-democratic and non 
accountable bodies created by central government. 
Culture and shared stakeholder expectations are a crucial driving force in strategy, 
and these are reflected in supplementary coalitions that are created when specific 
projects, initiatives or events used as regenerative activities. The regime taps into sub- 
regional agencies and networks, and as a focal point between the external and internal 
worlds, it is a repository of information emanating from many directions. 
Another writer on strategy, Hax (1990: 34-40) recognised three core processes, 
coonitive, (ii) social and, (iii) organisational, all necessary to build consensus on 
setting objectives and long term change. The data reveals an exPlicit and proactive 
approach to objective setting, and the development of integrative economic and social 
blueprints. Traditional corporatist decision-making arrangements were deliberately 
fashioned into a much xvider system of interests to cope with new demands. Nissan 
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galvanised elites, as did the closure of the shipyards and the mines, and the creation of 
UDCs, or TECs that focused minds on how to bring about change. The creation of 
new institutions such as TECs and UDCs was not greeted with suspicion, in contrast 
to other regions. Rather, they were welcomed as yet another opportunity to absorb 
greater numbers of civil servants into the regional cause, and thereby adding to 
legitimacy. Unlike Manchester, where long running battles were widely reported, 
there have been few explicit tussles between quango heads and regime elites 
Interviewees were asked to list the most powerful and influential figures"'. Individual 
figures such as Bridge, Robson, Denham, Balls, Wrigglesworth, and Wright were 
identified , because of their longevity in the political landscape. The data was no 
surprise, given that all chosen elites feature regularly in the press and attend every 
function. In reviewing the list of names it is clear that elites share a view on who, and 
who is not influential. The fact that those chosen have been in post for long periods 
indicates an importance attached to long termism and stability. Objective setting 
needs stable conditions, because continuous redirection and erratic reorientation is 
debilitating, consequently the need for a clear strategy is confirmed. As part of long 
termism elites have been concerned to develop a diversified industrial base, and 
continually asked 'what business are we inT and 'what business should we be inT 
Currently the focus is on the farming sector, but creative industries, indigenous 
development and clustering are all part of a long running, though restricted dialogue. 
Latterly it has engaged devolutionary campaigners, and is now supported by MPs, 
MITs who are equally concerned at the regional plight. 
10" The list of important stakeholders appears later in the chapter. 
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One answer in the face of global restructuring has been an aggressive marketing and 
PR campaign but questions remain on effectiveness. As case material shows. there has 
been some success in raising the profile, but continued concern on the inability for 
marketing to help to address the decimation of traditional industries. Elites adopted 
business management techniques and rhetoric such as Performance review to foster 
transformation ideology. They have also emphasised R&D. skills and education, as 
exemplified in the following quotes: 
'A mechanism is put in place for strategic planning, strong individual 
action, and converting ideas into action' (Robson) 
'Three strategic themes keep us all going (i) are we competitivc, (ii) can 
we regenerate the physical aspects, get rid of the blight of pit heaps, 
create jobs and improve social conditions, and (iii) how can we sustain 
changes and ensure that ii, e leave a legacy behind? We pride ourselves on 
being a strategic-, sensible and sustainable region which is wh 'v we 
have 
concentrated on a good support ftamework of after care and supply 
chains'(Robson) 
'We are trying the German model of corporately looking across the whole 
region'(Bridge) 
'We aim for synergy. Nissan forced us into this. All local authorities 
wanted Nissan on their patch but that was unrealistic so we had to look 
across the whole region'(Robson) 
'The aim is strategically plan but to be pragmatic, and entrepreneurial so 
that synergy is matched it, ith flexibility' (Bridge) 
'There cannot be a dominant partner. All the regional bits need to fit 
together integralýv. Its like making a cake, all the ingredients have to cook 
iogeth LT and we have all the best ones if we take a long term look at 
ourselves and determine where we want to be'(Gill) 
It may be hard to see what effect strategic planning has had on overall success. but 
there are deliberate attempts to adapt national policies to regional needs, thus: 
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'Our ability to match national policy objectives with regional capabilities 
is a key feature of our success. In fact the first question we always ask is 
'How do we use (a new government policy) for regional ends'. This is 
done strategically, and examples; The White Paper on Competitiveness 
was national, FEFC at the national level, but at the regional level we had 
key partnerships developing. From an institutional learning point of view, 
the Service and Manufacturing Challenges are all about setting targets 
for regional companies so we pre-empted a nationalýy driven policY 
initiative' (Wright) 
This continual adherence to a combined managerial and professional discourse has a 
downside because local politicians and other interests have become colonised by 
professional and managerial rules of the game whereas business people become 
absorbed in regional politicking. This dilution and synthesis is deliberate and aimed at 
sustainability and growth in non-traditional areas of the economy. 
Additional comments confirm that elites believe that it is possible to shape the 
political agenda: 
'Central government sets a ftamework and the regional agencies are 
pragmatic, sensible and draw in as many players as necessary' (Denham) 
'The regional level is the focal point for strategic change. It is where 
national policies and local needs enmesh. Taking a regional view of needs 
leads to sustainability' (Wright) 
Sustainability was characterised by: 
'The biggest change in the regional approach has been the emphasis on Supply 
chains' (Richardson) 
JVe have had to create a mechanism, a conduit to draw all sub-regional 
programmes together. IJ e pick the team, set up essential structures, set 
objectives, and make sure all sectors are represented' (Bridge) 
'We arc keen on pei. -formance review o the whole region. Only then can 
'f 
ive qýkr the region as a place to invest in. We develop a corporate plan, a 
IA 
resource plan, and a business plan. This, is long term. J17ij, else do ' vou 
think the region set up the Brussels office, and why else does XDC have a 
procurement section so suppliers can be immediately put in touch with 
Nissan or Samsung? ' (Robson) 
'I defy anyone to match us on our integrated regional transport system. 
That's why Japs and Koreans want to come here, they love it. They have 
not got such brilliant infrastructure as we have here(Gill) 
Paradoxically central government and global capital have the power to shift huge 
resources, which shapes the level of autonomy, and a capacity to shape regional 
fortunes. However, there is no doubt that elites do try to emphasise ideas, innovation 
and new ways at looking at problems. In this way elites believe that they have some 
control, as these comments show: 
'The region is dynamic and the key to our success is that we are an ideas 
region, we are always thinking up new ways to tackle decline. We were 
the fist region to have a regional consortia of LAs (NEA), an NDC, a 
regional response to Agenda 21 after Rio, an Ambassador Scheme, and to 
regionalise our business voice (Frankish) 
'We are evolving our institutions as we learn, and our strategic success is 
down to the smallness, homeliness, outwardly friendly people who all 
know each other. We call it a lifelong learning approach to regeneration' 
(Gill) 
In gathering intelligence and environmental scanning for external finance to support 
specific projects elites use all available external networks, which were particularly 
important in Visual Arts. Indigenous industries furnish information for inward 
investors in a 'one stop shop' on infrastructure, finance, utilities, personnel and local 
employment conditions. A support framework from initial enquiry through to after 
sales and continuous business support, links companies into supplier chain links, and 
research into after sales. 
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A repository of data on R&D capacities of universities and a 'Who's Who of elites is 
on record; and information is gathered from sub regional levels by various means; 
formally through ED agencies and informally through elites. Much of this was taken 
over by Knowledge House (a consortia of all regional Universities) and Observatories 
are being established for Public Health, Skills. and Environmental Data. Discussions 
are also taking place about the feasibility of a Regional Observatory to be the single 
repository for all such data"'. Data speeds speeds up inward investment (e. g. to secure 
Siemens and Samsung a joint effort between Freudenberg, English Estates, Durham 
County Council and other agencies established land and other technical and 
knowledge based information). Elites were critical to these investments as they 
allowed networks to be used for procurement purposes. 
In the light of such systematic intelligence gathering a question might be raised on the 
costs in personnel, finance and time, given that the benefits may be seriously 
outweighed. It is clear that by conducting a thorough analysis elites satisfy their own 
consciences, and if things go wrong, can always point the finger at national 
government or global capital. 
Elites lobby on behalf of the region by contributing to national and international 
forums"'. The ambassadorial role is regarded as crucial, which is why a buddy 
scheme has been created to aid networking inside and out with the region. Elites also 
have extensive linkages with other regions and nation states, which helps to update 
108 The author is University of Durham representative on the Regional Observatory Steering 
Group, with over 30 agencies(formed in July 2001). 
109 E. g Denharn chaired the GO national group, Bridge advised Caborn and Prescott on 
setting Lip RDAs, Wrio-lesworth advised CBL Beecham is the Chair of LGA, Wright sat 1=7 -- - 
on national educational and equal opportunities panels, Grant was a national TEC board 
member, Aviss N\ as national secretary of the British C of C. 
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knowledge and information. Deliberate policy communities were created to lubricate 
cross sectoral networking, as examples large scale automotive manufacturers were 
linked with small suppliers, and Bridge, Grant, Wright and Robson, in particular has 
been involved in many of these events ....... Whether we choose to accept the 
proposition that lobbying brings success or not, the data does reveal that elites see this 
as a primary activity, perhaps the most critical, not only to keep up pressure on central 
government to ensure that the NE is high up the political agenda, but also to legitimise 
their own activities. 
Many forums have been established to foster growth in creative, arts, or other sporting 
or cultural activities"'. The Sage Regional Music Centre at the Baltic Flounnills in 
Gateshead: 
'Which will be the finest in the UK. It resulted ftom VA, which was a 
national initiative' (Wright) 
As well as economic data collection data on employment levels, crime, health, is 
continuously appraised for a continuous dialogue between decision makers. By 
having a close proximity to civic society elites can align social and economic aims. 
An example of this is when a SWOT of Teesside Chemicals Initiative assessed the 
environmental/community impact of growth. This resulted in an expansion of the 
industry, but only after the companies gave assurances that finance would be made 
available to clear up pollutants. Thus competing demands of urban and rural dwellers 
110 Black and Decker hosted a 'good practice exchange' and Common Purpose allows elites 
to network. 
Durharn County Council ED Strateoy 2002 advised cross-secondment between agencies. 
This author commented on the draft. 
112 This author is a member of Culture NE, part of the strategy body responsible for 
deN eloping a Culture Strateov for the Region (led by GONE, ONE and NEA) 
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were reconciled and judgements made on any future investments. Urban and rural 
collaboration is encouraged and conflict minimised by bringing some issues into the 
political and institutional arena. There are critics, as the following quote shows: 
'As ajournalist I want to see an improvement in the quality of life. I worry 
about business dominating the agenda, that is why my newspaper takes 
such a crusading stand on inward investment. We must have socially 
desirable projects (Kelly) 
Sub-regional conflicts over resources, planning permission, siting of new investment 
are minimised, although not always entirely eradicated at regional level. Seemingly 
irresolvable turf battles are aired to diffuse otherwise explosive situations, and 
competition between agencies is dampened by appeals to a united front. The primary 
purpose of diffusing conflict is that over the years elites have recognised that regional 
discord equals wrong messages transmitted to the external world. The funders of 
projects become very nervous when there is instability so, it serves everyone's interest 
to be seen to be harmonious. 
'Inside the region I deal with dissent. Outside 'we are all in it together' 
(Bridge) 
This quote indicates the managerial and professional desire to keep conflicts hidden, 
whereas the following political view indicates a contrary view: 
'We on Newcastle City Council worry that decisions will be taken by NDC 
or GONE. That is why its our role to provide the democratic input' 
(Beecham) 
Managerial, professional and political agendas are balanced and worked out through 
dialogue, sometimes very heated and often in the regional press. It might be argue that 
this demonstrates that differences are aired in the open, conversely there are onlN- 
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certain issues that surface for discussion. Any issues requiring a political spin are 
referred to a higher political authority. thus: 
I D'. 
By representing local communities at regional and national level and 
using what power we have to influence Blair through the Northern Group 
of Labour MPs, I am the channel ftom the locales right zip to national 
government' (Robson) 
The importance of sharing institutional resources is reflected in the wav that 
secondees are moved between agencies. Business people are regularly seconded to 
regeneration forums with time and expertise granted freely, e. g. The Regional 
Chamber worked with Gateshead BC and the Police to undertake a review of crime 
and effects on the businesses in Team Valley. This sub regional issue became 
regionally focused and regional specialists were identified for secondment. 
'There is a lot of transferring of ideas between sectors in the region bill 
there is also a sharing of institutional capacity to achieve regional 
economic aims'(Balls) 
Another example is reflected in the following comment: 
"In attracting Nissan NDC did the marketing, we (DCQ and other LAs 
had the sites, infrastructure and are very good at strategic planning. We 
drew in the Dept of Transport, reclaimed land, and improved the road 
s ruc ure (Robson). 
Individuals were assembled on planning meetings prior to FDI, or for foreign visits, 
usually by attendance at sporting and cultural events"'. 
Personnel rotate across institutions and this has the benefit of transferring knowledge. Bridge 
was an economist at the University of Durham before NDC, Joe Mills, well known 
There are hundi-eds of examples such as International Centre for Life, Northern 
Inforniatics. and Unkersity of Industry. 
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trade unionists chairs of Sunderland HA, Sir Fred Holliday former VC of the 
University of Durham chairs Northumbria Water, Sir Ian Wrigglesworth, fon-ner Lib 
Dem became Chair of the Northern CBL and is in a property development partnership 
with Karl Watkin. Elites also have prominent places on governing bodies of regional 
universities, Don Robson, a former school teacher and keen cricketer, was influential 
in bringing first class county cricket to Durham. Multi-agency roles are explained by 
the following: 
'There is a small pool of very high profile people'(Balls) 
'We work together well, we move around a lot, and provide top quality 
people when needed'(Gill) 
'We scratch each other's backs, and we have all been around like the 
dinosaur for so long that. We pool of good practice, and as we move 
around a lot we have a bank of knowledge' (Mills) 
'I am on so many partnerships I cannot even list them all. It helps to move 
across the region, I travel a lot externally, and sit on government panels 
for education' (Wright) 
On the one hand it is argued that it is good to move around the region, but on the other 
it reinforces parochialism, a myopic view and explains the 'Fortress NE' mentality. 
Elites need a platform to enhance their prominence and widen their circles of 
influence Using regional media helps to enhance career aspirations. 
Inward investment elites are assimilated into regeneration forums, and they have 
shaped the agenda on notions of after care, and continuous improvement. The idea of 
being a 'learning region' entered the regional psyche and permeated agency agendas. 
This fostered an ideology of long termism and sustainability. Bridge personally visits 
colleoes and universities to 'sell' this message. It is interesting to note that no matter 
144 
how successful these activities are they have still not altered the long term economic 
performance. 
Recent job losses galvanised elites into assembling various task forces for a rapid 
response to closures. They did this successfully because of the availability of 
information on the relative strengths and weaknesses of a wide range of people, and 
agencies. Trust and support, as reflected in the following quotes, smooth the process: 
'Our strength is getting people ftom different sectors to act together. It is 
what we do best'(Mills) 
'There are so many devotees here to regional excellence that we share 
everything' (Mills) 
'We are so trusting of each other that there cannot be a dominant partner. 
To move things we collaborative' (Gill) 
'I put my own expertise in to the hat on many occasions, fi-ee of charge, 
because that's the way we are up here, aren't we? '(Richardson) 
A cohesive view is not shared by all, as one commentator argued: 
'Most partnerships are the same old, manipulative group of self interested 
(and mainly Labour supporters. '(Lennox) 
Elites are keenly aware of how the region is perceived externally, thus: 
'Success breeds success. We are well known in Paris, you know! Nissan 
showed the world that we could do it. We must keep up the momentum' 
(Watkin) 
'Meadowell was a problem. How on earth could we be viewed by 
potential investors when pictures of car burning and looting were 
screened via TV into homes around the world? It damaged regional 
ef , 
forts'(Gill) 
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Sustainability of effort is considered as essential: 
'I think our setting up of the Brussels office shows that we can commit 
over the long term'(Robson) 
'We take a long-term view of everything, not changing because it seems 
fashionable. Nissan is embedded(Gill) 
'What we are good at is being effective across time. We are far ftom 
reaching Utopia, with our terrible backlog of deprivation, but we are 
changing slowly' (Beecham) 
Mutuality and reciprocity were cited as important in elite relationships and flexible 
mixing and matching agencies in regional efforts, as was the need to convince central 
government that a transformation was underway. The cynic might propose that this is 
more to do with elites desire to maintain, enhance and enlarge their own power base 
free from state interference, and having an updated corporatist models of consensus 
and collaboration is an obvious way to capture institutional 'space'. Rhetoric has 
allowed a marrying of remnants of the old regime to one seemingly based on newness 
and transformation, and had the effect of appearing to change, despite evidence to the 
contrary. 
Elites live in a rhetorical universe where language is a powerful means of persuasion. 
Aristotle (translated by Kennedy, 1991: 50-69) believed that rhetoric brought energy 
and emotion to thoughts, and was then transmitted through a system of signs, 
including language to influence people's decisions or actions. Rhetoric is therefore a 
powerful element of elite decision-making, as it allows consensus building. 
Acceptance that arts and cultural activities as viable replacements for industrial 
activities have been achieved by persuasion. Many image building, symbolic projects 
have developed the physical infrastructure. such as Hartlepool Marina, Royal Quays 
on Tyneside, River-side Park in Sunderland, Metro Centre Retail Park, and 
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environmental improvements at East Durham have concerned cleaning up beaches 
and reclaiming old colliery sites. Undoubtedly, the sporting, cultural or artistic life of 
the region has never been better, as witnessed by Durham County Cricket Stadium, 
Gateshead International Athletics Stadium, or refurbishment of the Tyne Theatre. 
Elites, since the days of T Dan Smith have been encouraged to sit on cultural 
committees e. g. Northern Arts, National Glass Centre, Tyneside Heritage, Millennium 
Committees. Japanese or other investment companies have sponsored many projects, 
such as the Annual Kite Festival, the Tall Ships Race and the National Glass Centre. 
Not everyone agrees that the image is changing, however, more likely that it is due to: 
'A region obsessed with image'(Kelly) 
However, most elites do believe in this process: 
'When mining and shipbuilding went, our people could have lost their 
dignity but did not. We had to find something to replace the pits, people's 
lives, and more importantly their dignity depended on it'(Gill) 
In response to the 'Is the region changing its imageT only 46% believed it to be true, 
however comments presented in Fig 4.4 reveal an altogether more complex picture: 
Fig 4.4 Comments on regional change 
"We are getting things done, in Europe we are much more identifiable than ýve were 
since we opened the Brussels office" 
"We are absolutely first class" 
"Other places are envious because of the energy we put into attracting inward 
investment- 
We have a strong corporate philosophy for the region" 
We are still renowned for our football" 
"The region is on the up, but it's taking a long time" 
"We are a roaring success story, it is the place to be for the under 40s"' 
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"Reporters in newspapers might like to foster the old image but they are quite simplý 
wrong" 
"We still have the legacy of the 1930s derelict industrial areas so ima,, Ie is still a 
problem" 
"Out success in inward investment makes other regions look to us for inspiration" 
"We have a lot of respect in London for our capacity to bring bio international 
companies in" 
We still remain deprived, depressed, working class and labour dominated" 
"Sadly we talk ourselves down rather than up" 
"We are comrades in adversity. Historically we've had to cope with adversity and 
disappointment" 
"The Tories dragged us down, but we have more expectations than they think" 
"This is the best place in the country. You watch it, in the next 20 years all those 
Southerners will be desperate to get here" 
We've gone from the begging bowl to self help' 
It is difficult to measure the success or otherwise of regional projects because no one 
knows where to attribute value, or how to determine cause and effect. It is almost 
impossible to arrive at definitive indicators of success (a comprehensive discussion 
follows later in this chapter) but interviewees were asked to judge the most significant 
incidences in recent regional history, as shown in Fig 4.5. 
Fig. 4.5 Key events and critical incidences identified by interviewees 
1985 Sir Fred Holliday's meeting in Durham Castle with Mrs Thatcher and 
invited guests) 
9 Setting up of North East Assembly of Local Authorities and the Brussels Office 
Closure of Consett Iron and Steelworks, Shildon Waggon works. the closure of 
Sxvaii Hunters the last coal mines. 
91 I'ync Tees TV Takeover 
9 Nissan's attraction, then Fujitsu, Samsung, Siemens 
9 Setting up of TWDC and TDC 
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Gateshead Garden Festival 
The Manufacturing and Service Challenges. Challenge by Karl Watkin 
Opening of Metro Centre and Sir John Hall's purchase of Newcastle Football 
Club 
" All football teams getting into the Premier League. 
" First Class County Cricket 
" Gateshead Stadium 
" Campaign For a North East Assembly 
" Regional Chamber of Commerce 
" Launch of Northern Business Forum 
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They were then asked to suggest the most successful projects, and as can be seen in 
Fig 4.6. answers reveal a mixture of economic. social and cultural activities. 
Fig 4.6 Most successful projects( identified by interviewees) 
Choice One 
INWARD INVESTMENT 
(attracting large scale inward investment is by far the single most important measure 
of success. This is seen to improve wealth creation. ) 
Choice Two 
LARGE SCALE PROJECTS (Symbolic and high profile) 
Metro Centre, Centre for Life, St Peter's, Royal Quays, Regional Airport extensions, 
infrastructure improvements, City centre improvements, National Glass Centre, 
Industry Centres in Universities. 
Choice Three 
ARTISTIC, SPORTING AND CULTURAL PROJECTS 
Visual Arts, St Peter's, Theatres and Art Galleries, Baltic Flourmills, New Football 
Stadia, Gateshead Arena, Durham County Cricket (First Class Cricket), Gateshead 
International Athletics, Killingworth International Swimming Pool, Tourism projects, 
First Class Universities. 
Choice Four 
ATTITUDE CHANGE 
Cohesion and collaboration, partnership working, embeddedness of supplier chain, 
greater expectations, mentally changed attitudes. No longer the feeling that 
manufacturing is the saviour. 
Choice Five 
VARIED 
More SME start-ups. Well known beyond the region. Northern Ambassador scheme 
helps to ensure outsiders take the region seriously. Taken more seriously by 
Westminster. New products, processes and management practices. 
What is interesting in the data in the previous figures is how elites use projects in a 
very ambiguous sense to capture just about anything that encapsulates their activities. 
and proves that changes are being made. Elites travel extensively on business 
throuohout the UK and beyond and when asked to say whether or not the region is 
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seen in a positive or negative light externally more than half of inten'iewees believe 
that outsiders have a positive view. 
In answer to the question of which region is the keenest competitor for inward 
investment data revealed that Scotland, followed by Wales and Northern Ireland are 
the most prominent. These choices may be more to do with the glossy brochures 
emanating from regional agencies than from a true understanding of the external 
situation. Nevertheless elites do position the region in comparison with others. 
When asked the question 'is the NE proactive in responding to external influencesT a 
resounding 91% who think that it is a proactive region. This high figure might be 
attributable to the continued elaboration of a regeneration agenda and a manipulation 
of symbols proclaiming it as ' the fastest growing European Region' or the ' future 
European Capital of Culture', because neither claims are substantiated by objective 
facts. These deliberate policies are aimed at resisting the charge of *dependency, and 
more to do with enhancing power bases, as we shall see in the section that follows. 
Agency involvement in regeneration 
Unlike the shallow politics of opportunism found in Manchester (Peck and Tickell. 
1994: 55-78) and conflicts in Sheffield (Peck and Tickell, 1995: 16-46), a dominant 
business class lacking cohesion (Harding. 1991: 295-317) or the indolent groups only 
concerned with profit (Cooke and Morgan, 1993: 543-564), the autonomous actors 
who only act voluntarily to gain xvider leverage (Bassett, 1996: 539-555), NE business 
elites have Iong been part of what Lipsky refers to as political opportunity structures, 
in N\hIch businesses choose an appropriate action repertoire that enables them to focus 
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on the critical factors needed for success, they develop frames of reference. mobilise 
collective support, and broaden appeal beyond the business class (Lipsky, 1968: 1144- 
58). Moore and Pierre (1988: 169-178) propose both public and private elites 
voluntaristically occupy political space created by democratic gaps in povernance, 
and pragmatism overcomes ideology. Pragmatism has certainly overcome political 
ideology in the NE. Interviewees were asked to define the business class, and as can 
be seen from Fig 4.7 it is much broader than in other regions, as it includes public 
sector and inward investors. 
Fig. 4.7 Four categories of business class (identified by interviewees) 
Group one: Traditional industrial capital, from the brewing, property, financial, 
media, sporting and culture agencies. 
Group two: Recent entrepreneurial capitalists, wealth created during the 1980s 
Thatcher years. 
Group three: Executives representing inward investment companies, such as 
Fujitsu, Nissan, Siemens. 
Group four: Individuals who would formally have been regarded as public 
servants, but who now act in a more 'business-like' fashion and are 
incorporated into business groupings (e. g. CEOs of the Utilities, 
CEOs of Universities, CEOs of Quangos such as TECs, UDCs). This 
is now referred to as a service class. 
The business class is fragmented but most elites are represented on either the CBI, the 
Chamber or NBF, which is useful in diluting potential conflict, and transferring good 
practice. Both NE Regional Chamber and NBF have elites from non-commercial 
agencies, and this has been a deliberate policy to ensure transfer of knowledge, 
expertise and ability to dra,, v on resources. There are many NE business led 
I ý-, 
groupings, e. g., Teesside Tomorrow, The Newcastle Initiative. as -ývell as countless 
support agencies 
Health trusts, universities, media, the voluntary sector and other sectors, referred to bN' 
Harding (1991: 295-317) as auxiliary players, are significantly represented on 
business forums. NBF, set up in May 1996 gave a co-ordinated voice on output, 
exports, education and training targets. It was a joint initiative by the NE Chamber 
and Northern CBI, and the Board is managed by a CEO, and an Advisory Body, 
which includes public sector individuals, e. g., Grant, Bridge, Wright, and Balls. 
NBFs primary aim is to sustain learning between organisation, and multi-agency 
initiatives have been centred on the long-term health of the region, in crime, health, 
and IT. This broadened out the resource and skills base, as the CEO said: 
'We got as many people as possible to set targets for the region on, job 
and business creation, the types of skills and educational achievements 
needed, how much supplier chain activity was necessary and the types of 
neit, products required It is no good having idealistic, outlandish aims 
and thenfailing to achieve them'. 
All NBF members, in particular its founding members, Wrigglesworth and Watkin 
believe that it has been a positive force in bringing together the regional 'business 
voice' and point to many successes. However the CEO cautioned that: 
'The idea that there is a common purpose or a shared agenda in the NE is 
an interesting question. I oscillate between agreeing that there is one but 
as soon as I try to get things done Ifind that the underlying tensions and 
politicking suýface again and again. There's always a positioning, a 
jocke. ving. 1br power, prestige and status (Johnston, CEO) 
114 There are so mariN that ONE is currentIN conducting ail audit. 
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NBF and the Regional Chamber lack the organisational capacities of public sen, ices 
and the CEO cautions against accepting the altruistic views propounded by business 
leaders. As she suggests: 
'There seems to be a lot of altruism but in fact people are in it for what 
they can get out of it. Business leaders know that if the region succeeds 
they also benefit' (Johnston) 
The NE Chamber took on a high profile role, with members who served on a myriad 
of regeneration forums. Nicholson, a prominent Conservative businessman, was 
succeeded by Aviss, as Chair. It is the fourth largest in Britain, xvith a wide 
programme of networking, lobbying, and welcoming events for FDI investors. 
Northern CBI is not prominent in regional affairs, elites such as Wrigglesworth, 
Watkin, Aviss, and Nicholson are members, but it one of the vveakest business 
organisation, with little obvious power and influence. Some powerful individuals have 
external political and business linkages externally; much of their power and influence 
is covert and difficult to determine. 
Tomaney's and Amin's (1991: 479-487) claim that: 
'the North East's labourist and collectivist tradition is seen as a major 
cultural and social obstacle to entrepreneurial solutions. ' 
Is not supported by the empirical data, because evidence suggests that entrepreneurial 
elites rotate between sectors, to transfer business and public/political ideas, 
knowledge and practices. There is limited evidence to prove that business elites are 
involved in activities purely to market the region, as they are involved in Nxide ranging 
decisions on investment priorities, infrastructure provision, in transportation and 
utility areas and in the growing infonnatics arena, locational decisions, target setting 
for educational and employment attainment, service and manufacturing outputs. The 
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advantages of having such broad involvement are obvious but the disadvantages are 
that many decisions are dependent on external funding to achieve targets because of 
the in built structural problems. 
Elites collectively adopt a variety of different strategies and roles fitted to the 
institutional context within which they operate, so Bridge's function, role. purpose 
and strategy as CEO of NDC differs from the function, role, purpose and strategy that 
he adopts in his involvement with the NE Chamber, his membership of NBF or his 
membership of a university governing body. He pursues a particularistic agenda, a 
collectivist or organisational agenda, depending on which forum he is in, and 
knowledge of earlier corporatist forums, ability to transfer experience and expertise 
across activities, provides sustainability. The value of multi-purpose elites is due to 
the fact that they hope to achieve more, but conversely the effect can be that a few key 
people are involved in all decisions and all forums are saturated with similar 
personnel. Not only is this stressful for those involved, but it does not provide the 
opportunity for other voices to be heard. 
Elites keep in touch by in touch daily by telephone, or meet at sporting or cultural 
events. This quote is illustrative: 
'We have always had a loose net-work, so that I will ring John (Bridge), he 
will ring Olivia (Grant), she will ring Pamela (Denham), and we keep in 
close contact' (Watkin) 
The geography of the region means that urban conurbations, especially Newcastle, act 
as focal points for interconnectivity to aid decision-making but across the region there 
are local and sub regional networks and partnerships where informal decision-making 
and exchange of information takes place: 
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Decisions, which seem to be disparate and uncoordinated at the local and 
sub-regional level become, in reality, enmeshed in certain 'decision 
domains'and achieve 'coherence (Wright) 
Planning meetings are held prior to an inward investment or large project for 
informal. Gill and Robson, respective leaders of Gateshead and Durham spoke with 
all regional local authority ED Officers, prior to Samsung's decision, about land 
availability, infrastructure, skills levels and utilities provision. Meetings then took 
place at NDC, GONE, NEA, EP, or some other business, sporting or culture venue. 
Various representatives were then drafted in, including executives from some of the 
earlier, successful FDIs. Involvement was as little or as much as the individual had 
time for, and they were asked to visit to foreign states, provide welcoming parties 
network and foster a positive image: 
'Networking at the Scottish and Newcastle Plate Day at Neii, custle Races, 
helps us to stay effective. We may be small but we are effective' (Denham) 
'We need to market the region because under the surface the old divisions 
are still there. There is still a pride in the working class history. Football 
I. s the great unifier, and any rivalry is good humoured' (Denham) 
'Our last Newcastle Racecourse event involved 330 companies, and 
thousands of individuals. It was such a success that other regions ring me 
, 
for advice' (Johnson) 
Wrigglesworth feels that these events: 
'help individuals who are starting out in business to have successful role 
models to emulate ýpeople like myseýf who have made millions are good 
role models, because we are driving the change. The opera, theatre and 
sporting events are all good networking venues, where we do deals with 
GOAT e. g., this does not happen in other regions, you know. How many 
business people doYou know in the country that are regularly approached 
by government ministcrs and senior civil servants and asked how can we 
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do? 
... such and such. What are your views on? ... such and such' 
(Wrigglesworth) 
All is not always harmonious between the various sectors, despite the rhetoric, and 
Watkin, one of the most vehement anti-public sector business leaders (a self made 
working class entrepreneur, conser-vative supporter, CBI member and NBF founder) 
has a view that leaves us in no doubt about where he stands in relation to other elites: 
'I have fought the old boy's network all my life. We still have a strong 
establishment here, with Nicholson, and his inherited wealth, fle. v, strong 
establishment, and decisions still made by a few. We set up NBF itith a 
twofold agenda ... one, to get businessmen off their arses and two, to get 
control of the money so that the public sector doesn't get its grubb ,v 
hands 
on it. We want to direct them because they don't know the meaning of the 
bloody word management ' 
Many elites are friends as well as colleagues. Two prominent Labour politicians, both 
leaders of large councils, claim (in jest) that: 
'all the major decisions on anything on the regional economy are, of 
course, decided between the two of us in Blackhill Workingmen's Club on 
a Sunday morning, over a pint! '(Robson and Gill) 
Patronage is still a feature of the regional scene, and: 
'There is still a lot of patronage, a class system, all the elites have 
learned to get along. They've had to. We have a top down, regionalforum 
of decision makers. An elected one would be too bureaucratic and taken 
over by the Labour Party. Our Friends in the North, such as Sir Ian and 
Watkin, see themselves as acting with others to achieve regional 
objectives. We learn ftom each other. A body like this one (NBF) carries 
out the functional aspects of strategies decided at a regional level, 
between regional decision makers' (Johnson) 
Clearly patronage based on friendship ties means that the old boy network is still a 
lirevalent feature of NE political life, thereby sustaining paternalism and a siege 
mentality. 
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Robinson (1990) found a lack of political conflict, and interview data shows that what 
conflict there is, 'managed' so as not to damage the 'cohesive and cosy' image that is 
presented to the outside world. This is especially crucial in inward investment cases, 
as disharmony was thought to be counter-productive. Despite disputes between 
authorities regarding the location of Samsung and Siemens, NDC, and Bridge., in 
particular strove to present a 'co-ordinated image 'to foreign investors. 
All Chairmen of NDC"' have been regional spokesmen, and NE Assembly, is the 
longest serving voluntary consortium of local authorities in the UK (founded in 1986). 
It represents 33 local authorities, and produces an Annual State of the Region report 
in collaboration with NDC, GONE and the NE Chamber Commerce. It co-ordinates 
bids for European structural and social funds, liases with Euro institutions, links with 
Kyongii Province and other states, and appoints individuals to regional sports, arts, 
tourism and heritage bodies as well as NDC, NA, the Northern Screen Commission, 
Northern Sights, the Alliance of Maritime Regions in Europe, the Assembly of 
European Regions and the Committee of Regions. The three key elites on NEA 
(Robson, Gill and McCormack) are also influential on other forums. 
English Partnership was absorbed into ONE on I April 1999, but continued to work 
with local authorities, Urban Regeneration Companies and Sub-Regional 
Partnerships. Central to regeneration, it drew up a Corporate Plan in collaboration 
with GONE, property companies and communities. The limited mandatory 
constraints, lack of clarity on priorities, and limited personnel hampered operations. 
115 No\\ merged into ONE. 
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The Senior Regional Director of GONE"', Pamela Denham. reported to four different 
ministries, and was criticised by Las for lack of transparency in determining SRB bids 
and regional policies. She had responsibility for all staff and expenditure routed 
through GONE and for ensuring that co-ordinating mechanisms to bring respective 
regional agencies together were in place. GONE drew together TECS, NEA, NDC, 
and the university heads to determine regional priorities, on skills and education. 
Denham's involvement on regeneration forums added credibility and legitimacy to 
elite activities. She participated in many formal regional forums such as the old 
Economic Planning Councils, local authority Standing Committees, TEC regional 
groups and the regional CBI, NE Chamber or NBF. As a high profile civil servant she 
featured high on the choice interviewees made regarding centrality to decision 
making. It was claimed that she was one of the most powerful women in the Northern 
region and networked and shared public and private platforms with other prominent 
women. This high profile network of senior public sector females, contrasted with 
more traditional male dominated forums demonstrates that things are slowly 
changing. This does not mean that there has been an overnight complete ferninisation, 
rather it provides evidence that very strong female public servants, mostly who 
achieved prominence in the Thatcher era, are in particularly critical strategic positions 
to draw on resources and help to lobby with politicians. These females were 
functional and instrumental to regional aims, so obviously the macho political elites 
were happy to collaborate with them. 
Denham, Wright, Balls, Dixon and Grant were singled out by interviewees as public 
sector entrepreneurs, drawn into regeneration activities because of particular skills, 
116 Dobbie. who has since been replaced by Blackie, replaced Denham. 
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expertise, knowledge or resources. Indeed one respondent believed that a public 
sector managerial class rather than the business communitv was leadin, 2 
transformation. This need breed of elite was referred to as: 
f E'- 
T cudal Barons protecting hislher own fiefdom' (Balls) 
Most sectors were represented in elite activities e. g. education (Ann Wright). retail 
and property (Sir John Hall), health (Liam Donaldson), autornotives (Peter Dickinson, 
Nissan), public sector/quangos (John Bridge, Olivia Grant) politicians (Don Robson, 
George Gill), but the resources they could draw on were disputed: 
'Most government agencies are good at powers and finances, and most 
business people have sound business sense, and the onýy totalýj, useless 
and moribund ouýfas in the region are the LAs'(Balls) 
Managerial and 'business-like' public sector entrepreneurs incorporated into business 
organisations, also represented civic and community life. Business elites were 
political', whereas political/public sector elites acted 'managerial and 
entrepreneurial'. Watkin, Nicholson, Aviss and Wrigglesworth were political 
businessmen (with strong links to the national parties) and Beecham, Robson, Bridge, 
Wright, Balls, Grant, and Denham, were managerial and entrepreneurial public/quasi 
public servants. 
Despite attempts to harmonise concerns remained over legitimacy and accountability: 
We don't want the public sector controlling huge sums of money, only 
business can drive change. If we Robson his merry men to control the 
money they'll cock up the regionalfinances'(Watkin) 
Watkin went on to say: 
'Beecham wants to be in charge of Neucastle CC, and thely're a waste of 
space. Come the Revolution I'd abolish it'(Watkin) 
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Responding to Watkin's first comment, Robson claimed: 
'Business isn't capable of driving the change. The public sector has all the 
clout, because we have the sites, we move things, and we are a powerful 
lobby on such things as road and reclamation schemes' (Robson) 
Contrary to both views some interviewees believed that: 
'George Russell, Chair of NDC is brilliant, he doesn't let the business 
people take over, even though he is one of them'(Gill) 
'We overcome parochialism in the interests of the region. Ideology is 
simply not allowed to stand in the way, of pragmatic progress' 
(Wrigglesworth) 
'There's an enormous amount of committed individuals who put in ftee 
time to make this region the proud region it deserves to be' 
(Wrigglesworth) 
Maybe, however, the apparent good working partnerships have a financial basis after 
all, as asserted by one respondent: 
'The public sector is good on ideas but it takes the business people to 
pump up with the cash' (Richardson) 
or as the TU and LA leaders suggest: 
'We are a very bigjamily with one single determination'(Mills) 
and 
'People talk together in this region and we trust each other, no other 
region like it'(Gill) 
Elites may feel that they have been successful in collaborating. but there are still 
questions over how successful this working together has been in the overall reversal 
ot'reoional fortunes. 
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One way that elites confirmed their successful activities was the flexibility they have 
used to merge initiatives and organisations and foster institutional leaming. This came 
across in many of the interviews, for example: 
'We did a steep learning curve since Nissan, but it forced us into 
transferring goodpractice between agencies John (ADC) set up a Quality 
Initiative, BS5750, TQM, and IS09000, and linked GOATE, the Regional 
Industry Centre, Cowies Motors, the DTI Supply Chain, Regional 
Competitiveness initiative, to universities. We used central government 
policiesfor our own regional ends'(Wright) 
Denham confirmed that mixing and matching agencies, based on informality 
contributed to success: 
'We are aflexible region, one single organisation might become ossified, 
so we sta innovative and share objectives across the region. It helps to y 
beat the competition out there'(Denham) 
Flexible, but co-ordinated negotiation on objectives has allowed elites to manage 
regional space, within external constraints. 
Far from having a peripheral or auxiliary role the empirical data shows that. 
universities were central to regeneration in numerous ways"'. Benneworth saw a 
university as an animator or rejuvenating force for democracy whereas Stone (1999) 
saw universities as drivers of change (by making rapid responses to markets and 
technological changes, identifying regional skills, make local connections and 
networks of innovation and knowledge transfer). All are key to regional 
competitiveness and the NE RES placed education at the core of regional aims. 
117 Lobbyists and clewlutionists (Holliday, Wright, Liddic, Byrne), soclo-economic 
planning forunis (To\\ nsend, Tomanev, Benneworth, Stone) RDA Board members 
(Fraser), Regnonal Committees (Cockerill, Charles, Hudson) 
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'Universities can contribute to governance system, but they must retain a 
wider social purpose to inform individuals, citizens and debates' 
(Benneworth, IPPP debate, Cork, May, 2000) 118 
All regional University VCs are prominent, on various, "9 and the five Universities 
have signed a concordat for regional collaboration (Chamber of Commerce, 1999). 
Universities are an important source of information dissemination with groups of 
academics working on regionally focused R and D in collaboration with many of the 
FDI companies. Universities made Japanese professional appointments and reoularly 
held lectures and seminars for multi-sectoral representatives to attend. 
Trade unions elites have always been central to regeneration, as some are very 
influential national players. They were represented on numerous boards, forums, and 
trusts. Mills OBE and Howard, the former and current Chair of the Northern TUC 
were the most prominent. The TU R&I Unit in Newcastle regularly commissioned 
research by Universities. TUs were represented on the Campaign for a Regional 
Assembly, and on artistic and cultural bodies, to which we now turn out attention. 
Sporting agencies also have a central role in regeneration as interviewees testified: 
'The Power of sport should not be underestimated It is part of the social 
fabric' (Kelly) 
'Sport is buoying up the common man' (Beecham) 
Football is a tribal obsession, and many elites are proud Newcastle United season 
ticket holders, with regular invites to the Directors' box (by Sir John Hall). All 
prospective FDI company representatives are welcomed, and sports metaphors 
118 This author took part in this debate. 
111) E.,,. licalth Trusts. Chamber of Commerce, Common Purpose. 
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abound in elite discourse, and during interview every respondent mentioned it at least 
once, such as: 
'Newcastle Football Club's success is making us all feel positive' 
(Bridge). 
'We used the The World Cross Country Championships in 1995 to trade e 
with the rest of the world '(Frankish) 
'Getting first class country cricket gave an impetus to regeneration' 
(Robson) 
Media TV, radio and newspapers include significant elites who promoted the region, 
as well as serving on a myriad of Boards. Sporting personalities such as Steve Cram, 
Kevin Keegan, Brian Robson and actors, writers, performers, pop stars were regularly 
drafted on to regional forums"', such as youth and crime panels. Owners of 
manufacturing or commercial entities allowed sporting facilities to be made available 
for networking e. g. the Head of Tyne Tees Television is also Lord Lieutenant of 
Northumberland and allowed TTTV to be used and Riverside Park, home of First 
Class County Cricket became the venue to entertain inward investors. Most elites 
belong to Newcastle, Middlesbrough or Sunderland Football Clubs, Tyneside Sailing 
or Tennis Club, Durham County Cricket Club or Newcastle and Brough Park 
Racecourse or attends the Theatre Royal as a guest of Watkin"'. 
Utility networks have hitherto been taken for granted in discussions on regeneration. 
Notably they are part of the attraction for FDI, as the provision of such services was a 
120 The Campaign for a NE Assembly is blitzing the media, sport and cultural worlds for 
support. Jimmy Nail, Sting. Tim Healy, Denise Welch have been tar,, eted (January. 
20E) 
121 Watkin entertains at his Northumberland home and French chateau. 
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vital element in relocation. The Chairman of Northumbria Water"' was one of the 
foremost advocates of regionalism, contributed ideas to the elite debate and as he 
says: 
'Environmental and social issues are an integral part of regeneration' 
(Holliday) 
The empirical data supports the view that universities, sports, arts, TU s and utilities 
are central, rather than auxiliary to regeneration and this raises a number of questions. 
If they are so critical to success why is there so little recognition of their importance at 
national level, or little support made available? Many do not possess large staff or 
other resources, but yet became engaged in regeneration. This poses serious questions 
for the skills base, and organisational resources of local agencies, and also highlights 
the inadequacies of existing support mechanisms at regional level. Much energy has 
gone into business support, but little to support these vital agencies. This is a policy 
question for further attention. 
TWDC and TDC were both second generation UDCs, established in 1987 with a life 
span of 10 years, set up to stimulate economic regeneration, in particular major tracts 
of land surrounding the riverside areas around the Tyne, Wear and Tees. f 300 million 
pounds was pumped into to the creation of business parks, marinas, new housing, 
retail schemes and industrial development. High profile flagship projects such as 
University College in Stockton, or St Peter's Development were used to illustrate the 
successful reclamation of derelict areas. 
TWDC and TDC, though set up to carry out similar roles tasks vvere very different in 
tlicir styles of operation and rhetoric. Balls of TWDC and Norman of TDC. managed 
122 Sir Fred HollidaN. former VC of the University of Durham. 
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their agencies very differently and each was perceived differently by other agencies 
and local communities. TWDC sought legitimacy but TDC ý, vas managed in a more 
autocratic manner and the reluctance to involve local politicians or community groups 
not surprisingly led to continuous battles over planning, compulsory purchase orders 
and the siting of specific projects. Balls became a significant elite with a high 
personal and civic profile, who as well as being considered a friend to the business 
sector was highly regarded by other public or quasi sector elites, such as Grant, 
Bridge and Wright. He moved between commercial and political worlds, and gained 
legitimacy from GO and in communities, as a proponent of change. Policies were 
apparently more open to challenge than those of Norman, but as the case material 
shows TWDC was not entirely free from controversy and conflict. 
Like UDCs, TECs 12' achieved prominence in regeneration, as key partners in 
formulating and delivering strategies across the region. Little is known about the 
exact operation of TECs due to unaccountability to local communities, secrecy and 
decisions difficult to challenge. Tyneside TEC, headed by Grant, was manned by a 
number of salaried civil servants, and an Annual Report and Corporate Plan, included 
data on training places, provision, costs or jobs found, were developed in 
collaboration with other elites and agencies. 
Grant, a very charismatic and high profile executive, was drafted onto countless 
regional forums. She believed that: 
'Public servants must act responsibly on behalf of the local communities' 
(Grant) 
12 3 TECs NN ere absorbed into Learning and Skills Councils and ONE . Grant led one of the NE Learning and Skills Councils, but has just been appointed as the Chair of Culture NE 
( 24th January 2003) 
166 
She was instrumental in setting up public/private sector forums to discuss educational 
training needs and skills shortages, and worked closely with FE and HE sectoral 
representatives. 
The elites discussed in the preceding sections worked collaborative IN'. and gained 
support from civil servants, but by also acting as civic representatives they were able 
to determine innovative projects, adapting national policies to regional needs. Despite 
the claims to openness and transparency it is clear that many activities took place in 
secret, and in the next discussion there is an examination of the relative power and 
influence of the various elites and agencies. 
Inter-agency politics and stakeholder power relationships 
In order to assess the relative power and influence of stakeholders and levels of 
conflict, interviewees were asked to rank individuals, and to discuss the findings it is 
important to have some understanding of stakeholder and power concepts. 
The stakeholder concept emerged in the 1960s as a simple but controversial idea, and 
was popularised by Freeman (1984: 46) and defined as ' any group of individual who 
can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisation's objectives'. The 
ambiguity and indeterminacy of the term has led writers to distinguish between the 
descriptive, instrumental, and normative aspects (Donaldson and Preston (1995: 65- 
91). It is accepted that the concept has been used mainly in the field of politics, xith 
little empirical evidence to illustrate its economic or social advantages., and has been 
challenged because it is based on a pluralist premise that a multitude of actors vith 
diverse and competing interests can be ' managed * by assessing, arbitrating and 
allocatincy resources. This creates an imbalance between those NA, ho are managing and 
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those being managed, implies a hierarchy, and is not ahvays a means of getting from 
exclusion to inclusion, because it fails to deal with the structural reality of 
redistributive conflict between stakeholders' (Froud et al, 1996: 120). 
A review of literature indicates that Freeman's 1984 definition is still considered by 
most scholars to be the classical norm, but six important additional conceptual 
qualifications can be identified, a legitimate claim on the organisation (Cornell and 
Shapiro, 1987: 5-14), (Evan and Freeman, 1988: 75-84), (Carroll, 1989). (Alkhafaji, 
1989: 61-75, Hill and Jones, 1992: 131-154), formal contracts (Freeman and Evan, 
1990: 337-359), direct or critical impact on survival (Cornell and Shapiro, 1987: 5- 
14), a moral obligation to make decisions for fair distribution of harms and benefits 
(Carroll, 1989, Langtry, 1994: 431-443, Donaldson and Preston, 1995: 65-91). risk- 
bearing, either financial or otherwise (Clarkson, 1994). 
We find that in the NE elites have no absolute legitimacy to act on behalf of civic 
society, their activities are relational rather than contractual, and the level of direct 
and indirect involvement varies between projects. The moral basis, which guides 
behaviour, is not fully established but actors do claim to have social rather than 
financial gain as their main motive. The regularity of participation, the profile of 
actors and the ability to harness resources depends on many variables, not least 
mandatory or other obligations. Financial risk is minimal, because resources 
committed to regional activities are not of a personal nature, but elites were able to 
harness tangible (finance, staff, premises) and intangible (knowledge, information, 
stakeholder management, capacity to lobbying) resources. 
The balance of direct and indirect power/interest changes over time, and depends on a 
specific prQject. Some stakeholders remain powerful in some circumstances but 
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become less powerful at other times. The unity, diversity. alliance or rifts between 
stakeholders changes in line with circumstances. and level. nature and frequency of 
communication impacts on strategic direction. The NE regime is sustained by its 
exclusionary nature, but it does have unity of purpose and frequent contact between 
elites. 
Specific events often trigger off the formation of stakeholders (Johnson and Scholes, 
1993,1997), Nissan in 1985 was a good example of a critical incidence where formal 
and informal inter-connections galvanised stakeholder support for strategic aims. 
Rhetoric and symbolism were used to remove obstacles to change and to convince 
detractors that FDI was a good thing. Inward investment as a strategic aim has been 
rarely challenged, until very recently when high profile withdrawals from the region 
emphasised its vulnerability. 
90% of interviewees saw NDC as the key agency, but supported by EP, NEA, The NE 
Chamber, GONE, and NBF (See Fig 4.8). Every interview, without exception, 
revealed that Bridge was the key figure in regeneration, though six businessmen (Sir 
John Hall, Karl Watkin, Sir Paul Nicholson, Sir Tom Cowie, Sir Ian Wrigglesworth, 
Llew Avis) were mentioned among the top ten elites two local politicians (Gill and 
Robson) and one quango head (Balls) also rated highly. Power and influence were 
determined on the basis of position, reputation, ability to draw on resources and 
information. Each elite acted in individual, civic or organisational roles, when 
necessary and depending on the project. 
Sir John Hall was regarded as significant in tenns of his personal, regional profile but 
N\, as an elusive man who never featured in discussions with other elites. Neither was 
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he considered to be a civic elite, as he is not regarded as a 'network man'. Indeed not 
one respondent mentioned him, other than when asked to directly choose key people. 
Fig 4.8 Name rive key individuals/agencies influential in regeneration (and 
whose role is central to decision making) 
(Percentage based on percentage of all intervieit, ees choosingfive) 
76% Dr John Bridge, RDA, formerly NDC 
45% Sir John Hall, millionaire 
30% Karl Watkin, millionaire 
30% Sir Paul Nicholson, Vaux Breweries 
28% Alistair Balls, TWDC and Centre for Life 
24% Don Robson, NEA and DCC 
16% George Gill, Gateshead MBC and NEA 
16% Sir Tom Cowie, millionaire 
16% Sir Ian Wrigglesworth, NBF and business 
14% Llew Avis, Siemens 
8% Reay Atkinson, VC University of Northumbria 
8% Ian Gibson, Nissan 
8% Kevin Keegan, formerly NUFC 
8% Sir Ralph Hey, Cookson International 
8% Dr Ann Wright, VC University of Sunderland 
8% Pamela Denham, CEO GONE 
8% Joe Mills, formerly TUC, now SAHA 
8% Olivia Grant, CEO, TEC 
8% Richard Maudsley, Newcastle Building Society 
8% Bill Minto, Cumbria County Council 
8% Sir Ron Dearing, former Chair NDC 
8% Sir G Russell, current Chair NDC 
4% Tom Burlinson. GMB 
4% Michael Bird. CEO, NE Chamber 
4% Kingsley Smith. CEO, Durham County Council 
4% Bob Howard, Northern TUC 
1 10 
4% Arthur Dickens. Dickens DIY 
4% Adrian Smith, CEO NEA 
4% Raif Carr Ellison, Lord Lieutenant 
4% Frank Nicholson, Vaux Breweries 
4% Ken Frankish, Director of Education, DCC 
4% T Dan Smith (deceased) 
All elites possessed what Linford (1999a, editorial) referred to as overt executive 
power (those who have proved themselves the most powerful in fulfilling contracts or 
doing their duties) and reputational power (the degree of respect they command) and 
cultural power (transmitted through ideas, active persuasion, through -ý, 'alues, and 
codes of conduct that prevail). All were celebrities who had achieved credibility, or 
notoriety, in some cases. Fig 4.9 shows the top ten stakeholders, based on centrality to 
decision-making and capacity to act. It also shows in what capacity they acted, and 
political affiliations. 
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Fig 4.9 Top 10 Individual regional primary stakeholders 
(Based on centrality and capacity to act, and identified at intervieý, v) 
Stakeholder Centrality Periphe- 
rality 
Acting in 
Organisational 
Capacity 
Acting in 
Individual 
Capacity 
Acting in 
Civic 
Capacity 
Political 
Affiliation 
Dr J. Bridge Yes No Yes Yes Yes Unknown 
Sir J Hall No Yes No Yes No Unknown 
Karl Watkin Yes No No Yes Yes Conservative 
Sir P 
Nicholson 
Yes No Yes Yes Yes Conservative 
A. Balls Yes No Yes Yes Yes Unknown 
D Robson Yes No Yes Yes Yes Labour 
G. Gill Yes No Yes Yes Yes Labour 
Sir T. Cowie No Yes No Yes Yes Conservative 
Sir 1. 
Wrigglesworth 
Yes No No Yes Yes Liberal 
Democrat 
Llew Avis Yes No Yes Yes Yes Unknown 
Interviewees were asked to determine which stakeholders (agencies) were central to 
regional regeneration, and their combined responses are shown at Fig 4.10 . 
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Fig . 4.10 Stakeholder agencies: centrality in regional decision making 
(determined by interviewees) 
On the basis of combined interview data Fig 4.11 shows how each regional agency 
contributed to regional aims. It divides agencies into primary and secondary agencies( 
on the basis that primary = more direct and regular and sustained strategic 
involvement). 
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Fig. 4.11 General Stakeholder Power Analysis of the Regional Regime 
Indicators Primary Stakeholder 
Secondary 
Stakeholder 
NDC NEA GONE EP RCA NBF TWDC TEC Univ Utilities 
Observable DM H M M L M M M M L/M L 
Past Performance H M M M N/a N/a M/H M L L 
Accessibility to info 
H M M H M M M/H M H L/M 
expertise/ Knowledge 
Profile at regional level H M M M H M L/M M H L 
Control over/links with H M M L M M M L/M M L 
external word 
involvement in key DM 
H H M M H M M M M/H L 
forums 
Closeness to strategic H H M M H M M M M/H L 
DM 
Informal links H M M M H H M M M/H L/M 
Control over 
internal/external H M M L M L M M M L/M 
resources 
Mandatory role/legality H L H H L L H H M/H L 
Freedom to choose H L H M M M M M M L 
Power Legal/rational 
traditional/Historical H L M L M M H M M/H L 
charismatic 
Resource capacity M M H M L/M L/M M/H L/M M L 
Knowledge/ skills M M L/M M M M M/H M H LM 
Status H M M M M L/M M M M L 
Discretion M L H H L L H M M L 
11 = Hiah M= Medium I- = Low 
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All agencies with financial support from central government had a stronger power 
base than others, because of their strategic overview on personnel availability. and 
tangible and intangible resources. GONE, was therefore a very powerful agency \ý Ith 
a strong influence over regional strategies. Historically NEA and NDC had achieý, ed 
supremacy as each was headed by high profile and charismatic elites, with close links 
to the external world and capacity to draw on resources. 
Individual business elites acted as regional spokespersons, out with the NE, but 
internally they coalesced around NBF, Regional Chamber of Commerce and CBI. 
Their level of influence grew after 1996, when NBF and the Regional Chamber N\ýere 
created, but influence was largely attributed to individual business elites who liked to 
be in the public eye. Business elites used their network to draw in other prominent 
people and resources. They also had access to information sources, as well as being 
active lobbyists. 
UDCs, TECs, local authorities, property sector, universities, and other sectoral 
representatives had close interactions with GONE, NDC, NEA, and the business 
community, but because power changes over time and between projects, schemes or 
initiative, this was dependent on the level of specific finance, expertise or resources 
they could contribute. 
Community or disadvantaged stakeholders do not feature in regime activities, other 
than representation through trade union, cultural, sporting or artistic agencies. This 
type of stakeholders is largely absent from regional affairs, in part explained by their 
inability to penetrate the decision-making forums. 
Less powerful but interested stakeholders such as the media or local NIPs xere 
oalvanised when necessary to support regional aims, as happened when Sir John Hall 
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worked closely with NDC, NEA, TDC. local politicians and local state officials to 
attract Samsung to Teesside. 
NDC NEA and GONE were considered to be the most central agencies with the most 
regular and continued involvement, they also had the most influential actors. EP NBF 
and the NE Chamber were important, but less so that NDC, NEA and GONE. NDC, 
GONE, EP and the Regional Chamber all has highly paid heads, whereas NEA and 
NBF did not, relatively speaking. 
GONE was much larger and had the highest staff levels than the other agencies, and 
like EP had a much larger budget in comparison with other agencies. Individuals from 
NEA engaged in decision-making activities more than any of the other agencies, in 
particular NBF, which did not second many members. Individual business people did 
acted in a personal capacity, rather than organisationally, but they did believe they 
acted on behalf of communities. NDC, NE Chamber and NBF all benefited from 
being housed in excellent facilities, and GONE was able to offer excellent support 
services, when required for regional efforts. The role played by Universities and other 
sporting, cultural and artisitic agencies has grown, and their contributions to 
regeneration are well recognised.. 
GONE, NDC and the NE Chamber (RCA) were perceived as high profile with good 
links with the external world. NDC, NEA and NE Chamber (RCA) were regarded as 
close to decision making with other agencies, though utilities had limited level of 
involvement. GONE, EP and TWDC possessed the highest levels of discretionary 
power to act, and NDC, NE Chamber (RCA) and NBF representatives had informal 
more informal links than other agencies. 
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NDC, GONE, EP, and TWDC., understandably were the agencies ývith the hi, -, hest 
mandatory control, but only NDC and GONE were regarded as having the highest 
control over resources and the freedom to choose when, and when not to commit their 
resources to regeneration initiatives. Other agencies scored medium or low in this 
respect. Power was derived from statutory powers, so GONE, TWDC or TECs had 
formal authority or powers vested in them to carry out specific regeneration tasks, 
providing they carried out tasks in collaboration.. 
What the aforementioned discussion revealed is that elites and agencies took primary 
and secondary role in shaping strategic decisions, they had direct or indirect 
involvement and the capacity to draw on resources and information to implement 
chosen policies. Activities were conducted in secret and excluded large number or 
individuals and groups. The result was that few challenges were ever made, due to the 
impenetrability of inter-personal connections. 
Hidden levels of power? 
For Lukes (I 974a), pluralists believed that the focus of power was determined by who 
prevailed in decision-making, or where conflict was observable, but these were 
inadequate mainly because the structures of decision- making determined the kinds of 
explanations and outcomes. His three-dimensional model of power identified, (i) overt 
conflict i. e. A has power to get B to do something B would otherwise not do, (ii) non- 
decision making aspects, identified by Bacharach and Baratz (196-1: 946-952), and 
(Ili) a radical structural view of decisive socialisation processes, in -which A educated 
and persuaded B to accept an assigned role, and conflict was diffused. The latter, 
more insidious and unobtrusive type of power, or management of meaning allo, ýved 
1 -1 - 
power to be retained by dominant interests (Fulop and Linstead, 1999: 125). A fourth, 
relational dimension of power showed how each partner to the interaction is 
constrained by roles, contextually specific practices, techniques procedures and forms 
of knowledge routinely developed to shape the conduct (Fulop and Linstead, 1999: 
126). 
Interview data suggest that elites stage-managed decisions, excluded non-elites and 
secrecy and informality sustained this position. Decisions are also made up of a 
multitude of networks at various level of governance, so it is impossible to deten-nine 
either interests and preferences or to find out how power and influence are distributed. 
The many unwritten agendas, and outcomes of decisions based on an agreed 'script', 
through rhetoric and ideology are so strong and forcefully articulated that it is almost 
impossible to get beneath them. 
Introducing mobilisation of bias, by the use of coercion, influence, authority, force, 
and manipulation can help to show who confines and restricts the scope of decision 
making to relatively safe issues for discussion., and this two dimensional view 
challenged the idea that observable decisions are a true reflection of the reality, and 
NE findings confirm that many issues are kept off the agenda. The case studies in 
subsequent chapters highlight some of the numerous sub political or extra political 
dialogues that are characteristic of regeneration. 
Both 'one' and 'two' dimensions of power adopt a Weberian analysis of individual 
will, and ignore collective forces and social arrangements (Lukes, 1974b). However, 
decisions are not only the result of individual decisions or behaviour but also result 
from collective views. Secondly. systemic aspects of decision-making are not taken in 
circumstances chosen by an individual, but directly encountered, given and 
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transmitted from the environment and the past. Latent conflict inherent in political 
and economic systems is an insidious form of power, and not readily observable. This 
'third' dimension of power is borne out by the intervieýv findings, showing elites who 
acted in personal, organisationally or civic representative capacities. However each 
elite claims to act for the interests of a broad segment of society, but in a region with a 
legacy of decline, there was a reflection of structural and systemic aspects of political 
economy, over which elites have little control. The circumstances, which have given 
rise to economic and social decline, are beyond the control of individuals or 
organisational representatives 
The fourth dimension, or relational view of power was also reflected in the interview 
data because, rather than A having power over B, the quality of relationships between 
elites is of significance, here. Each elite was constrained by the role they played, 
whether it be as a representative of an organisation, civic society, or individually. 
These contextualised and shaped conduct, as certain routines, expectations and 
knowledge determined the types of decisions made. Clearly elites responded to 
decline, but the potential to change was a product of the socio-political system. How 
successful they were in articulating and implementing a set of strategies will now be 
considered. 
Conclusion: Has the elite regime been effective? 
Means of measuring success on 'soft'. socially and culturally desirable projects are 
difficult to substantiate on any hard, objective, economic basis. Much regeneration 
activity is never quite explicit or open. but instead governed by implicit and 
embedded social interactions and relationships. There is continued uncertainty on 
I-Q 
solutions and secrecy surrounding policy formulation and implementation. I-', Iites 
operate by their own rules and conduct; it would be difficult to discern real motives or 
outcomes of their efforts. As there are many hidden agendas, and unNNTitten or 
unspoken social conventions, practices and behaviours. This makes any assessment or 
appraisal even more of a problem, because of the 'slippery' nature of various 
elements. However, we cannot measure impacts unless there is demonstrable hard 
evidence to be seen. 
Drawing the boundaries around a unit of analysis and looking for causal linkages is 
not a simple operation. Moreover, if boundaries could be drawn effectively, there is a 
problem in showing whether any changes that have arisen can be attributed to elite 
activities, or whether other extraneous forces are responsible. Who can ever say, with 
exactitude that a=b, and this is made even more difficult in complexity and 
ambiguity No one knows whether outcomes, or accrued benefits would have arisen 
with or without elite intervention. 
In an economics analysis we would point to elements such as jobs created, 
employment levels, SME business start-ups, turnover, or contribution and value added 
activities, to demonstrate success in regeneration. Questions arise when the activities 
are designed to meet social rather than economic aims. Elites make grand claims on 
how effective they are, and indeed the empirical data demonstrates a belief in the truth 
of these claims, but measurement of change and transformation prove elusive. How 
can we ever measure the economic impact of a set of social relations and networking 
activities? How could it be possible to gauge the economic benefits, or outcomes of 
many of these activities? What indicators might be used? Have elite activities 
stimulated growh, created new working practices. increased networking, or any other 
benefits" Has the existence of this regime improved the quality of life of local people. 
180 
altered their perceptions, attitudes, or aspirations? Clearly. these and many other 
questions show that outcomes or accrued benefits in regeneration are not open to 
measurement by conventional means. Traditional economic rubrics. have in-built 
problems, are ambiguous and contestable. There is the added problem of time. for 
when exactly should impact or outcome be measured? It may take years, or even 
generations for any real impact to be seen, or to determine whether these 
entrepreneurial interventions had any effect on the lives of people in the region. It is 
generally agreed that there are no quick fixes, this is a long-term project and that 
many of the activities are catalysts to stimulate further growth. 
Measuring the key direct effects of activities, let alone the associated indirect, or 
knock on effects, or how and where to attribute value, is always going to be difficult. 
There is also no way of knowing what the gross, or total effect of many inter-related 
activities might be. It would be virtually impossible to arrive at definitive indicators or 
measures of success, not least because capturing social values, or identifying 
multiplier effects of social actions is not easy. Elite activities, based on social 
interaction and networking are meeting unmet needs by transformation, but political 
ambitions cannot be denied, as one very significant aim has been to place regional 
fortunes further up the national political agenda. Despite the claims made by elites on 
how successful they were, and how much improvement or transformation is going on 
in the region, the fact is that the region remains, on any economic indicators, at least 
as one of the poorest, disadvantaged and deprived areas of the country. 
This is not saying, however, that we cannot make an), assessment at all of elite 
activities. Nevertheless Nve must be cautious in any real assessment, lest Nve fall into 
the trap of attributing any successful. identifiable changes or outcomes to elite 
activities, when in fact they may have been only one, small contributinu, factor. 
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alongside a myriad of others. Confirming the absolute contribution of elite activities 
to regeneration in the region, or claiming causal connections, is obviousl% going, to be 
open to counter claims and challenges. The fact is that we have no way of ever 
knowing, or establishing in any realistic sense, that an elite regime's existence has 
added value to regeneration. What is a more important question policy question, one 
that politicians or civil servants are unable to provide an answer to, is 'how much 
worse would the region be in regeneration terms, without the existence of this regime, 
or the activities that have been carried out? 
Having cautioned against attributing too much credibility to elite activities, it is clear 
that there has been some regeneration of the region, during the past ten years, at least. 
Nevertheless the region does still lag behind all other regions in its overall economic 
performance, and this relative position has not changed over a very long protracted 
period of history. We can point to physical transformation of certain areas of the 
region and fine examples of high profile projects that elites have been intimately 
associated with (St Peter's Development and spin offs from Visual Arts are good 
examples here), but it is difficult to speculate on whether or not they would have 
happened without intervention, or indeed what the driving factors were. A host of 
other factors might be responsible for these types of initiatives, for example the 
availability of Eurofunding, government intervention, local government planning, 
property investors aligned with UDCs, community initiatives. 
It is also claimed that 15,000 jobs have been created or safeguarded in the region 
(Bridge, December, 2001) and clearly elites were involved in many inward 
investment success stories. but it would be impossible to explain, or measure the 
impact they had on bringing the companies to the area, of whether or not the jobs 
would havc been created without elite activity. Moreover the recent withdrawal of' 
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high profile companies was not stemmed by the existence of a regime. despite the fact 
that many of them served on Task Forces looking for new buyers for the plants. The 
fact that manufacturing, and many other sectors are in terminal decline, and that SME 
development has failed to improve may be attributable to other factors. The existence 
of a cohesive group of elites has not helped much in reversing this dire situation, 
despite their best lobbying efforts. 
Projects, has improved the quality of life for many people, but again without the jobs 
and associated incomes it might be argued that nothing much has changed. A huge 
amount of energy has gone into 'thinking the unthinkable' on cliversitýving the 
economic base and creating opportunities for non manufacturing growth, but despite 
much rhetoric, it is too early to say whether creative or knowledge based industries, 
tourism, sports and arts have the potential to fill the gap or make up the shortfall. 
Added to this we can't say exactly how influential individual elites have been. 
Strategically, there is evidence of close collaboration and networking between key 
elites, but who can say, with certainty, that this has not been anything more than a 
bunch of friends getting together regularly to pat each others' backs, and 'sing from 
the same hymn sheet'? There are many strategic forums, some involving elites, others 
with broader representation across the region. It is impossible to say if they were 
stimulated by earlier regime activities or not. Maybe they would have happened 
anyway with the advent of RDA s, or to draw down Euro monies, but the scale of 
strategic bodies is staggering in the region. Not all of them have arisen because of 
central of European direction, because quite a lot are bottom up initiatives. such as 
Task Forces. The region is a 'region of forums', and though a lot of these are talking 
shops, some of them do actually achieve things. Personal experience on various 
forums, including the Regional Observatory Steering Group, indicates that thev are 
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far from mere talking shops. The unique partnership approach, which merges all 
sectors, has many long term effects. but there is no way of knowing if it is attributable 
to elite regime activity. What is obvious is that elites circulate, and this facilitates 
knowledge and information flow. 
Cultural change and raising aspirations are both worthy aims, but the region has a 
long way to go yet, so it would be very unwise to suggest that regime activity has 
changed much. Classical indicators still reveal poor educational, health and lifest\ le 
factors, and the level of entrepreneurial ism remains much as it has always been. 
Despite this, Newcastle and surrounding areas are buzzing with new initiatives, a 
thriving artistic and design community is beginning to develop, and in the urban 
areas, at least, some changes are being witnessed. There are hopes that the Regional 
Innovation Fund will increase business start UPS 
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However, in the political sphere, there is more apparent success. Lobbying has been a 
contributing, if not the entire reason, for the establishment of RDAs. Bridge was a 
close advisor to Prescott and Cabom, so had an input into the structure and financing 
of these bodies. He also lobbied, with other elites to have RDA budgets increased, and 
the 'single pot' changes came into place in April 2002. The region is much higher up 
the political agenda than it was, and is expected to be the first region to have a 
Regional Assembly, once public opinion is guaranteed and a successful referendum 
held"'. The Barnett Formula will be reviewed, after much pressure from elites, and 
124 There is a thriving design community; in and around Nevcastle, and kno\ý ledge based 
industries are growing. 
125 House of Commons meeting. December, 2001. LG Minister, outlined plans for Regional 
Assemblies. NE is anticipated to be the first region to establish one. Author ý\as in 
attendance. 
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some backbench supporters in the House of Commons"'. None of these political 
changes can be solely attributed to elites as others have long campaigned for change 
(including this author), but it is an unquestionable fact that elites have worked hard on 
raising the national and international profile of the region. Moreover. the political 
changes may result from factors, other than campaigning or lobbying. The regional I 
media has filled many column inches over the recent past highlighting the plight of 
the region, European programmes have crucially highlighted the social and economic 
divide, and Scottish, Welsh and NI devolution are genies now out of the bottle. The 
region is now thought to speak as one voice, even though it is recognised that tensions 
and conflicts reside just under the very flimsy surface. Individuals and institutions 
have coalesced around a political banner, so the synthesis of a business community 
(articulated through the Regional Chamber), the political and local communities 
(Through CNEA, NEA, NECC and CFER), and the public and service sector 
communities (GONE, ONE, Health, Police, and other regional agencies) means that a 
united front is presented and regional voices heard. Elites have been an integral part 
of this combined articulation, over a protracted period. 
Elites point to a more confident and self assured region, no longer dependent and 
looking towards a successful future. The rhetoric needs to be matched with realism, 
and Bridge recently cautioned that: 
'The only measure of success will be when we are no long reliant on 
public subsidy' (December 200 1) 
Joyce Quin announced that she \\111 retire from the Commons to take up the regional 
cause . 
She is a signatorv to tile 'Yes Campaign' (14th September 2001 
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Clearly, the region is changing to some degree. and those elites, whose activities and 
power relationships have been outlined in the preceding chapter. are obsessed with 
bringing about more changes, as we shall see in the following chapters, containing 
examples of specific cases that illustrate just how they have aligned economic. social 
and cultural activities within global and other constraints. 
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Chapter 5 
The Case of Siemens UK: The Regional Regime and FDI 
'The Tories closed the mines and the shipyards. A`ow the Blair 
government is standing by to see whether anything is left after thC 
struggle for survival' (Letter to the Joumal Newspaper, September 
1998) 
'It's aftagile economy that is based on inward investment. 
(Tomaney) 
'Inward Investment is a continuous thread through changing fads, 
fashions and ideologies. There is no uncritical acceptance that a branch 
plant syndrome is no longer a problem' (Robinson, 1990, BBC TV) 
Introduction 
The earlier chapters set the historical and theoretical parameters of the existence of 
an elite regime and this chapter presents the first of three detailed case studies. In 
recent years a consensus has emerged on the need to build local and regional 
capacities to support and embed sustainable forms of economic development, and 
FDI has been regarded as one important form, in other words, 'regional actors need 
to attract FDI by creating an infrastructure of cultural collaboration, which is of 
equal importance to the physical needs. Interactions are informal and the social glue 
to foster cooperation. ' (Kanter, 1995: 151-160) 
This chapter provides an examination of the efforts of elites attract Siemens' to the 
NE, and then how they acted to try to ameliorate the effects of the , vithdraxal 
sixteen months of operation. It shows how central and local state actors inter-acted 
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with regional elites to develop coherence as the NE was pitted against other 
competitor regions. It brings into question just how much autonomy and , itimacN. le "- 
elites have, how they were drawn together to negotiate and bargain, and confirms 
that autonomy was constrained and contingent on funding decisions made by 
central government and the corporate might of Siemens". 
The decision is of interest because it illustrates the complex interplay of resources 
that each agency contributed, and brings into focus exactly how much pmNer and 
influence regional actors wield in comparison with central government. 
A short lived, high profile case, it did create institutional innovation and elite 
entrepreneurship in multi-sector agencies, as they came together to attract the 
company, but more importantly they were able to form a task force to cope ý, vith the 
closure decision sixteen months later. Siemens' did permit elites to redefine and 
validate their activities, but revealed how risky inward investment was as a core 
strategy is. It had the indirect benefit of concentrating minds on indigenous 
industries, and left a legacy of infrastructure and networks established for R&D in 
universities, clustering and supply chains, built up during the period. 
Regional interests were never equal partners to Siemens' globally, or government 
nationally, but civil servants did help to legitimise activities, but lack of 
fundamental resources meant that without support from national government elites 
were not in a position to persuade Siemens to stay. 
It concludes by demonstrating that no matter how effective elites were in 
developing regional capacities including PR, marketing and lobbying skills to 
embed an important FDI, the national and international floxv of capital was outside 
of the control of regional elites. It demonstrates that despite exhortations for regions Z-1 
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to shape their own regeneration policies the rapidity and increased mobility of 
international capital leaves them neutered. 
Many doubts have been expressed, documented and debated over recent past about 
the quantitative and qualitative impact of inward investment because of the 
rootlessness of multinational operations, lack of integration in the local economy, 
weak multiplier effects, quality and remuneration of 'screwdriver jobs' or lack of 
high level functions (Thomas, 1996: 225-240). There has also been also concern 
about where companies should be located, and the degree of geographic imbalance 
brought about by clustering of plants in specific corridors throughout the UK. To 
add to these concerns, Barnett funding arrangements meant that substantial sums of 
money previously given through the Welsh Office and Scottish Offices was used to 
'poach' new investment (Tomaney, 1998: keynote speech based on CNA 
pamphlet). FDI was not a panacea to solve all economic ills, though it was still of 
'140). strategic importance for national, and regional economies (Thomas, 1996: 225-ý 
Inward investment policies between localities, over time was a reflection of a very 
complex mix of economic and political factors, and engendered a growing debate 
on whether it should take precedence over the development of indigenous industries 
(Collis and Noon, 1994: 843-849). 
Siemens, one of the world's leading companies in the field of electrical and 
electronic engineering, employing 300,000 people worldwide, is German owned. 
and has been expanding for the past few decades, notably in Villach, Austria and 
Reaensburo, Germanv. It is well established in the UK and began to look for semi- tý -- - 
conductor markets outside of Germany. The scale of the investment \\orth an 
estimated f 1.1 billion was anticipated to generate 1800 jobs. in the planned first 
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phase. The plant produced ASICs (Application Specific Integrated Circuits), for use 
in telecommunications, and the decision to locate in the NE was presented by the 
Conservative government, as confirmation of the success of its regional economic 
policies. In the words of Ian Lang, policies that had contributed to 'a skilled and 
flexible labourforce'and 'excellent labour relations(on a visit to the region). 
Important financial, technical, strategic and political issues were considered before 
North Tyneside was chosen in preference to other competitor sites, but the case 
does reveal how elites were able to demonstrate their capacity to strategicall), 
collaborate, since the arrival of Nissan, the prototype FDI in the mid 1980s. Bridoe 
(NDC) gave a strong lead, supported by other elites who maintained informal and 
mutually reciprocal relationships; managerial and professional public entrepreneurs 
and politically astute business and other interests were drawn in to provide 
resources, personnel and information. Siemens' gave elites the opportunity to 
develop a common vision of transformation, dynamism and renaissance, and this 
coincided with the modernisation project that Government Ministers and civil 
servants were proposing for the region. What became evident, however, was that 
uppermost in the minds of Ministers was the political capital to be gained from such 
a high profile investment. Inevitably this top down strategy marginalized and forced 
elites into a secondary role at the "attraction" stage, but they still fulfilled maný, 
important roles, not least high level lobbying prior to the decision and drawing ltý 
together resources, but the volatility and transience of global capital meant that no 
matter what Herculean regional efforts were made the plug, was still pulled. 
Crucially it showed that innovative and entrepreneurial strategies alone cannot 
rectify social and economic problems which rely on external forces, so once the 
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decision had been made to close the plant, elites ýýent into overdrive by shifting 
strategies to provide personnel and inforination for a task force, lobbied govemment 
and overseas investors in an attempt to reverse the decision and find a new buver 
for the plant. 
Background to the investment 
In a rapidly changing semi-conductor market, in January 1995 an initial enquirý- 
was made to IBB, DTI in London from Siemens concemino possible sites for a 
major wafer fabrication plant in the UK. The potential scale of the investment 
produced a rapid response in Westminster and Whitehall. 127 IBB immediately co- 
ordinated the process through English Partnerships (EP) and Bridge at NDC. EP 
began to offer sites from its UK portfolio, offer assistance on tcchnical 
requirements, above all to satisfy the need for a level, vibration-free green-field site, 
with good access, electricity and water supply. 
NE agencies were informed of the prospect of the investment, but at the very early 
stages there was no desire to have a competitive auction of contending claims as 
each region vied with the other. Elites began to lobby Siemens' executives and 
contending sites were narrowed down to Hadrian Business Park, North Tyneside 
(NT), and Springvale Park, Wolverhampton. Between June and July 1995, Siemens' 
executives visited both sites and at this stage regional agencies were drawn into the 
process. 
1 -2 7 Tile Deputy Prime Minister, Michael Heseltine, was acti\ el" invok ed from the earliest 
stages. I 
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Senior executives from Siemens' visited the NT site five times between 16 %lay and 
2 August 1995, during which they began to articulate how impressed they NNere with 
regional agencies for co-ordinating and bringing together high quality information 
that would inform their final decision. 
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Until early 1998 the semi-conductor chip market was the fastest growing market in 
the world, valued at well over US $200 billion, and there was a worldwide market 
for such a portable product with a very high added value. After a decade in which 
Siemens had made large losses in semi-conductors, the signs between 1995 and 
1997 suggested that this particular area of their business was beginning to yleld 
significant dividends. 
Siemens' needed to increase productive capacity, and the rapidly changing nature of 
the market accounted for the crucial importance attached to an expeditious decision 
making process. The UK alone represented a massive market for semi-conductors 
worth f 3.5 billion per annum as one Siemens' executive confirmed: 
'we want to be close to that market' (Siemens) 
and 
'North Tyneside was an Anglo-American bridge into global markets' 
(Siemens) 
Labour costs in Germany in 1995/6 were a great deal higher than in many other 
parts of the EU, both in terms of hourly labour costs and also in non-wage labour 
costs, such as employers' contributions to social insurance, see Appendix 5.0 The 
Made on 4 August 1995 in Munich at Siemens' Board meeting. 
129 7% of oroup sales and 14% of pre-tax profit (Siemens' UK Annual Reports 1993. 
1994). 
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significance of this differential in Siemens' calculations was confirmed when 
interviewees considered the relative importance of factors in Tyneside's favour: it 
was consistently cited as 'a very important factor of crucial significance'. the hh-, hest 
rating possible. In a capital intensive venture such as this labour costs represent at 
most about 15% of the projects total costs, this was still a significant enough 
differential to ensure that the NE's low wage levels were an important factor in the 
finn's considerations, as reflected in the following: 
'It was a political decision, because of non-unionised cheap labour. We 
used a worldwide criteria on which to base investmew decisions' 
(Siemens) 
The NE's additional attractiveness for Siemens was also the fact that ý, vorkers in 
manufacturing industry are paid considerably below the national average (see 
Appendix 5.1), a ready pool of labour was available to emploý'ers, NT's 
unemployment rate in October, 1996 stood at a rate of 8.9 %, with the bulk of this 
being male unemployment. Appendix 5.2 A Daily Telegraph report showed that on 
the first working day after the announcement of Siemens decision, on Monday 
7 August, over 3,000 telephone enquiries had been made to the employment centre 
in North Shields by noon. Another important labour factor which carried significant 
weight with the Siemens management team was the financial role that Tyneside 
TEC was willing to train the workforce required by Siemens. 
Siemens' executives referred to the importance of the financial package devised by 
central government and the local agencies to offset some of the costs of land 
purchase, site preparation and buildings. Financial assistance alone did not sway the 
decision in Tyneside's favour, since the financial inducements offcred b-, the 
Austrian government Nvere greater in sum than those availablc in the UK. 
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qualified for Regional Selective Assistance (RSA), furthermore it became apparent 
to Siemens that more than just the RSA grant would apply. Althou,.! h there ývcrc 
wildly speculative figures quoted in the press concerning the size of the financial 
package the findings indicate that the package finally offered was substantial but 
not excessive, and most importantly included a series of commitments that Siemens 
would get the new plant into production as quickly as possible. The RSA grant, the 
single largest component of the package, amounted to f 30m, and was part of central 
government's sop to NE, in the hope that 1500 high tech jobs would be created, in 
the wake of the Swan Hunter closure. NT City Challenge fund and Tyneside TEC 
offered f 15m for infrastructure development and training costs respectively. EP 
took financial responsibility for site preparation, a contribution of a further fI 5m, 
whereas NT Council contributed a further f 150,000. Additionally, there was a 
comprehensive set of non-financial commitments to support the investment. Since 
the land was largely on enterprise zone land, it was mostly zero-rated. NT City 
Challenge altered many of its programmes to dovetail its infrastructure programme 
to meet the needs of Siemens'. 
Grant, Tyneside TEC was influential in using the agency as a conduit for 
substantial custornised recruitment and training programmes, as well as holding a 
comprehensive knowledge base on the regional labour market. Previous inward 
investment experience was put to good use and Grant indicated that: 
'Siemens needed to be assured that we would listen and talk to them and 
be able to provide support. for their demanding recruitment and training 
needs. In conjunction with the Employment Senice we enabled Siemens 
to conic to a decision. ' 
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Siemens' executives indicated that this comprehensive support package has been 
'invaluable' in the recruitment process. 
A variety of technical considerations also made the NT site particularly suitable. 
The production of ASICs required excellent ground conditions, completely level 
and free from any subsidence or vibration. Although mainl), former farmland, 
concern was expressed on the fact that parts of the area had for the previous 200 
years also been part of the coalmining heartland. Despite the fact that there were old 
pit shafts on the site, the vibration tests, carried out by consultant engineers Ovcr- 
Arup, proved it to be vibration free. 
Another essential technical requirement was a plentiful supply of pure ývater. 
Holliday, Chair of Northumbria Water, an environmental specialist, had high-lewl 
discussions with Siemens' to confirm that water available would meet their 
stringent quality criteria. Wafer-chips cannot be manufactured without a ready 
supply of high quality de-ionised water. The company also took into consideration 
electricity costs and the quality of service offered by the local supplier. These 
compared favourably with the electricity services available at the five other main 
competitor sites, interviewees attributed an 'excellent' grading to the suitability of 
the local electricity supplier. 
Siemens' were also concerned about recruiting a sufficient number of skilled 
graduates in electronic engineering or other disciplines, so Siemens executiN'Cs were 
introduced to representatives of all local universities, in particular Wright of 
Sunderland and Wright of Newcastle. Appendix 5.3 shows that the region had a 
large number of graduates and post-graduates entering the labour market cquippcd 
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with the requisite skills. The following quote is illustrative of many comments at 
interview: 
'We have good infrastructure, large adaptable and potentiallY 
productive workforce, low costs, excellent FEWE provision and 
excellent communications '(Wright) 
German companies prefer the flexibility of British engineers who receive a more 
generalist training to their German counterparts who tend to be highly specialised. 
The universities became involved in a number of other ways; Northumbria and 
Newcastle provided training in conjunction with Tyneside TEC. Siemens' also 
provided funding for a number of research studentships. Balls, TWDC, secured 
funding to create the Siemens' Chair of Micro -Electronics in the Electronic 
Engineering department. Professor Anthony O'Neill, the first incumbent, was a 
leading academic in this field, who was involved in persuading the company to 
choose the NE. 
The NE, although an area with a strong tradition of trade unionism, has never been 
an area noted for industrial militancy, and interviewees commented on the good 
labour relations. Officials and leading lay members of the Northern Regional TUC 
and the largest Unions are mainly 'moderates'. The decline of the traditional 
industries in the NE has meant that the largest trade unions experienced a decline in 
membership, and a consequential competition between unions to win the right to 
organise in many of the inward investor plants. Disputes in these companies are 
virtually unheard of. 
A positive picture of labour relations, and co-operative relations between companics 
and the mainly Labour local authorities of the region, was confirmed 
by 
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interviewees from the Siemens management team, one -who wished to remain 
anonymous claimed: 
'Analysts have questioned the sense of the initial investment, given that 
the micro chip market was already falling, but in my Oeit, North 
Tyneside was a speculative investment, only one part of global 
operation, and it was a wake up call to German workers, because of 
their high wage demands. NDC and the other partners in the region 
were able to push things along very quickly ii-iihout much trade union 
opposition, and this conveyed a strong message to trade unions and the 
Board back home. ' 
Siemens also had discussions with senior managers of inward investment 
companies, facilitated by Bridge of ONE and Denham of GONE. Siemens' 
management team was with Mr Reinhard Schutz, Managing Director of the NT 
plant of Freudenberg Technical Products, a large manufacturer of fluid hydraulic 
seals, who attended a lunch. He spoke in very positive tenns of his experiences in 
the region, in particular the quality of the workforce, the supportiveness of local 
agencies, and the high quality of life in the region. 
The existence of an efficient road network, a relatively low level of corporate 
taxation, and the ease with which profits could be remitted to the parent company 
were factors in the NE's favour. Siemens executives' were asked to choose the most 
relevant variables in the decision to locate in NT and to assess each site in turn 
under various essential criteria, as can be seen from Appendix 5.4. It is clear that 
NT and the UK possessed a distinct competitive advantage over the other sites 
considered. 
197 
After the decision to close it became evident that: 
'NDC and the regional partners gave a very slick performance, but the 
decision to close was really a domestic one back in Germany where the 
internal Board politics had the old guard, von Perrier pitted against 
Ulrich Schumacher' (Anonymous interview) 
Schumacher was appointed Chief Operating Officer and second in command in the 
Siemens' Board in October 1997. The NT plant became a white elephant when the 
price of DRam wafers began to slump in late 1996, and early 1997. Hyundai and 
Lucky Goldstar went to South Wales, but Siemens had heavily invested in NT, 
especially in capital costs of $100m per wafers produced per week, and the industry 
standard of 15% labour costs. One executive commented: 
'Hyundai and Goldstar were already aware of the gross over capacay 
in production, but unlike Siemens they decided not to equip their 
factories or take on many staff'(Siemens) 
Siemens was unable to diversify its portfolio to produce logic wafers, which would 
have been more applicable to other consumer goods (existing D Ram AISICs were 
circuits for front ends of computers, and had no other use) because they did not 
have either intellectual property rights or designers capable of converting the North 
Tyneside plant. Added to this: 
At the time West German workers were producing half the productivity 
that NT workers, and NT products were much more appropriate to 
market demand, so the closure made no commercial sense whatsoever. 
NT did have massive overheads, and 16OOm had been invested, but it 
was easier. for the Board to make the decision to close AT, get out of the 
seini-conductor market than it was to close other parts of world wide 
operations' (Siemens) 
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As investment dried up, the price of chips fell dramatically the closure decision was 
taken: 
' To satisfy shareholders, West German workers, and the in-fighting at 
Board level, rather than on commercial viability'( Siemens) 
In June 1998 Siemens suffered its worst ever losses, and Von Perrier, the CEO was: 
'Being barked at on allftonts to do something to appease shareholders. 
Schumacher, the Young Pretender, was the most vociferous critic. [on 
Perrier came up with a ten-pointplan of action' (Siemens) 
Executives from NT were called to Munich, told the news, and as one, anonymous 
source claimed: 
'I was told to sit in the decision for three days in German 
' y, and 
think 
about how we could exitfrom NT with dignity, given that there would be 
a political jurore. We agreed that it would shut on August I Oth 1998 , 
and that Schumacher would be the hatchet man who would stand up in 
front of . 500 workers and tell them that, despite better technology and 
superb production, the world market for chips had fallen to such an 
extent that there was no option but to close. ' 
f 6m of debt was written off and the closure cost f 20m in redundancies and related 
payments, but what the NT workers didn't know was that: 
'the secret they weren't let in on, was that Schumacher's reivardftom 
the Board in Germany, for handling the closure was his own spin off 
semi-conductor company, Infineon '(Anonymous) 
The Siemens plant, in the words of one executive, became: 
'The biggest piece Qf real estate in the world' (Siemens) 
And, as ,, xTe shall discover in the next section, the scale of the nwestment. which 
clites initially hailed as a beacon of hope in the region's fortunes, turned quickly 
into an albatross around their necks. as they had to consider contingencv action after 
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the closure announcement. Before assessing how they dealt xvith closure plans we 
examine the exact activities and inter- rel ati ons hips bet,, ýýeen elites in the attraction 
and closure phases. 
Activities and Power Inter-relationships 
The Siemens' case permitted elites to redefine their roles, activities and inter- 
relationships because it was a critical incidence in the regional storY of 
modernisation and transformation. It was therefore regarded as a catalyst for neN\, 
thinking, in particular in response to the vulnerability and continued dependency, 
not only on foreign inward investment but also on the national state. This became 
an appropriate time for elites to start considering other strategies that might enhance 
the social and cultural life of the region, as the cases in chapters six and seven will 
confirm. 
In terms of the activities and power inter-relationships interviewees were asked to 
determine which individuals and agencies were powerful or influential in the 
Siemens case. Fig 5.0 is a composite illustration of the resource base that each 
agency brought to the case, with individuals ranked according to their profile, 
centrality to decision-making, and capacity to harness relevant tangible and 
intangible resources. 
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Despite regional input, the Major government had set the overall economic 
framework within which the investment took place. and the level of corporation tax 
was as a key factor in the decision, as was the provision of a financial package. The 
Deputy P. M., Heseltine, was held in high regard for his negotiation skills. DTI and 
IBB commissioned research, recruited technical consultants and provided grants, data 
and expertise. Siemens' executives in the UK and in Germany were in a relativeh, 
influential position in the early stages because of their knowledge of UK %vorkforce 
and the business situation, and when the decision was taken to close the plant, it 
became obvious they had ultimate power. 
Interviewees could not agree on whether EP, NDC or GONE acted as the lead bodv. 
EP, but what became clear was that EP acted as the conduit organisation and co- 
ordinated all the various regional bodies. As the following quotes demonstrate: 
'We didn't have to manage conflict, there was none. It was a team effort, 
all the agencies will claim credit, but we had the lead ' 
(Bowman, EP) 
'We had no political axe to grind, all we had to do was get them to come 
here'(Bowman, EP) 
'We let NDC so the red carpet job; IBB was good at paperwork but we 
excel at the technical aspects and without good water, electricity and 
vibration Siemens wouldn't have chosen us. We put together a package of 
sites in a glossy brochure and then engaged the consultants. TVe were the 
main contact with Siemens in Germany. Don't let Bridge tell you 
othenilse, NDCs role was quite minimal' (Bowman, EP) 
'The business sector didn't have much of a role but we let them think theY 
ivere important' (Bowman, EP) 
A contrary view from NDC: 
'Thei, would nei, cr had come, had we not taken the initiative' 
(NDC) 
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And a business view; 
'Business in this region is so well organised, and helpful to new investors 
that Siemens knew they'd be made welcome' (Wriggle sworth) 
The aforementioned quotes confirm the importance placed on consensus, despite the 
recognition that political infighting is a fact of life. PR and marketing Nvere an 
essential ingredient to overcome some of the divisions because continued reference to 
the ideology convinced even the most vehement detractors that it would be in 
everyone's interest to articulate a common vision. 
EP carried out a traffic impact study, ground investigation, magnetic influences, wind 
data, topographical surveys, procurements, contracts, infrastructure assessments in the 
period leading up to the plant opening. In collaboration with NTBC they found 
temporary accommodation for all the contract workers; this transpired into a logistic 
headache. Siemens' executives praised the strong support offered by: 
'John (NDC), and his Chief Officers' (Siemens Executive) 
Bridge: 
'Was very focused, rational and instrumental in bringing Siemens here' 
(local authority) 
'Personable, able and experienced He's also a confidante of Ministers, 
which does us no harm'(Robson) 
'Has strategic control of the media and ability to see the big picture; these 
are his best strengths'(EP representative interview) 
And he and Balls are: 
'Skilled operators. Whenever there's a northern view required they are 
both wheeled on to the media stage. They are both good with the national 
and regional media'(EP) 
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This demonstrates the functional and instrumental nature of elite activities because 
FDI can bring fresh resources into the region, but only if elites continue lobbying and 
PR efforts. These activities, not only legitimised the chosen strategies. but also had 
the effect of securing resources above generalised national expenditure. There was a 
hope that Siemens' would validate the clustering policy, benefit R&D, provide direct 
and indirect employment, but stimulate infrastructure development. NDC worked 
with TWDC, TECs, business and other agencies, and clearly the ability of Bridge and 
other elites to lobby at senior levels was a crucial factor in the success. Denham and 
other civil servants were pivotal in helping to make the business case, on behalf of the 
region. She became a lynchpin between the NE and Whitehall, with responsibility for 
keeping EP/IBB/DTl informed of progress. All elites, including Denham used 
existing political, business, and personal networks to lobby central and European 
governments in the phase leading to the decision to locate, and in the withdrawal 
phase. In particular, the business community and NDC/NEA used what influence they 
could to pressurise MPs, MEPs and any one else of import, who could have effect the 
final decisions. NDC, through its Ambassadorial Scheme, and NEA, through the 
Brussels Office, obtained infon-nation on European grants, and both became useful 
avenues to look for suitable buyers after closure. The Task Force created once the 
company decided to withdraw is an example of what elites do best, using networks in 
a crisis situation. No matter how smoothly such processes run, it means little if they 
have ' no teeth', and clearly in this case the Task Force did not have much pwwer. but 
members would claim that they were instrumental in finding a new buyer. 
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Bridge, an economist with a long history of working at NDC. had excellent lobbying 
skills and a sharp understanding of how the NE relates to the political economY. "" He 
did not act alone as it was vital to draw on as many resources as possible to persuade 
Siemens to relocate, so Denham represented GONE, Robson, Gill and McCormick 
represented local authorities and NEA, in setting up meetings and venues for 
Siemens' visits. Many leading business people, such as Wrigglesworth, Midgley and 
Watkin, became involved and: 
'It was the socialising and informal nature of the links it, e made that could 
have swung it in inward investment terms'(Robson) 
Robson, Gill, McCormick and Bridge (as well as North Tyneside BC, Regional 
Chamber of Commerce and NEA) allowed ED and R&I staff to be available for 
establishing sources of finance, procurement opportunities, labour market information 
and land availability. 
Regular and informal communications between elites meant that NDC and EP held 
vital information on local supplier base and very extensive links into the business, 
public sector and other agencies. This facilitated a speedy response to queries from 
Siemens' executives and they were able to draw on specialist expertise on finance, 
marketing, skill levels, and utilities, land availability, as necessary. Officers from 
NEA and local authorities were seconded as secretarial support. The Regional 
Chamber, NDC and GONE offices would be used as venues, at other times executives 
were taken to sporting events, cultural or artistic venues and 'wined and dined by 
groups of elites, as this commentary confirms: 
130 
-vicNN \Nith Bridge lasted for almost four, as he explained planned one-hour inter 
cornpreliensivek the Nl-' relative global positioning, 
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'We go to theatre or football I have a Director's box there, and 
horseracing. After the traumatic closures of the past we've put energy and 
a corporate philosophy into getting inward investment' (Watkin) 
Together elites provided an overview framework of re-(-, Ional resources and able to 
present Siemens' with a watertight portfolio of key considerations. In this Nýav the 
company, like earlier FDls, became part of the overall portfolio of economic activit\. 
an adaptation of national policy to regional needs. 
NTBC, TEC, and the universities, headed by Bridge, Denham, Gill, Grant, Wriolit. 
ltý 
Robson, Balls and Wrigglesworth, commissioned or allowed their own organisations 
to carry out research into labour costs and availability, consultancy charo 
employment trends. A skills directory for Inward Investors was produced for 
Siemens' executives, by NBF, to make better-informed judgements, and as the 
following quote shows, elite actors also involved civil servants in their acti\, ities: 
'We had a learning tool route map for new investors, run by a DTI 
secondee and Nat West bank, and a bank of knowledge that it, e share on 
goodpractice companies' (NBF) 
LAs, through NEA, worked with other agencies to make resources such as finance, 
officer time, facilities or venues, and officers available in the planning and welcoming 
stages. Networking between universities, development agencies, industrial and 
commercial sectors and public/service sectors, allowed representatives to be drawn 
together at different times, for example Denham was used on financial and political 
issues, given her regular visits and contacts with Whitehall, Grant advised on trainmI(, I 
Wright on university business, and Mills and Howard on trade union issues. Gill and 
Robson met ,, vith, or spoke xvith, all Directors of ED across the region to establish 
land availability, infrastructure, skills levels, utilities provision. Utility Heads and 
TEC, TWDC, University CFOs Nvere included in these connections, and prescntations 
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were made to the Germans on various features of regional skills and resources. The 
whole exercise was a strategically planned, self-congratulatorN- validation of elite 
activities, as they knew that the significance and scale of the case would raise the 
profile of the region, but such a large coup would enable them to deflect criticism 
from those uneasy about 'putting the regional eggs in one basket", in other words a 
heavy reliance on inward investment. 
NTBC appointed a specific officer to run the Siemens Project and: 
'Took a lead role due to the importance of the investment and Foster, th C 
CEO was happy to provide officer time(Bilson) 
As well as giving financial advice, because: 
'It was on a City Challenge site so we could advise Siemens' on any 
finance thatcould be draw down'(Pellow). 
'The site was on fteehold land owned by NTBC but TWEDCO had the 
lease so we had to negotiate on Siemens behalf (Pellow). 
At different points in the case, elites from NDC, NEA, TWDC, TEC, Universities, 
TUs and GONE acted as brokers in managing networks, such as bringing together 
indigenous and inward investment companies. As senior strategists with an overview 
of the region Denham, Wright and Bridge were in positions from which they could to 
call on regional expertise, resources and R&D facilities. It was useful for them to 
connect Siemens' into regional initiatives such as the Regional Competitiveness 
Proj ect, Manufacturing and Service Challenges, supply chain networks, 
benchmarking and best practice clubs as soon as possible, not only because it might 
benefit the company, but the indirect benefit was a large investor company gave the 
*NE manufacturing way' a stamp of approval. 
As well as acting individually and on behalf of their agencies, elites acted in this case 
as civic spokesmen e.,,. Gill and Robson represented their wards. business elites. such 
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as Wrigglesworth, expressed the business voice, and at the preliminary stages of the 
investment. The critical need to minimise conflict between competing local 
authorities of Gateshead and NTBC as both battled over . N-here the plant should be 
located, meant that a compromise had to be achieved, as Gill asserted: 
'We've never been the same with NT since the demise of Tyne and Wear 
County, so we knew we'd have a battle on our hands. It got quite naslY, 
but we had to pull together in the end ' 
It was the role of elites to negotiate, bargain and resolve such conflicts, more 
especially after the closure announcement when it became evident that NTBC could 
do nothing alone. Elites provided the critical information link between local and 
regional levels by maintaining a continual dialogue and exchange of personnel 
between levels. Conflict inevitably also arose between competing rural and urban 
demands, between the needs of SMEs, vying to supply Siemens, as well as social and 
economic factors. Elites resolved as many of these conflicts as they were able to, so 
that reconciliations to the many demands across the region were agreed upon. FDI 
was a regeneration field with a multitude of competing agendas. 
The rapid-response task force that was assembled once closure was announced acted 
quickly to provide DTI with information on existing personnel and other available 
resources. Bridge set it up on 3 August 98, only three days after the announcement. It 
consisted of Dobbie (GONE), Bridge (NDC), Blackie (EP), Avis (Siemens), Grant 
(TEC), representatives from NEA, Stringfellow (leader of NTBC. ONE Board 
member), Price Waterhouse, TWEDCO (Tyne and Wear Development Company) and 
DTI/11313 officials. All were invited to join, primarily because of their international 
links, and because the objective was to: 
'Packag, c tl7C 1)1(1111 10 world wide buyers'(Siemens) 
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'Sending sales and marketing materials to embassies andforeign consills, 
demonstrating the assets of the plant, and workforce skills. The aim was 
to sell the plant as a total, going concern. Consultants developed a video 
and internet link so that the message went around the world Tyneside 
TEC set up a job club on site at Siemens and NTBC, set up a job search 
forum'(Gill) 
Two years were spent trying to find a buyer for the plant, and even an MBO attempt, 
fronted by the Production and Finance Directors was: 
'Thwarted by Schumacher, as it would have been in direct competition 
with his new company' (Anonymous interview) 
Formal bids were received from Chinese companies, but the Chinese om, ernment 
would not give assurances to underwrite any debts, so that bid failed. Task Force 
personnel made countless visits around the world and in early 1999 efforts to secure a 
new buyer seemed limited but by 8 September 2000 it was reported that Atmel, an 
international semi-conductor manufacturer based in San Jose, San Francisco, had 
proposed a joint venture with Siemens. Atmel was the third US Company to negotiate 
over the site in 18 months. Byers, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry took 
the proposal seriously, asked the company to make a written submission, on the basis 
that any partners to the joint venture would commit f 250m investment. There was no 
evidence to suggest that jobs created would match the 1,100 lost from the closure but 
the proposal was: 
' Welcomed by the investment support team of ONE'(Bridge). 
It was regarded as a: 
'Bargai17 basementprice, qf ýC74m' 
With the guarantee of f28m state aid. The company currently (mid 2002) has 320 
employees but is hoping to create 700 more bv the end of 2002. as the market for 
microchips has improved. However. as a company spokesman said recentlv: 
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'In the aftermath of September 11, we'll need to ke 
, i- an e- ve on 
how well 
the sector performs in global markets' (telephone intervie%\. January 
2002) 
Conclusion: Effectiveness of the regime 
The decision by Siemens UK to locate its semiconductor microchip plant on NT was 
of ma . or significance to the NE economy. It was hailed as a success by a Conservative 
central government as it gave credence to their policies. The belief in the power of the 
market to solve economic ills meant that the attraction of a large multinational 
company gave force to central government's argument that could reduce regional 
support. 
Regional elites were happy to secure national resources, above and beyond 
generalised expenditure, and they were able to claim that this high profile inward 
investment would show that the region had reached a turning point and was now a site 
for large- scale investment. It therefore confirmed that the region was modernising, 
but elites also validated and confirmed the legitimacy of previous activities and 
processes. Regional policies such as clustering, supply chain, benchmarking and 
others were validated by the arrival of Siemens. Elites were able to redefine their 
activities and inter-linkages because it was thought that Siemens was a classic catalyst 
for change. 
In the regional story it rates alongside Nissan as a critical incidence. The elite 
constellation was functional and instrumental as they all hoped that this success would 
create a new infrastructure, add to the R& D basis of the region, improve direct and 
indirect employment opportunities, as well as various spin off activities. In this \vay it 
was part of the traditional ideolo,,, ý, of long termism and sustainability. 
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Resources and people were drawn together through formal and informal mechanisms 
and the ideology of growth was articulated by use of the media and any conflicts Nvere 
managed so that future investments would not be jeopardised. 
Elites negotiated with, and lobbied central government, and Siemens executives, by 
using Denham and other senior civil servants to lubricate some of the bar, -, ainino 
meetings. Ultimately, despite the effectiveness in drawing on regional resources, 
elites could do little other than to assemble a task force, given the volatility and 
transience of global capital. Herculean efforts to save the plant were useless. 
On a more positive note, Siemens did mark a shift in thinking, as regional elites began 
to articulate the plight of the region and think more deeply about the dependency on 
inward investment as a sole strategic aim. Many benefits had accrued from Siemens, 
such as the development of technical know how, a skills base, R&D and 
organisational capacity, and none were entirely lost once Siemens withdrew. There is 
now an even greater bank of knowledge and information, and Siemens demonstrated 
that elites can work effectively together, but that support from external sources needs 
to be forthcoming. New innovative and entrepreneurial thinking, policies and 
practices cannot alone rectify the multitude of social and economic problems. 
It was a short lived, very high profile risky strategy that brought about institutional 
innovation and individual entrepreneurial activity across a wide range of agencies, but 
at the end if the day decisions were being taken outside of the region and no amount 
of effort could alter that. 
Elites felt let down by central government, and the Siemens withdra-wal gave a (greater II 
impetus for elites to articulate the unfairness of the Barnett Formula and to begin in 
earnest with demands for a Regional Assembly. Siemens was therefore a cataIN'st to 
orcater political lobbying, for the region to be allowed to determinc its own 
dýýstiny. 
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In the next, very different, case we see how some of the skills and expertise developed 
by elites over the years in attracting inward investors were put to good use in an 
artistic and cultural project. Visual Arts is an example of how regeneration can be 
used to meet unmet social as well as economic need. 
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Chapter Six 
The case of Visual Arts UK 1996: the Regional Regime and Arts 
'We learnt so much that we can pass on ftom Visual A ris, that perhaps we 
can turn the Siemens plant into a huge museum or gallerv. It could be a 
state of the art microchip plant of the 1990s. We're verl, good artistic 
things, but we seem to be having a problem with industrial plants' 
(MCCormick) 
'Our greatest ability in the region is that people and institutions can har- 
ness existing resources, and work in partnership towards shared goaLv. 
Visual Arts demonstrated this beautifully '(Collard) 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter the findings illustrated the main influences over Siemens' in- 
vestment decisions were related the company's need to reach new markets and the 
British government's macro promotion of inward investment. Elites had a secondary, 
though important role, however Siemens, like its predecessor Nissan gave elites the 
opportunity to redefine roles and activities, improve networking, information sharing 
and resource deployment to achieve a strategic approach. This ability to learn from 
past experiences has implications for future projects and, and within culture-led strat- 
egy the existence of a strong intra-regional regime has potential to avoid the fragmen- 
tation characteristic of earlier programme -led approaches. Cultural projects can raise 
the profile of a region, as Nvell as maximising social benefits and minimising tý, _, the 
dis- 
advantaoes of fragmented approaches. 
'1 
In this spirit Visual Arts 96, a regional project firmly rooted in the social systern Is 
introduced as a good example to illustrate how elites manipulate symbols and strate- 
gic rhetoric to foster an ideology of change. This was a locally based, bottom up ini- 
tiative with a strong, existing institutional framework and very strong information 
flow from the grass roots to the regional, national and international levels. It was cru- 
cial to obtain financial support from the Arts Council and international sources, and 
commercial and industrial support in the early stages. Unlike the Siemens case this 
grass roots initiative engendered a strong sense of ownership from elites and commu- 
nity based actors. Elites were able to influence the project in much more significant 
ways than they had been able to influence Siemens' investment decisions. The le\-el 
of autonomy they had was significantly greater than in the Siemens' case and demon- 
strated a flexible and innovative approach that allowed elites to enhance, maintain and 
enlarge their power base. The Arts Council originated the idea but once the bid was 
secured the power and influence of regional and sub regional elites to affect the over- 
all success and outcomes of the event was vital. 
It is also a classic demonstration of civil servants and local state officials drawn in to 
legitimise activities, resources drawn together to harmonise social and economic need 
as elites adapted and shaped a national initiative to play to regional strengths. 
Background to Visual Arts 
Property development and economic forces have dominated regeneration and social 
regeneration has been largely ignored. We cannot ignore physical aspects because 1-n 
people need houses, schools. roads and leisure facilities but the social costs of under 
development has tremendous costs. There are questions on how much impact or bene- 
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fit to community's cultural and arts-led regeneration can have. or whether or not they 
are focused on raising the profile in the external world. 
In the last two decades arts and cultural activities have become dynamic aspects of 
regional economies (Griffiths et al, 1999: 257-264, McCarthy and Lloý-d. 1999: 264- 
8), and there are positive economic, social and symbolic benefits that might accrue, as 
well as a strategic approach to bring together the linkages, connections and networks. 
Appendix 6.0,6.1, and 6.2 give some indication of employment in the cultural sector I 
in the UK. 
There is nothing new about art and creativity being used as a tool for regeneration as 
civic improvements in I gth century British cities, quite often funded by industrialists 
keen to show their wealth and prestige"' Town halls, public libraries and galleries 
reflected civic pride in the booming industrial cities, and today goý! ernment is invest- 
ing in developing public arts such as the Tate Modem, and the Lowry Centre in Sal- 
ford. Art is seen as a catalyst of cultural renewal and economic development, but there 
is debate over whether this is a viable strategy. Undeniably arts can bring people to- 
gether and raise spirits but some artists believe that it is pious to assume that they will 
create urban renaissance. Without market prices it is impossible to fully appreciate the 
impact, though Throsby (2001) sees aesthetic, spiritual, social, historical, symbolic, 
authenticity or originality value as significant and Johnson and Thomas (1992) as- 
sessed revenue created and the multiplier effect of a museum. Few studies show the 
benefits of art, nor do they capture network development, awareness of the role of arts 
in people's lives, image change or spatial and historical information flow. 
131 Some of the magnificent as galleries. museurns and other buildings in NeýNcastle, Sun- 
derland and Nliddlesborough are good cxamples. 
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There are countless positive impacts of cultural regeneration. but there are also disad- 
vantages. It can unlock creativity, imagination and innovation but there are concerns 
that it does not make up the shortfall in manufacturing activities. Not everyone be- 
lieves that the time, personnel and other resources and costs devoted to cultural act, N*I- 
ties will bring the promised benefits. When questioned, elites believed that Visual 
Arts would raise the profile, stimulate the economy. create dynamism and bring local 
talent together. The theory was that cultural role models would help communities to 
become involved in arts, and a knock on effect would be possible world-class projects 
as magnets to property development. The Baltic Arts development has already at- 
tracted a large, popular property development scheme. 
By nurturing world-class talent elites shared a vision that confidence would improvc, 
relationships would be established and lessons learned would transfer to other activi- 
ties. Moreover, as well as helping to stimulate investment there was a belief transport 
and other infrastructure improvements would add to sustainability and competitive- 
ness. The need for cultural renaissance in the NE is embodied in the NE Cultural 
Strategy (2001), and the management of Visual Arts and the intra-regional networks 
that developed as a result played an important part in the success. (Appendix 6.3. 
reflects the complex institutional and policy framework surrounding the 
NE Cultural 
Strategy). 
Competition for funding has intensified the need to justify the rationale of artistic pro- 
jects, with post evaluation more prevalent. The Angel of the North generated more 
media exposure in its first year of its life than the f8OO, OO 
it cost to build (l)-neside 
Vision, 2001). Usherwood et al (2000) refers to this period as one of 'creative feroc- 
ity', with onc hundred and eighty public sculptures established. 
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Mega events like the Winter Olympics at Lillehammer had a modest economic el - f-C C t, 
and only the tourism industry really benefited. The long term economic benefits Ný ere 
certainly out of proportion to the huge costs of hosting them (Spilling, 1996: '12 1- 
343). The problems were the structural legacy and size of the economy and the disap- 
pearance of the 'industrial intermezzo' of temporary, short terin and entrepreneurial 
activity after the event. An important lesson for the NE is that costs outweighed the 
benefits. 
Interview data revealed that elites wanted to sustain the cultural and economic bene- 
fits long after VA came to an end, as reflected in this comment: 
The region is excellent and we need to invest in cultural elements (Hewitt) 
Visual Arts brought about image change and ive wanted to harness the 
dynamism and energy. NA has led the national Arts movement as we have 
some vibrant cultural areas (Hewitt) 
Appendix 6.4 shows tourism figures for the NE. 
Furthermore there was a deliberate attempt to create an institutional framework and 
culture of sustainability and transfonnation, as the following quotes reveal: 
'We had to re-invent an artistic culture because of the decline in the Arts 
industry' (Hewitt) 
'We must keep arts graduates in the region'(Dixon) 
ONE is relying on clustering as the strategic approach, to link regional, intermediarý' 
and local level networks. Fig 6.0 shows how arts strategies fit into a proposed Re- 
gional Assembly. 
Fig 6.0 How arts strategy fits into a proposed Regional Assembly Source: 
Culture Strategy NE, GONE 
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All interviewees agreed that VA UK 96 should focus on changing the perceptions, as 
Hewitt suggested: 
'Visual Arts was set up to change the perceptions, and business and poli- 
ficians are keen on cultural affairs '(NA) 
But it was also a mechanism for a broad range of elite activities, with interconnections 
and multi-agency linkages across the region, as the examination following shows. 
The Bidding Stage 
In 1991 the Chairman of the Arts Council, Lord Palumbo launched the Millennium 
project Arts 2000 Initiative which aimed to celebrate a different art form in a different 
part of the country each year between 1991 to 2000 and towns, cities and regions -ý\ ere 
olven the opportunity to bid to host each annual e\'eiit. The North of England \\on the 
bid, and elites worked in collaboration to shape policy and blend resources to develop 
economic and cultural activities. Competition was very stroncy across the 
t'K. 
218 
The NE with its long established informal arts associations under the aegis of North- 
ern Arts, became a strong contender. Other parts of the country made the decision to 
apply as towns or cities but the NE decided to bid to stage the event across the whole 
region. VAs triggered off the formation of new elite groupings that became absorbed 
into existing groupings, and the levels of influence they had changed over the eight- 
een months duration of the event, some elites and groups. Some elites were more in- 
fluential in the bidding stages and others became influential once the event was un- 
derway. 
In the bidding stage a multi-agency effort was vital so that a composite review of 
skills and resources could be determined. Northern Arts, NEA, NDC, GONE and 
other agencies had long experience of putting together competitive bids, made easier 
by the strong links NDC had into to the business community. Northern Sights, the 
body set up to run the event, worked with local artists and local communities, v, 7hile 
LADAs (Local Authority Development Agencies) held a data base on local artistic 
expertise. In the initial stages it was decided that a good institutional structure would 
benefit overall success. Stark (NA) spoke with Gill and Robson (NEA), Denham 
(GONE), Bridge (NDC) to strategically analyse how regional artists, educational in- 
stitutions, tourism, media and business resources could be drawn in. Fig 6.1 is a com- 
posite review of agency involvement and resources used. 
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f250,000 was needed to formulate the bid and to operate Northern Sights. so NDC 
secured sponsorship from businesses for start up costs and f750,000 for marketing, 
whereas ERDF, local authority finance, private sponsorship and lottery moneýý made 
up the remainder. An estimated overall budget of f6 million pounds escalated to f 25 
million, but luckily: 
'Seed corn funding of f25k came ftom the Arts Council but they were so 
impressed that thisfigure was increased to f ]million' (Collard) 
Stark (NA), a strong figure in public are convinced elites that the region had a strong 
competitive advantage due to its decentralised institutional framework of LADAs , 
and its innovative processes of commissioning artwork. They were pivotal in feeding 
artistic initiatives upwards to regional level, and to disseminate information and ex- 
pertise. N. Sights, with Collard as the CEO, restricted personnel to five people, to cre- 
ate an 'information base', as the scaffolding thought necessary for future projects, 
thus: 
'We wanted to leave behind expertise and aframework' (Dixon) 
Stark had been a key figure in Garden Festivals in the UK; experience had taught him 
that large staffs and bureaucracies could not be sustained. Normally once a Festival 
ended people and their expertise disappeared. 
After the bid 
'What was good about V Arts was the linkages between institutions, 
ATDC, NEA, LAs, Northern Arts, Tourist Boards and the private sector. We 
did this, formally and informally' (Hewitt) 
This comment gives an indication of the importance of creating inter-linkages both 
fon-nally and infon-nally between individuals and agencies. The Arts Council, as the 
main funder, had an influential role but elites lobbied in London by using existing 
business sponsorship as leverage, to ensure they were well briefed beforehand; Col- 
lard and other elites made regular journeys to London. A Business Sponsorship Incen- 
tive Scheme (BSIS) in which central Government matched pound for pound xvas used 
in The NE to provide strong evidence that regional businesses were supportive. As 
one of ten Regional Arts Boards, NAs, Acted as the focal point and clearing-house for 
funding, co-ordination and advice. 
NArts was financed from different sources, such as the Arts Council, British Crafts 
Council and British Film Institute, but raised finance from sponsoring LAs, business 
sponsors and local universities. Local area initiatives were given special status to 
draw in LA, Euro and lottery funding and specialist agencies such as Folkworks, Art- 
ist Agency, New Writing North, Northern Screen Commission and the Arts Marketing 
Company worked with grass roots artists, at strategic level, NDC, NEA, GONE, local 
authorities (through LADAs), the Sponsors Club, Regeneration Agencies, Broadcast- 
ing Companies, Media, Tourist Agencies, and universities and colleges were involved 
very early so that the bid could demonstrate cross-sectoral support, and thereby con- 
vince civil servants of its worth. As in Siemens', Denham and Bridge lobbied at na- 
tional and European levels, in particular with the Department of National Heritage' 32 , 
the Arts Council, the Crafts Council and the British Film Institute. NAs also worked 
with sports, heritage and tourism sectors to bid for Lottery Funding and LA s and the 
two UDCs made substantial funds available. f 50 million was accessed from European 
sources so NAs worked as the focal point in funding applications. 
Extensive networks between the artistic community and public and private sectors 
Nvere evident in the 'Case for Capital', which was fully supported by NDC, NEA, 
-) -) -1 
GONE, TWDC and other agencies to secure sponsorship. The media was used as free 
promotion for the event; Tyne Tees TV allowed one minute of airtime every evening 
for a project entitled'My Favourite Object'; The Journal newspaper carried a daily arts 
league and commercials for regional artists; there were MPs briefings, Northern Elec- 
tric Arts Awards, regional 'What's On' and a 'Northern Review' to sell the message, as 
well as : 
'Asking artists they wanted' (Dixon) 
And because of the: 
'Strong link between the sub-regional and regional institutions' (Deane) 
LADAs met with public arts officers, museum officers and other cultural groups to 
identify specific projects, thereby benefiting networking linkages. Northern Arts was 
organised around performing arts, publishing and broadcasting, visual arts, finance and 
resources, lottery and regional development 
Cumbria and Northumbria, two of eleven RTBs with handed the task of promoting the 
region, but they were constrained as they only had f 2m, the smallest proportion of 
national funding in the UK, to promote event. What they did make use of, however, 
was a well-established distribution network and translation service, to distribute bro- 
chures more widely. Both Boards promoted the region across national and intema- 
tional networks. Special holiday deals on hotels and travel, brought more visitors to 
the region, and in one particular deal Observer newspaper and Great North East Rail 
paid for a family to travel at low cost from any destination to the NE. . 
Bridge, Gill, Robson and other elites worked closely with arts and tourist boards in- 
formally, but formally through N. Sights to plan and execute the project. 
132 Later to become tile Department of Culture Heritage, Media and Sport. 
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N. Sights, set up by the five organisations that led the bid (NEA, NDC. NAs and 
N&CT Boards) was formed as a charitable company limited by guarantee with the 
primary aims of devising, developing and delivering the artistic initiatives throughout 
the year. From inception it was designed to shape arts, generate funds, marketing and 
carry out PR activities. Though it was a focal point of activities, and had many elites 
on its board, it had no grant awarding powers. Membership was drawn from a wide 
selection of agencies, and rotating secondments facilitated knowledge and information 
transfer. As the budget holder for funding grass root artist's activities were channelled 
through it. No artwork was commissioned by Insights; instead this was left to local 
arts development officers and the artists themselves to initiate new ideas. This delib- 
erate policy was designed to engender a bottom up approach. As an example, Gates- 
head artists in the Borough were invited to a meeting to suggest ideas for community 
arts projects, and Local Arts Development officers from Gateshead MBC determined 
the level of funding the local authority was prepared to finance, how much was likely 
to be forthcoming from NAs, and N. Sights acted as the conduit agency. 
Co-ordination was essential as elites used the event as an innovative project that 
would: 
'Have the same effect as Glasgow and Barcelona's cultural growth had 
by changing the outside world's view. It was a long term aim'(Collard) 
And it was regarded as: 
'Part of a ten year strategy, a catalyst for the future. Not only would it 
show the region off to the rest of the world, attract visitors, and secure 
economic success, but it would demonstrate that the NE has the social 
capital that improves quality of life'(Collard) 
133 
133 Collard moved to the Festival of Arts and Ideas in New Haven, Conneticut after VA, but 
returned to lead the NGI. and the bid for European CIty of Culture 2008. 
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LAs were given a month in the calendar to profile local artists and N. Sights helped to 
promote them. TWDC, also allocated a week to profile existing or new work, Nvas a 
key agency in Visual Arts. Balls, the COE, was: 
'A great supporter of the event, as its important to have arts in communi- 
ties'(Balls) 
N. Sights as a Press Officer, on secondment from NAs, and continued to work closely 
with VA to ensure a cross fertilisation of ideas between the organisations and to de- 
velop a pool of expertise for future projects. He helped to shape perceptions and de- 
flect criticism, as events caused considerable public debate: 
'When we put a controversial artwork in some public place, we knew the 
press would be on to it. The local press officer got as much publicity as we 
could, and then I would use that in our dealings with the London, and be- 
yond audiences. It was all good exposure' (Collard) 
Conflict was resolved between businesses and local authority representatives by Local 
Arts Development officer who approached local companies for sponsorship: The fol- 
lowing comment confirmed this: 
'Who would you trust the mavericks it, e have in local government here? I 
certainly don't'(Watkin) 
N. Sights developed as an arms length agency operated on a fonnat that business 
could understand, and Collard wrote directly to business complainants to deflect criti- 
cism. As a short-term organisation everyone knew NS s purpose, and there was a de- 
liberate attempt to make it different to multi-purpose local authorities. N. Sights there- 
fore gained credibility. 
Bridge took a strong lead and allowed NDC to contribute tangible and intangible re- 
sources, because its credibility and reputation, its longevity and capacity to manage 
alliances were considered to be critical to success. Having infon-nation on regional 
resources was an important factor. It had limited involvement in the bidding process 
but gave office space for N. Sights, and seconded a Marketing Officer. NDCs promo- 
tional activities were mainly used to stimulate business involvement: 
'We know the business community well, and can contact them directlY if' 
need be' (Bridge) 
It was also recognised that cultural activities could benefit the economy are reflected 
in the following comment: 
'Japanese managers would ask why Newcastle was better than Cardiff or 
Birmingham, and we had to have evidence? (Robson) 
A strong artistic and sporting/cultural life can be the deciding factor in 
whether they want to come here' (Avis) 
Bridge hosted dinners and social events, and the Inward Investment Unit held a data- 
base of international companies and the International Trade Office used VAs to pro- 
mote the region. Wrigglesworth, and others saw VAs as a vehicle to achieve sustain- 
ability, thus: 
'There was a definite aim to try out new ideas in Visual Arts and pass 
them across sector' (Wrigglesworth) 
'All the ideas learned were passed on to St. Peter's and Baltic Flourmills' 
(Laurie) 
As usual all agencies saw this as capable of regenerating the region, and VA person- 
nel used all available data-bases. Bridge, McCormick, Robson, Gill, Denham, and 
Balls worked with Tourist boards, the VC s of Universities and colleges and NAs did 
a SWOT analysis of existing resources across the region and assessed the region's 
distinctive competitiveness against competitors to achieve a strategic fit needed: 
JJ e all have a keen sense of where we fit in relation to other regions, but 
we just need to know how to sell our strengths' (Denham) 
Research facilities were made available to VA organisers, and the existing skills di- 
rectory used in FDI Nvas a useful source to identiýv regional artistic groups. NDC drew 
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together specialists from the commercial and artistic world, links to the universities, 
and other service/public sector agencies were used to ensure that everyone knew as 
much as they could about the event, but could also offer their facilities to host installa- 
tions, as this comment confirms: 
'We mounted exhibitions here in Sunderland and they ivere verY success- 
ful. It also did the Media and Arts Department no harm to show what they 
could produce' (Wright) 
'Reg Vardy, the car dealer is an excellentftiend to the arts'(Balls) 
TWDC, through Balls, looked for high profile public art, flagship projects and VAs 
and St. Peter's Riverside Development were good examples. VA was timely for 
TWDC to market and raise the profile on existing initiatives, and officers drew on 
expertise in communities as well as channelling information to the general public, 
community representatives, and councillors. More especially LA officers, NDC, NAs, 
and GONE. TWDC was able to channel central and European finance that had been 
removed from LA budgets and establish links with the business community for spon- 
sorship, thus: 
'We got KPMG to sponsor previews of artists' work and give finance for 
leaflets and brochures' (Collard) 
Balls provided f 50,000 and office space at TWDC to house the secretariat, and 
though personnel were not seconded they contributed time in facilitating working 
groups and forums for community art. This became a crucial link between commum- 
ties and the strategic level. Every LA invested in VAs, either by sponsorship through 
NEA or NAs, or in either creating new visual arts facilities or refurbishing of existing 
ones. All LADAs Arts and ED officers were involved in planning and revie-ý, ý, meet- 
ings, but more importantly a NEA Officer group had links to the Department of Na- 
tional Heritage Officer Group and the Regional Planning Guidance Steering Group. 
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They used the opportunity in meeting civil servants to continually negotiate and bar- 
gain for greater levels of support. There is no explicit evidence that this was forth- 
coming, but interviewees did confirm that the NE was regarded as a model of good 
partnership in Whitehall circles. 
The officers group also made appointments to various regional bodies such as NDC, 
Northern Arts, the Northern Screen Commission, N. Sights, the Alliance of Maritime 
Regions in Europe, the Assembly of European Regions and the Committee of Re- 
gions. Each appointment was chosen to maximise lobbying activities, and the linkages 
allowed elites to locate sources of finance not available from other sources, and publi- 
cise event across Europe. 
NEA contributed officer time and facilities, but more importantly held a huge data- 
base on local authorities personnel, venues, and important networks. VAs was useful 
in allowing the agency to achieve its objectives by promoting economic and social 
well-being, but it had the added benefit of enhancing lobbying activities. Each LA 
gave finance through Local Arts Development Agency (LADA) and Arts Develop- 
ment Officers, who were responsible for initiating and promoting cultural and artistic 
events and established strong linkages to NAs, N. Sights and NEA. Annually LAs bid 
for arts money from NA, and in doing so conduct a SWOT analysis to prioritise. A 
negotiation process follows this where NA s considers all business plans and a deci- 
sion are made on the level of funds available to local authorities. NAs is therefore a 
useful mediator role between the Arts Council at the national level and local authori- 
ties at the local community level. During this process Denham, drew elites and agen- 
cies in to forums where objective setting and strategic plans were formulated on be- 
half of the region. A mix of formal and informal means as usual arranged this, but the Cý 
evidence shows the strateoic importance to the rc, 2ional objectives that Denham and 
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her directors were continually and intimately linked into decision making throughout 
the year. She knew that the potential that for VA to aid sustainable development was a 
key consideration: 
'I drew on the support of universities, TECs, TWDC, and other bodies, so 
that we could make it a success, but as the main contact between the re- 
gion and central government I also had a duty to keep Ministers and sen- 
ior civil servants informed of how public money was being used' (Den- 
ham). 
This comment illustrates the fine line that was drawn between central state and com- 
munities, and shows how political this 'entrepreneurial' civil servant had to be to sat- 
isfy the many competing constituents she had to respond to. It confirms that her role 
was pivotal in negotiations between the national and local state and other interests, in 
the interests of drawing in any available resources, but also in keeping the NE profile 
on the political agenda. 
Commercial organisations were significant players, in giving substantial financial 
support and other resources, but goodwill, and intangible resources, in some cases 
were more significant to achieving the objectives. Many projects that might otherwise 
have been unworkable due to financial or operational constraints were developed, 
with the goodwill and support of many hundreds of organisations. Business elites 
were able to draw in technical skills and experience, as well as appropriate knowledge 
and infonnation. "' 
134 Great Northern Railways provided first class carriages and free rail tickets for journalists 
and artists; promotional packages, and ; displayed posters in every UK railway station. 
Air UK gave f50, OOO cash sponsorship and free flights. A European Air Gallery was 
linked to the Japanese Kite Festival. Scottish and Newcastle Breweries and NeNNcastle 
Football Club had af 100,000 marketing campaign, linked to Nexus Passenger Transport 
Executive. Ne\Ncastle Supporters mounted photography exhibitions. Northern Electric 
and BT gave generously. e. o. A Time capsule in a pit village and arts exhibitions in small 
village shops. Universities held a National Jewellery Conference and National Black- 
snilth's Fxhlbition. 
Activities and Power Inter-Relationships 
Denham and other multi-agency elites worked in close collaboration Nvith Stark (NA) 
and Collard (N. Sights) to develop an overview of regional capabilities, because it was 
agreed that this event would showcase the region to the external world, but also sat- 
isfy the twin objectives of social and economic regeneration. It x,, -as important to ap- 
praise which initiatives would benefit the whole region and panels of people xý'ere 
drawn in to achieve this task, to co-ordinate and bring together programmes, avoid 
duplication, as the following comments reveal: 
'It was decided early on to have afundamental review of our regional ca- 
pabililies. Bridge and NAs did this but we had local arts officers, and then 
drew in museums and art galleries' (Hewitt) 
'We asked 'what can we achieve, who will be the best people, how can we 
keep it going of a year, how will everyone buy into it? ' (Bridge) 
Each elite did an assessment of resources in their own agencies, and was asked to 
commit available ones to VA. Such a huge initiative required excellent co-ordination, 
if it wasn't to descend into chaos. Many informal events and hundreds of networks in 
230 
artistic and economic development fields came together to share experiences, and this 
allowed elites to initiate new ideas, and entrepreneurial ways of addressing problems. 
The fact that so many artistic and creative people were involved enhanced the flow of 
information and knowledge, and there was a deliberate attempt to market VAL as one 
that every person in the region could have a stake in, and one that could go some way 
to dispelling outdated image of cloth caps and whippets, to one that would be seen on 
the national and international scene as significant then the knock on effect would be 
sustained success. Artists from the world of TV (Byker Grove actors e. g. ), film and 
music (Sting) were brought together at specific initiatives to maintain the high profile. 
131 Elites gave their own time, but contributed organisational resources . Wrig 
glesworth used networks to obtain financial and non-financial resources sponsorship, 
Bridge persuaded NDC board members to sanction finance, personnel and office 
space, Balls encouraged officers to spend time on community arts forums, Howard 
(TUC) gave sponsorship money and attended high profile meetings. Throughout the 
life of VA elites from NEA, TWDC, Universities, TUs, GONE, NDC managed net- 
works, alliances and negotiated and bargained on behalf of the event. All elites had 
been drawn together in the bidding stages. in the operational stages and in the final 
stages when the event was winding down, it was even more important the stake- 
holders, because there were so many things that might have gone wrong, if they had 
been unable to activate their informal linkages. Robson and Gill (NEA), Grant (TEC) 
and other meets with NAs officers prior to the bid to ascertain what levels of finance 
or other support might be forthcoming from the respective agencies, Wright (Univer- 
sity) was involved in numerous meetings to determine how the universities could pro- 
135 Wright sat oil UniNersity forurns-, Balls gave media presentations: Bridge was central to 
the bidding, process. 
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vide facilities for venues where exhibitions could be mounted, Bridge (NDC) and 
Balls (TWDC) both acted as media presenters but at the end of VA each of their or- 
ganisations allowed personnel and finance to be made available to produce a book 
about the success of VAs. 
In a bottom up event it was essential that strong links developed between sub-regional 
and regional levels, so civic and organisational representatives from the sub-regional 
represented various constituent groups at the regional level. Under-represented groups 
were able to engage in VAs much more than they had in Siemens, and there xvere 
many examples of art being taken to remote communities in Northumberland or 
Weardale. Many new networks were created; some stable and cohesive for short time 
periods, but fluid and adaptable enough to be sustained after the event. Collard, a key 
figure was chosen by elites to front this initiative because his expertise on previous 
projects had been recognised, and Stark (who has since moved onto developing the 
Baltic Flourmills project to regenerate Gateshead) was very influential. It was claimed 
that : 
'Visual Arts gave the impetusfor us to have community art and other inia- 
tives are sustaining the gains made' (Nordgen) 
The need to encourage cross-sectoral flow of expertise, information and knowledge 
became so vital to the success ofVA that on regional forums that culture-led strategy 
was in danger of overtaking FDI as a key element of regeneration. This was because it 
was thought to be a valuable way of reconciling commercial and social needs. and of 
ensuring sustainability, but: 
'Coqflict was never. /ar away,, but it was managed Gateshead Council had 
to fight the RSPB who wanted a bird sanctuary, where we wanted artistic 
events. Jf"c won ' (Laurie) 
232 
Conflict, as was seen in the Siemens' case always lurks beneath the surface in 
any NE initiative, but elites are very skilled at diff-using any potential discord, 
by appealing to the 'regional interest'. In this way man), of the disputes are 
managed out of existence and kept behind closed doors. Years of working with 
national and local state officials have created a cautious mindset, and a need to 
negotiate from a position of strength, rather than weakness. An apparent cohe- 
sion works well in central/local relationships. ) 
Elites resolved conflicts between urban and rural needs, thereby ensuring that projects 
were evenly spread across the region, in the remotest parts. Different issues across the 
region meant that a delicate balancing act between competing agendas had to be 
achieved. Elites were keen to achieve cultural and attitudinal change and glossy bro- 
chures were used to sell the message, as well as some nationally known projects, such 
as: 
'Symbolic icons of change like the Angel of the North gave us national 
profile' (Laurie) 
Changing the mentality and cultural heritage of dependency, with slogans and high 
profile projects helped to get the message across that the region was a thriving cultural 
and artistic capital. This clear remit to change attitudes drove the corporate philoso- 
phy. 
At national and international political, business and artistic forums elites attempted to 
lobby external actors and this resulted in visits of high profile politicians, artists and 
business people, during the 18 months of VAs to speak in support of the initiative. 
There was a deliberate strategy to involve Far Eastern companies, such as a very suc- 
cessful sponsored Kite Festival, which , vas opened by a Japanese dignitary. and at- 
tended by his company representatives. Wright (University), Balls (TIAIDC). Grant 
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JEC) and Wrigglesworth (business) used established links with executives from in- 
ward investment companies to gain sponsorship for such events, and invited individu- 
als who would receive media coverage. 
Conclusion: Effectiveness of the regime 
Overall Visual Arts was hailed by elites as a great success, a region with feýv art gal- 
leries became the focus for international interest, and public perceptions and expecta- 
tions of the role of art improved. All thirty two local authorities in the region joined 
the Visual Art cause, and individuals who had never had any connections with the 
artistic world initiated projects. Major companies were persuaded to sponsor the 
event, and it became the biggest ever sponsorship out side of London. The success 
created the confidence to bid to be the European Capital of Culture in 2008, but it was 
a catalyst for other projects, such as The Tall Ships Race, The Angel of the North, the 
f 23 million Baltic Centre. VA, like the bid for European Capital of Culture which 
followed to: 
'show that the region is undergoing a transformation, physically and cul- 
turally, with the growth in urban villages on the north bank of the Tyne, 
the Baltic Centre for Contemporary Art on the south of the Tyne, and 
dance companies, art galleries and orchestras, designers and artists 
(Joumal , 24 
th December 2001) 
VAs 96 was a success, when measured independently by Harris research, as shown at 
Appendix 6.5. And it raised public awareness of the arts in general, and of VAs UK, 
in particular. NDC's own research showed similar findings. The event was a financial 
success, it achieved some of the economic, artistic and social/cultural regional objec- 
tives that elite actors had expected, but the ultimate objective of using it as a vehicle 
to make the NE a leading region in Europe for Arts has yet to be achieved. HoweN er. 
politically and commercially the national and international profile of the region was 
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improved as a result of the initiative. Politically it had a bearing on the 'White Paper 
establishing RDAs, as it is cited as evidence of good partnership practice. It was a 
good example of strategic culture-led regeneration, and Chris Smith. Minister for 
Heritage in a speech at Christmas 1997 hailed VA Year as an outstandino success in ,,: N 
addressing umet economic and social need were being addressed. Northern MPs and 
Cabinet Ministers, including the PM, became associated with the Arts in the region, as 
a result of VAs. Hewitt (NAs) and Bridge (NDC) argue that arts in the region has 
moved up the political agenda as a direct result of the success of VA. 
The model developed by Johnson and Thomas (1992) to assess the direct and indirect 
economic impact of Bearnish Museum (shown at Fig 6.2) can be usefully adapted 
here to measure the success of VA, although many of the hard figures and data upon 
which to base an analysis are not readily available. This leaves us with softer meas- 
urements, such as increased confidence; spin offs, such as The Glass Centre, and the 
International Centre for Life, media coverage, stimulus and catalyst to other activities. 
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Fig 6.2 Economic Impact of Beamish Museum: direct and indirect costs. 
Tourism, museums and the local economy 
Employment in the Museu 
(The key activity 
Employment in the chain 
of supplies to the key 
direct activity 
Employment in associated 
activities (ie. Activities 
outside the Museum but 
attributable to it) 
Employment arising from 
successive rounds of 
spending of incomes 
generated in direct and 
indirect activities 
The economic benefits of the Museum 
Source: Johnson and Thomas (1992) 
Elites believed that VA was successful because of the high profile it generated, and 
the Baltic Flourmills Centre for Contemporary Arts has brought international recogni- 
tion. Stark, one of the key players in VA works as a freelance consultant based at 
Gateshead Civic Centre and is now responsible for co-ordinating the regeneration of 
the South Bank of the Tyne, which includes af 46 million pot of money to develop 
the Arts Centre. There are plans for many other projects, due to the success of VAs- 
It is more difficult to show effective elites were in this Project, but the interviews did 
reveal that much of the activity that enabled VAs to be successful was as the result of 
informal linkages between them, and the fact that they were used to good effect by 
bringing people from diverse sectors together. Added to this a strong institutional 
framework Nvas developed as a catalyst for future endeavours. and elites believe that 
this lono term, sustainability is crucial to regional success. TheV 'Wanted to be associ- 
Employment in the chain 
of suppliers to the 
associated direct activitý 
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ated with a high profile event, that linked the region to its international communitý , 
and if visitor figures and if media coverage is any measure, then this NA-as achieved. 
VA was used as a shop window to the world, and as a vehicle to bring about attitudi- 
nal and cultural change, but all are difficult to measure by objective measurements, 
and arguably the event may have succeeded without elite their input. Elites and other 
individuals involved, were socially embedded in their locales and were able to negoti- 
ate and bargain to draw on regional resources and infonnation to support VA. Infor- 
mation and informality were used to lubricate interactions very effectively, and har- 
nessing a broad constellation of individuals to negotiate with civil servants and other 
local state officials helped to formulate and implement the strategy. Elites were again 
able to legitimise their activities by appealing to symbolism and rhetoric, within wider 
socio-political structures and traditional hierarchies. They operated in the poorly insti- 
tutionalised field of cultural-led strategy to develop an innovative and entrepreneurial 
project that raised the profile, but also helped to include community actors. It was, 
therefore, not as exclusionary as the Siemens' case. 
There is hard evidence to show that the event was a successful one, but giving con- 
crete evidence on how successful the elite intervention proved to be more elusive. 
There have been some useful networks developed for the future, and it might be ar- 
gued that without elite intervention these would not have happened. However, there 
appears to have been some useful networks created, which should allow cross pollina- 
tion of ideas between sectors, skills were learnt on obtaining sponsorship and other 
valuable lessons to be passed on to St. Peter's Development, the case which folloxs in 
the next chapter. 
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Chapter Seven 
The case of St Peter's Development: The Regional Regime 
and Development 
'We have developed our own model of regeneration, it aligns the needs of 
capital with social needs, not like the one dimensional approach you see 
in some USA urban regions. We have learntftom their mistakes. Our dis- 
tinctive form of regeneration is multi dimensional, we have a clear strat- 
egy, and we encourage cross- sectoral learning, and aim to have commu- 
nity involvement. This is what we did with St Peter's Development' 
(Wright) 
'In the absence of a manufacturing sector, we know we must move into the 
service sector. The National Glass Centre will employ 100 glassmakers 
within two years. So the service sector can rejuvenate and resurrect our 
declining manufacturing sector' (Sidaway, Leader, Sunderland CC ) 
'We have a moral obligation to help the disadvantaged and make their 
quality of life better, not Micky Mouse jobs, but real jobs that improve 
quality of life' (Denham) 
Introduction 
The earlier chapters have shown that regeneration in the NE is not solely based on 
economic objectives, and important as FDI is to regional development. elites have 
attempted to take a broader view of regional needs and to strategically plan more di- 
verse and socially significant initiatives. This chapter provides data on St Peter's De- 
velopment in Sunderland, a phased development project, in , vhich elites refined their 
activities, and by nevvorking and information sharing Nvere able to learn use collective 
NvIsdorn to pool resources and affect change. A strong institutional frame\vork and 
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strong simultaneous connections of multi-agency representatives across FDI, artistic 
and cultural projects at sub-regional and regional levels of governance were harrno- 
nised to formulate and implement this property development. 
Many of the initiatives under the St Peter's umbrella would have been impossible 
without negotiation between the various levels of governance and without the co- 
ordinative efforts of key individuals and agencies. It was another example of the xN, aý, 
in which elites identified projects to enhance the profile, and used lobbying skills to 
pressurised Ministers and civil servants to secure resources, in doing so they struggled 
for legitimacy and autonomy. It is a classic example of the way that elites aligned 
social and economic needs, but does illustrate how conflicts were managed in the in- 
terests elite objectives. It also confirms that regional and sub-regional elites have a 
level of relative autonomy, but that the local and national state have ultimate power 
and influence. However, the significance of business like public entrepreneurs and 
politically minded business interest was critical to this, and earlier cases.. 
Background to St Peter's 
St Peter's Riverside Development, on the River Wear in Sunderland and is part of the 
30 miles of Tyne and Wear derelict land left after cessation of shipbuilding and clo- 
sure of deep mine collieries at Westoe and Monkwearmouth. It covers a large area, 
overlooked by the historic 7th Century Church where Venerable Bede studied. The 
site was one of TWDCs flagship projects aimed at creating a "Sunderland Quayside" 
to bring new resources of learning, arts and leisure and strengthen the commercial 
business and research capacities of the City of Sunderland. The development was an 
overall investment of f 180 million, of which f 55 million ý, N,, as provided by TWDC. 
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It was a phased project over several years, included a University Campus with the 
first f 13.2 million phase opened in September 1994 and the second f 15.5 million 
phase in September 1996. The campus caters for 8000 staff, students and houses a 
learning amenities centre, nursery and conference centre. Initially it was anticipated 
that 1000 direct and indirect jobs would be created. A Business Centre provides space 
for commercial and business needs and 500 new homes were built. and the National 
Glass Centre, highlighting past glass making on Wearside is a business centre and 
tourist attraction"'. Finance came from ERDF, TWDC and Lottery money and a 
Board that includes city council and university representatives, TWDC and business 
representatives, r-uns the Glass Centre as a Charitable Trading company. The cessation 
of TWDC created land disputes and speculation over which bodies would take over 
ongoing projects. Lottery funding was used to fund restoration of a historical Ex- 
change building, afI million Marine Activities Centre, a new Yacht Club, Intema- 
tional Dolphin Watch, inshore lifeboat House, a riverside promenade and cycle 
track. "'. 
When it was created in 1988 TWDC had no legal obligation to consult councillors or 
community representatives about projects but each Chief Officer was asked to estab- 
lish the feasibility of plans. Alistair Balls, the CEO knew that his appointment had 
been contentious and that there was likely to be some opposition from Labour and 
Liberal Democrat councillors, who believed that: 
TWDC is an imposed Quango. It is not a proper partnership as it deval- 
ues the consultation process' (Lennox) 
136 A Glass Cluster Development Officer is now the link between artists, businesses and 
funding agents, and glass products across the world (Journal, 26th December, 01 
137 These \\ere part of a large dock restoration scheme. 
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Balls felt that : 
'local people resist and outsiders like me coming in to effect change' 
(Balls) 
Chief Officers were therefore instructed to consult as widely as possible with the local 
community and local authorities, as legal problems arose mainly in the implementa- 
tion phases when TWDC had to impose its planning powers and compulsory purchase 
powers taken from local authorities. The four local authorities within the boundaries 
of TWDC are Labour dominated and TWDC, regarded as a Tory creation led to a 
number of very high profile conflicts between Balls, and local MPs and members, as 
reflected in the following: 
'Bob Clay, MP, and Charlie Slater the leader, argued that Thatcher shut 
the shipyards and closed the pits, f4O m had been paid to British ship- 
yards to no avail so TWDC had to change the usage as there was no way 
that river edges were goodfor marine use'(Balls) 
This comment confirms the deep hostility still felt in a region, where people believed 
that central government had let traditional industries down. The battles culminated in 
Balls and the Labour MP Bob Clay (who was later de-selected by his Party) facing 
each other in court over personal allegations. Despite the political opposition data 
suggests that Chief Officers from TWDC had relatively cordial relationships with 
local authority Chief Officers and community groups involved in Monitoring Panels. 
The media ran many stories of two public organisations apparently at loggerheads, 
and tensions did rise. 
TWDC was in direct competition with all other UDCs throughout the UK for funds 
from the DOE and Euro sources so it was essential to be seen to be transforming the 
physical infrastructure quickly. This meant that Balls was in a critical position to se- 
cure extra funding for the area, and he was a very persuasive and highly political pub- 
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lic servant. He instructed all his Chief Officers that projects had to be identified rap- 
idly so that the brand image of TWDC could be enhanced. The media %vas used to 
raise the profile of flagship projects, easy targets for redevelopment in good locations 
were found where there would be few opponents and no major infrastructure reclama- 
tion. The guiding principles were therefore, high profile flagship projects and ease of 
implementation. Balls, like other UDC heads had the backing of central government, 
intent on an ideological battle with local authorities, so he occupied a strategic posi- 
tion between central and local government and the regional and local area. 
Bridge, Balls and other elites worked with TWEDCO, Northern Offshore Federation, 
the local authority, the university, the TEC s and the Chamber of Commerce to host 
receptions and arrange visits for Koreans, Japanese, American and other foreign cli- 
ents, and: 
'I'd bring along Ann (Wright), Pamela (GONE), John (NDC), Olivia 
(Grant), Sir Paul (Nicholson), and others to give them (investors) the 
works'(Balls) 
These friendships cemented a united front, which provided evidence that a constella- 
tion of interests were capable of transforming the region, and this sent out a clear 
message to the many civil servants and Ministers who visited the various projects 
developed by TWDC. The body had been criticised in its early years for seemingly 
favouring Newcastle over Sunderland in its development of high profile projects. The 
historical rivalry between the two cities, exemplified in tribal behaviour whenever the 
local football teams compete, reached new heights when the media ran an aptly 
named campaign known as TWDC (The Wear Doesn't Count). Partly as a result of 
this campaian, and in line with TWDC 's strategic objectives prospective develop- 
ments in Sunderland were considered on the basis of feasibility. 
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British Coal and British Shipbuilders had owned much of the land. and after the clo- 
sure of collieries it became evident that British Shipbuilders were experiencing prob- 
lems in gaining orders. The British government and the EC came to the conclusion 
that unprofitable yards should close, despite the local opposition. DTI created an En- 
terprise Zone and British Shipbuilders were instructed to dispose of the yards. Only 
one reasonable bid was put forward from a Greek Shipping Consortium, supported by 
one of their directors, MP Bob Clay, who had political enemies: 
(what can you expect ftom Labour politicians, they're alwa , vs 
involving 
themselves in grubby little deals, and they call themselves representatives 
of the people. Tosh, they're only outfor themselves! ' (Lennox) 
The Lib Dems and Labour Party were in opposition on SCC and constant battles; this 
was one of many, led the Lib Dems, in frustration, to use the local press to highlight 
Labour Party (apparent) misdealing. 
A Business Plan to utilise three redundant shipyards was rejected by DTI and British 
Shipbuilders, who sold off all assets and were requested to sell them to TWDC, who 
had identified contingency strategies in the event of being offered the land for rede- 
velopment. Throughout 1992/3 year many meetings and discussions were held with 
interested parties such as the University of Sunderland, City of Sunderland Partner- 
ship and local community groups, as Wright showed: 
'Alistair (Balls) and John (Bridge) kept me fully informed, and in fact the 
University was a key agency'(Wright) 
To maintain consultation and fend off any opposition TWDC created a Community 
Development Section and Chief officers conducted monthly meetings with local 
groups, at which councillors were rarely in attendance. Financed by TWDC, the ob- 
jective was to test the feasibility of projects, and allow communities to use Commu- 
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nity Monitoring Panels to resist plans they did not agree with. Robinson and Shaw 
hailed the panels as: 
'representing the best practice we have encountered of any UDC in Brit- 
ain'(TWDC, Annual Report 10 years, 1996) 
However, a cynic might legitimately argue that by resourcing such activities central 
government was as guilty as TWDC in securing compliance to very unpopular plans. 
Opposition was bought off with the use of public funds, and understandably local rep- 
resentatives were unhappy about this situation. 
The East Docks area had fallen into disrepair so TWDC had to decide what to do with 
it. A hotch potch of land use meant that there were 50 occupiers of scrap yards and 
timber yards scattered along the mouth of the river, on a combination of freehold and 
leasehold ownership. The dock walls were collapsing with little sea protection for 
properties in the area, and the lack of planning and treatment of this area allowed 
TWDC to receive bids from develoPers, made all the easier as it had taken over plan- 
ning and compulsory purchase powers from the City Council. According to a Chief 
Officer of TWDC: 
'The local community wanted us to do something positive with the eyesore 
but they did not want to have council member interference' (TWDC) 
Leisure and marine activities were created to benefit local communities. The canoe 
club, the river police, RNLI boat house, Sea Scouts, the Yacht Club, promenade land- 
scaping, cycle tracks all had representatives engaged in discussions on appropriate 
land use (but not council members). TWDC knew that profit was imperative but the 
Dock Users Group, a highly vocal community group were adamant that councillors 
should be kept out of any discussions. Elites had to negotiate and bargain with these 
groups to carry out their strategies to redevelop the area, and it was obvious that 
TWDC had to attempt to legitimise its activities by seeking to show that SCC mem- 
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bers were incapable of articulating their interests. This bargaining required very astute 
political skills, as well a good understanding of the local population and their main 
areas of concem. 
Protracted community discussions led to TWDC being given pen-nission by DOE to 
set up the Marine Activities Centre (MAC), headed by a chief officer of TWDC. as a 
charitable company. A Board including TWDC officers, community representatives. 
LA chief officers, business representatives and the Port Manager ran it. At the express 
wishes of the community representatives there were NO council members on the 
Board, and income from MAC came from renting out pontoon berths and mooring 
and berthing licenses. 
As the St. Peter's development grew elites from multi-agencies became more or less 
significant. Also the media was used extensively by TWDC to market activities and 
legitimise decisions that were made. NEA was involved because Robson and Gill 
collaborated with Sidaway of the City Council, and this cemented the linkages be- 
tween sub-regional and regional governance. Bridge had an arms length link because 
in the early stages he offered advice to Balls on how to market the project as attractive 
area for further investment. Promotion and marketing of flagship projects were ini- 
tially handled by NDC but in others TWDC took the lead among other agencies. 
(See Appendix 7.0 for TWDC Record of achievement). 
The Port Authority, a pivotal player represented by City Council members, provided 
expertise on marine management, and worked in collaboration with many of the pres- 
sure groups who needed advice to challenge TWDC. NAs had very strong links with 
TWDC throughout the development of St Peter's and seconded staff, provided fi- 
iiance, expertise and infonnation on local artists/sculptures and community groups. 
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A strong set of community networks in the artistic and cultural field as well as in the 
maritime representation enabled TWDC and other agencies and groups to circumvent 
council members and speak directly to local people. TWDC used the local press ex- 
tensively to publicise local meetings and illustrate the changing physical landscape, in 
this way Balls and other elites were able to manipulate symbols of change to 1qiti- 
mise strategies. TWDC assembled sites, and arranged construction work to reclaim 
land. 
TWDC had a number of strategies, and artistic events were integral to those strate- 
gies, as Balls suggested: 
"The regeneration of Britain's major urban areas is critical to our success 
as a nation. Successful regeneration is achieved through more than just 
physical renewal. It is about integrating the environmental with the eco- 
nomic, the physical with the philosophical and the artistic ii, ith the archi- 
tectura. " (Balls) 
TWDC had tangible assets, funding was mainly from central government grants, but it 
had the property and land rights of 300 hectares of land and it had the statutory pow- 
ers of compulsory purchase, town planning and the awarding of grants. The impor- 
tance of funding meant that Balls had very close and cordial relationships with Den- 
ham and other regional civil servants. Intangible resources such as experience, exper- 
tise, knowledge, information, reputation, leadership and culture were also regarded as 
very significant to success. TWDC had 40 core project staff covering all professions 
but called on external specialist consultants, when required, and the organisation be- 
gan to change, because: 
'When TTT'DC was created in 1989 it was a traditional, hierarchical, bu- 
reaucracy based on finance, business development, engineering and op- 
erations, project planning and marketing, but a new Director with exten- 
sive experience with the Scottish Development Agency changed the struc- 
ture (TNNIDC officer) 
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Scally, a forceful character, re-designed the organisation to reflect four project areas 
(Newcastle, Sunderland, North Tyneside and South Tyneside), and the personnel were 
able to transfer between project teams. Like Balls, he was in a powerful position and 
engaged with many individuals, and community groups to by-pass the City Council. 
City of Sunderland Partnership represent a multi-sectoral, agencies and comprised the 
City Council, Chamber of Commerce, TWDC, the University, the voluntary sector 
and TEC. Its aims were to promote the city in strategic terms regionally, nationallý' 
and internationally and ameliorate economic restructuring brought about by the loss 
of traditional industries such as shipbuilding, engineering and coal mining. The Part- 
nershil) originated from the City of Sunderland Forum, and aimed to see Sunderland 
as the: 
'Advanced Manufacturing Centre of the North' (Wright) 
Sunderland CC provided the secretariat SCP, and an officer group supported it. Prior 
to the development of St Peter's the City Council already had plans for developing the 
riverside, however, after the shipyards closed only a small amount of reclamation 
work had been done. During all planning and implementation stages of StTeter's City 
of Sunderland and University senior people were involved in decision making, as 
Wright explained: 
'I'd be invited by Alistair, so I'd take my Heads of Estates and Personnel 
to meetings, when we'd meet with environmental groups such as the Wear 
Estuary Management Group, community groups such as the Dock Users 
group, Wear Boating Association, the Ferryboats man's Association, and 
local business groups'(Wright) 
SCP and other local groups provided personnel, small amounts of finance and venues 
for meetings, and officers from SCC and TWDC worked in partnership to: 
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'Bring their experience, expertise, knowledge, information but because 
they had a good reputation of leadership, culture and trust'(Balls) 
The University had a vested interest in the development, as it was expected to stimu- 
late a massive increase in student numbers over the subsequent 20 years so it pre- 
sented TWDC with a Strategic Master Plan, phased over four periods. As Wright sug- 
gested: 
'The decline in secure funds ftom PCFC meant that 1, together with my 
senior executives needed new sites for expansion. As a Board member of 
TWDC, I was able to present a good business case for redeveloping the 
Universityjacilities' (Wright) 
And 
'I was also a Board member o SCP and the NE Chamber of Commerce' 
(Wright) 
She, like Balls was an influential and political public entrepreneur who used networks 
and lobbying to secure resource to support projects, and these comments illustrate the 
multitude of memberships elites hold. In this way she was able to legitimise activities, 
by obtaining support from regional and national state officials, from other elites and 
from the communities where initiatives were sited. 
The University development St Peter's housed North Sands Property and Business 
Park, built by English Estates for SME starts ups, St Peter's Church a listed building 
that could not be changed in any way, and housing and property development of 500 
executive homes and other business facilities. Wright, central figure in establishing 
the f 16 million National Glass Centre, in June 1998, recruited the Director Timandra 
Gustafson, who was seconded for a specified period from Northern Arts (Journal. 
I 8th April, 98), thereby ensuring that regional expertise was utilised in the sub- 
reoional activity. It Nvas set up as a Charitable Trading Company with various funding ItN ltý - 
sources, the University as landowner was a major Board member, but the board also 
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included the Council, TWDC and business/community representatives. Initial start up 
costs were pump primed by TWDC, University and City Council finance NA-as sup- 
plemented by lottery and ERDF finance, but future finance was expected to derive 
from fees for the exhibition centre and museum. Negotiations continued between lo- 
cal, state officials and this broad constellation of interests, to ensure that a co- 
ordinated effort achieved the aims. 
The National Glass Centre caused tremendous controversy and conflict. The first Di- 
rector of the Centre, Shiona Airlie resigned, had been replaced by Ms Gustafson, fol- 
lowing a highly public difference of opinion between the Board members, in particu- 
lar Wright and the outgoing Director. The underlying tensions and disagreements 
were centred on whether or not a National Glass Centre should be a socially desirable 
and important aspect of local history and culture or whether it should be driven by 
commercial needs. Shiona Airlie, as an artist was adamantly on the side of history and 
heritage, whilst the Board, directed firmly by Dr Wright disagreed. The disagreements 
became so public and irresolvable that Ms Airlie felt that her position was untenable 
so she resigned in a blaze of publicity. This brings again into focus the social/profit 
dichotomy, prevalent in the Balls/Clay fracas"'. Obviously Wright, like Balls, walked 
a 'political' tightrope as she negotiations such activities, because on the one hand the 
National Glass Centre had tremendous appeal as a socially desirable and regionally 
significant project, but on the other hand she, as the Chair of the Board knew that it 
had to be profitable. This illustrates the dichotomous position that public entrepre- 
neurs hold, given that they are accountable to many audiences. 
138 Wright was a very high profile, managerialist VC, who attracted publicity, and who on 
rnanv occasions was in conflict Nvith academics in the Unkersit\ over her controversial 
business ideas. She was a member of the Regional Chamber and sat on many economic 
forurns. 
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Sunderland CC participated in a wide range of regional and sub regional regeneration 
forums, as it had officers and members who served on NDC, NEA, Northumbria 
Tourist Board and GONE, thereby creating the crucial link between the levels of gov- 
emance, but it also forged partnerships with other government agencies and business 
and community groups. These linkages and connections validated and confirmed the 
legitimacy of actions but also had the benefit of incorporating central and local state 
officials into sub-regional agendas. Much of the finance that the council was able to 
draw from European and central government funding (such as SRB) was an essential 
ingredient in stimulating these regeneration partnerships, and which is why TWDC 
seemed more of a threat to members, than to officers who seemed to have more cor- 
dial relationships with Ball and his TWDC officers. 
There were many heated exchanges between labour members and Balls but in the 
main it was restricted to a few prominent members, and officers and individual com- 
munity representatives were mainly positive in their perceptions of the work of 
TWDC. The physical changes that were instigated as a result of St Peter's Develop- 
ment were generally regarded very highly: 
'We are happy with the physical transformation of the dock site and the 
opportunities to encourage business development'(ED officer, SCC) 
In addition to providing meetings venues and other expertise, the council also man- 
aged the various alliances and networks, such as the monitoring panels. SCC Officers 
worked in collaboration with TWDC officers to develop new processes community 
consultation. This helped in defusing political conflict and the fact that these capaci- 
ties, and formal and informal linkages were in place allowed information transfer be- 
tNN7ccn the Council, SCP and other agencies, without which objectives might have 
been difficult to achieve. 
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Sunderland TEC. like other TECs was, a primary funding body for training and other 
initiatives to fill local business skills gaps. There was always a cordial relationship 
between the TEC and other agencies in the town. because the TEC CEO had mem- 
bership of SCP, forums across the University TWDC and St Peter's Development I 
forums. St Peter's Development, sited on an area of very high unemployment with 
many traditional skills needed for coalmining and shipbuilding industries. required 
large scale retraining packages. The TEC worked in close collaboration Nvith the Em- 
ployment Service, and the University and City Council, as two of the areas largest 
employers. TEC provided officer time, information on local labour markets, and set 
up recruitment and selection procedures and training for the long term unemployed. 139 
The TEC managed its relationships, and was congratulated for its innovative methods 
of recruitment and selection, with strong positive discrimination in personnel prac- 
tices to enable long term unemployed from traditional industries to find work. 
The business community was represented on the Chamber of Commerce, NDC, NBF 
and the Northern CBI, and individual business people were involved in City wide 
initiatives. The establishment of TWDC had created a forum for prominent business 
people to find a voice and they were well represented on the University Governing 
Body, the TEC, SCP. The National Glass Centre and were important players in the 
Monitoring Panels. When the Marine Activities Centre was being planned and built 
many business representatives were invited to decision-making forums, and TWDC 
and the City Council deferred to their commercial expertise, so: 
139 Wright introduced a policy that any neN\ recruits to the university, other than for aca- 
demic staff, \\ould be retired shipbuilding and coal mining workers to demonstrate 
commitment to the local community. This starkly contrasted with commercial decisions 
oil tile Glass Centre, and controversies -v\-ith academics. 
-)ý I 
'Nicholson, a TWDC Board and CBI member, was useful as he has fin- 
gers in many pies (Bridge), he can call on regional, high profile people 
when necessary' (Sydaway, SCC) 
Activities and Power Inter-Relationships 
Interviewees were asked to say what how the various agencies contributed to the suc- 
cess of StTeter's and Fig 7.0. shows a composite of responses. 
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Unlike Siemens and Visual Arts, St. Peter's was a sub-regional project that never- 
theless had regional importance and involved numerous regionally significant elite 
actors, some of them were central to the earlier two cases, but in different NvaN s. 
Whereas the interview data on Siemens showed that Bridge (NDC) was the most 
central figure who worked in collaboration with other regime elites from a broad 
range of sectoral agencies, including the business community, he was also influen- 
tial in VAs, and developed close working relationships across regional and sub- 
regional networks, notably with Stark (NA), Grant (TEC), Balls (TWDC), Wright 
(University), Robson and Gill (NEA), Denham (GONE) and others. Bridge was 
involved in St. Peters but only in a peripheral role, and was mainly used for his ex- 
pertise in inward investment and marketing. There were reciprocal secondments 
between NDC and TWDC, and very cordial relationships established. The key elites 
in this case were undoubtedly Balls (TWDC), Wright (University), Nicholson 
(TWDC and business), but other actors had direct or indirect involvement over the 
duration of the initiative. Interview data supports this, and also revealed that at vari- 
ous points during the lifetime of the project elites, and other actors would be drafted 
in whenever their particular skills, expertise or resource base were required, much 
in the same way as they had been in the two earlier cases. 
The networks developed during Siemens and VAs, as well as already established 
regional and sub-regional networks and partnerships were particularly useful in the 
St. Peters case, as it was one that combined economic development and lei- 
sure/tourism and artistic aims. The experience gained by elites who had knowledge. 
or membership of hundreds of earlier networks gave them a bank of contacts and 
connections. Interviewees considered there to be no reason to 'reinvent the wheel' 
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or start from scratch when earlier networks were considered to have achieved eco- 
nomic objectives (Siemens) and social and cultural objectives (VA). 
As in the earlier cases resources and expertise were pooled in the interests of 
achieving the overall objectives. Sometimes this pooling was organised on a re- 
gional basis by regime actors (e. g. NDC provided personnel for meetings or presen- 
tations to inward investors, NAs volunteered expertise on artistic ventures or gave 
instructions on how to tap into artistic resources, NEA provided European infon-na- 
tion from the Brussels office for funding sources) and at other times actors from 
sub-regionally agencies worked together (SCP offered personnel, expertise, or fa- 
cilities, the University provided research or know how, TWDC had expertise on 
project management and media management). There were many instances of pool- 
ing resources and sharing risks and the business community, either as individuals, 
as representatives of their organisations or as members of sub-regional or regional 
forums were as significant in the contributions they could make as the public sector 
and voluntary/community agencies. 
The University, TUs, TWDC, NDC, NEA, GONE, and many of agencies managed 
networks and alliances during the lifetime of this project. As in Siemens and VAs it 
was a critical aspect of the successful completion of St Peter's. Representatives 
were brought together in many forums during the planning and implementation 
stages (TWDC set up monitoring panels, and the City Council conducted consumer 
satisfaction forums) and elites had to be aware of who were the best people to sec- 
ond to manage the various alliances. This initiative was a very political and sensi- 
tive one, given that there were many instances of change of land use so officers 
were selecti'vely chosen for their skills in dealing with stakeholders. Being able to 
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deal with communities and the media as a reflection of those community interests 
was a prerequisite for success. 
The existing databases across regional and sub-regional agencies were fully utilised 
in the interests of achieving up to date and appropriate information on which per- 
sonnel could be deployed. The type of people and information needed varied de- 
pending on requirements so for example Wright (University) used data bases at the 
NE Chamber of Commerce for economic and social data and NBF for business 
people for presentations and media appearances, Balls (TWDC) and his officers 
were able to liaise with NDC on information appropriate to developers and had staff 
seconded for specific purposes, the universities and councils had their own data 
bases and research facilities, and experts who could be used as and when required, 
and NAs was a useful source of artistic data and provided names of people, facili- 
ties and other data. All these networks of activities were powerfully used to legiti- 
mate strategies and validate the worth of St. Peter's as a feasible project. The nego- 
tiation and bargaining that elites were engaged in allowed them to act innovatively 
and entrepreneuri ally within wider socio-political structures and traditional hierar- 
chies of governance. 
The sub-regional nature of this development did not negate the very real regional 
importance attached to a flagship project as part of overall regional economic and 
social objectives. It was apposite to maintain continual interactions and inter- 
relationships that had built up over the years, and some elites had served on count- 
less regional forums, in individual, representative or civic capacity. 
There were many conflicts evident in the findings, some of them resolved at sub- 
rec, ional level but others where a regional solution was more appropriate. The bat- tý, 
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tles between TWDC and MPS/and Sunderland CC took place at the sub re, -, ional 
level but were of regional importance, given that TWDC covered the Tyne as Ný ell 
as the Wear Riverside area. The conflict was widely reported by the regional press, 
and had implications for other projects. It was also interesting to note hoýv often the 
press made comparisons between Balls and his Teesside counterpart, Norman. The 
battle between Wright (University) and the Director of the Glass Centre was also 
fought in the full glare of regional publicity. The resignation of the Director of such 
a high profile facility, and one that had been hailed as an exemplar because of the 
possibilities it gave for aligning social and commercial objectives, meant that quick 
action was necessary to deflect criticism, minimise publicity and find a replacement 
Director. Other conflicts remained at the sub-regional level, especially those be- 
tween boat owners, the council and TWDC, but they did attract regional publicity. 
The high profile nature of St Peter's and the large-scale capital investment meant 
that media attention was continually focused on any success or failures witnessed 
during the planning and implementation phases. There were many occasions when 
elites were invited along to meet national and international dignitaries, accompanied 
by journalists or other media reporters. At every opportunity there was a deliberate 
projection of St. Peter's as a symbol of the regional transformation. It helped to con- 
firm, in the minds of elites at least, of the regional success story. It also allowed 
them to lobby national and European government officials, and a constant stream of 
politicians, royalty, actors, European MEPs, or other officials were invited to xvit- 
ness, or open certain facilities, always fully widely reported in the press. They also 
used this opportunity to involve civil servants, who would accompanY the Ministers 
or Euro Officials. invited to check on how well funding had been used: 
257 
'We had the Regional Policy Directorate people ftom Brussek and 
Bruce Millan paid a visit at one time' (Balls) 
Elites capitalised on the results of the May 1997 General Election, and quickly in- 
vited some prominent Cabinet Ministers for photo opportunities. In this way there 
was a deliberate and rational strategy to involve people in high places, not only to 
escalate lobbying activities nationally, but ensure that the regional success stor. y. 
was available for regional consumption. 
Japanese and other foreign executives and visiting academics were invited to act as 
dignitaries for the opening of specific phases of the project. Some were made hon- 
orary professors of the University, others had sculptures or Halls of residences 
named after them. Chairs in honour of certain Far Eastern company representatives 
were created. A deliberate strategy to create links between indigenous companies 
and newly arrived foreign investors, between SME s and large companies, and be- 
tween commercial and public sector agencies was considered to be an essential pre- 
requisite for harmonious assimilation. Interviewees also felt that this was vital for 
regional regeneration efforts to have such cultural and knowledge transfer, so: 
'The successful Annual Kite Festival and Air Shows we put on are al- 
ways well supported by Nissan and other companies, so we made sure 
that St. Peter's would be a similar opportunity to involve our inward in- 
vestment. You never know what can resultfor this type of thing' 
(Officer, SCC). 
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Conclusion: Effectiveness of the regime 
It is clear that St. Peter's Riverside was physically transformed, as evidenced by the 
many photographs showing the run-down sites before TWDC came into existence 
and many large-scale projects are now completed. St Peter's Development is one of 
the many physical and other acclaimed successes. Elites wanted it to symbolise that 
the City of Sunderland had moved away from a dependency on heavy industn, to 
one focused on research, education, cultural, artistic and leisure facilities. 
Elite networking and transfer of information and resources, between the collaborat- 
ing elites and their agencies, were much refined in this case, and interview data 
demonstrated that many lessons had been learned and transferred from Siemens and 
Visual Arts. Learning over time was a critical factor in elite's strategic thinking and 
all elites agreed that this case had allowed this to happen. 
There was a recognition that sustainability and long term impact needed tangible 
resources such as finance, land and property and statutory powers to be aligned with 
less tangible elements such as tacit knowledge transfer, information sharing and 
expertise. Elites saw this development as one that could give a strong marker to the 
regional, national and international world that the NE was transforming, and the 
cultural change was in progress. It was therefore a useful validating and legitimisa- 
tion of activities. 
VAs had demonstrated that elites wanted to clearly articulate that a pool of artistic 
expertise could be sustained in the region, and used for future projects, and St Pe- 
ter's gave further confirmation to this strategy. Many elites spoke of the need for 
permanent changes in attitudes, alteration to existing practices and a continuance of 
effective networks and multi-agency relationships. St Peter's and the National Glass 
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Centre gained a high national and international profile, in the same way that VAs 96 
had done. The University Campus received numerous architectural awards. demon- 
strated by the hundreds of entries received from architects throughout Europe who 
wanted to design the National Glass Centre. 
One specific example success with communities was the Sculpture Project, a col- 
laborative venture between TWDC and the Artists Agency, led by an Sunderland 
based initiative to place artists in social and industrial contexts across the region. It 
received a mixture of financial support, but in supporting this initiative TWDC fa- 
cilitated a wide network of local people and agencies, and the community involve- 
ment brought further national and international finance. Artistic and organisational 
control of the project remained in the community and some local groups. Residents 
who had no initial interest in sculpture became interested and the physical and aes- 
thetic context showed marked improvement. The lessons learned from this commu- 
nity based project in terms of finance, support, research and management became a 
benchmark for other projects across the region as the ideas were transferred. New 
groups and networks that were formed enhanced the existing institutional frame- 
work and improved the capacities and skills bases of local community representa- 
tives. St Yeter's unlike the two earlier cases was an attempt to involve disadvan- 
taged and excluded groups in some, although not all activities. However strategic 
decisions still rested with elites, but they were constrained by global or other con- 
straints so could not achieve all of the strategies they wished to set in motion. 
Riverside Sculpture Project attracted visitors from other parts of the region and UK 
Nvide and inten'iew data showed that this type of initiative had the capacity to con- 
tribute to the well-being of the community. largely elderly and long term unem- 
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ployed. TWDC spent f 15 million (6% of its regeneration budget) on arts in the re- 
gion and also levered in external sponsorship from national and international com- 
panies. 
The St Peter's Riverside Project engendered a number of local political struggles. 
which was perhaps inevitable given that TWDC was regarded by the mainly Labour 
councillors as a Tory creation as having been set up to neutralise Sunderland CC. 
Bob Clay, a Labour MP and prominent councillors such as Charlie Slater were in 
the earlier stages vociferous in their condemnation and campaigned to retain the 
shipbuilding industry. The social history and political make up of the city was such 
that it would have been unusual had they not campaigned but the initial suspicion 
and scepticism of TWDC, in general and Alistair Balls, in particular, were replaced 
by acquiescence and complacency as opposition to many of the plans subsided 
Many of the key players in St Peter's Development were also serving as representa- 
tives on premier regional bodies such as NDC, NEA, the NE Chamber, CBI, ensur- 
ing regional as well as local significance. If the project had failed there would have 
been ramifications for regional elites. 
The key role played by Wright, a high profile figure on national and regional fo- 
rums ensured that St Peter's retained a political importance. St Peter's Campus be- 
came the venue for events such as: "The Health of the Region", "Lifelong Learning" 
Conferences, "Opportunity 2000" Conferences; with invited guests such national 
MPs, international speakers and other regional notables and with an underlying ob- 
jective to raise the image and profile of the City and its surrounding region. Prior to, 
and after the 1997 General Election the region was awash Nvith Labour MPs (includ- 
in,, Cabinet Ministers) at one event or another e. g. Tessa Blackstone was invited to 
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unveil the "University of Industry" with Sir David Putnam installed as VC. This 
prototype Virtual Reality University links up St Peter's Campus. The Stadium of 
Light SAFC, the Institute of Public Policy and many educational training and social 
and cultural organisations. Sir David Puttnam's arrival was accompanied by a week 
long showing of his films and a satellite link to Ridley Scott (who xvas born in Sun- 
derland) in Hollywood, an event quite unlike any other staged in the region, and 
owed more to Wright's political acumen and PR skills than to anything else. 
Dr. Wright captured the thinking behind such a fanfare event in interview when she 
said: 
'If important that film directors like David are prepared to associate 
themselves with the region, then we must be in transformatii, e mode, 
mustn't we? 
This quote cements the view that transformation is underway, and inviting 
high profile stars to the region gives further validation to elite activities. It 
also helps to deflect any criticism and fosters a growth and change agenda. 
The chapter confirms that in the NE regeneration is not restricted to satisfying eco- 
nomic objectives, and important as FDI has been in the past ten years elites have 
taken a broader view of regional needs to strategically planned more diverse and 
socially significant initiatives to benefit local communities. Many elites and other 
individuals in complex sets of networks and partnerships to achieve commonly 
agreed objectives learnt over time and across traditionally distinct organisational 
boundaries to share information, draw in resources and use collective wisdom to 
sustain changes. A strong institutional framework was developed which was critical 
to regenerative efforts, despite conflicts that inevitably arose between commercial 
and social needs this case demonstrated that a successful and balanced outcome was 
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achieved by a mix of business like public entrepreneurs and politically minded busi- 
ness interests who negotiated and bargained with state officials. 
Many of the initiatives under the St Peter's Development umbrella would haý, e been 
impossible without an existing framework of community-based organisations. The 
strength of the informal and formal mechanisms for sharing information and capac- 
ity building is shown by the success of the St Peter's Monitoring Panels, the mari- 
time groups and business led forums involved in the setting up of the Marine Ac- 
tivities Centre, the artistic and cultural groups involved in the National Glass Centre 
and the St Peter's Riverside Sculpture Project. 
Much of the good practice apparent in the partnerships and networks in the Siemens 
and VAs cases were absorbed, learnt and transferred across space and time and this 
enabled sustained effort. Forums for community and local involvement were al- 
ready in existence during VAs but in St. Peter's they became the useful stimuli to 
the formation of others. Specific events, such as these can be the trigger for alli- 
ances and improve social and cultural as well as economic performance. 
Some elites did not initially appear to be significant stakeholders in St Peter's Cam- 
pus, but in actuality there was close contact and involvement. Different elites took 
the lead role in this initiative but nevertheless a regional focus was still apparent. 
The ability to manage regional and sub regional networks, to ensure that infonna- 
tion is passed across and up and down the region, and the ability to harness institu- 
tional capacity between sectors, formally and informally, is a key to the sustainabil- 
ity and learning across the region. This is the social glue that holds regions together. 
It was strongly evident in St Peter's Development. 
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By having a strategic overview of how regional projects such as FDL VAs and St 
Peter's Development elite decision makers were able to see how thev dovetailed 
from community level upwards. Key regional personnel were in close and continu- 
ous communication at regional and sub regional levels, it was therefore possible to 
have a comprehensive and global picture. Over a period of time between projects 
the regional regime of elites redefined the strategic approach and improved the net- 
working between the respective agencies. 
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Chapter Eight 
Conclusion 
At the beginning it was suggested that there has always been an elite regime within 
regeneration, but that its nature and characteristics have evolved in response to 
national policies and global shifts. Incorporatist researchers have become embroiled 
in sterile debates, because contemporary regeneration has much broader agency 
involvement, and the notion that business is incorporated into state forms is open to 
challenge. More recent urban and regional research has added more sophisticated 
descriptive typologies, included motivations and power relations between actors, but 
few have explained the crucial need to develop a socio-historical perspective, or ho-,,,, 
extemal forces affect regime activities. 
Urban Regime Theories and existing partnership and network approaches are 
invaluable as starting points, but neglect socio-political and cultural aspects. It is 
acknowledged that they go some way towards explaining aspects of policy processes 
but provide narrow categorisation, and are weak on explaining the linkages between 
the various elements within regeneration. Those of us interested in explaining urban 
and regional change need to be very clear about how we do this. This research is a 
critique of existing literature on systems theory, networks, Urban Regime Theories 
those bringing together politics, management and geography but fail to explain micro 
power relations, while other approaches fail to explain the macro environment. Meso 
level forms of analyses, based on assumptions that state agencies incorporate other 
actors /agencies into change processes are flawed, and it has been argued throughout tý 
this research that the characteristics and nature of state forms have undergone massive 
265 
reform. State actors are urged to behave more business like, butyet they are not like a 
business. Public agencies are no longer large, monolithic entities as fragmentation and 
hiving off of many activities have dramatically altered their processes and practices. 
Existing categories of business no longer fit the fragmented and disparate commercial 
world that has also changed in many ways. As a consequence of global, European and 
national shifts neither public or private entities readily fit into specific categories and 
the interactions between what were traditionally referred to as 'public and private ý 
sectors are blurred, with indistinguishable boundaries, shared responsibilities and 
multiple accountabilities. Levels of resources that agencies and actors contribute to 
any common objective are difficult to define with precision, which means that 
linkages between agencies are often impossible to disentangle. Moreover existing 
literature takes as a given the idea that elites have profit as their primary motive. This 
research provides empirical data to confirm that NE elites believe their activities are 
socially as well as commercially motivated. They operate in an experimental form of 
governance, characterised by inter and intra-organisational negotiation within an 
ambiguous external environment to deal with unmet social and economic needs. The 
entrepreneurial regime emerged from the poorly institutionalised field of regeneration 
and elites have taken responsibility for identifying particular projects. 
Recent writers performed an invaluable service to this field of enquiry as they caused 
us to re think our traditional ideas. The introduction of concepts such as institutional 
thickness, un-traded interdependencies have improved understanding of urban and 
regional change processes, but attempts to apply Regulation Theory to local and urban 
levels remain unhelpful abstractions. However. the importance of extra- institutional 
dimensions between the formal institutional and informal relationships have improved 
our understanding of the xvay that elites negotiate and bargain within ý, vicler socio- 
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political structures and traditional hierarchies to formulate and implement strate-gles 
embedded in the social system and part of the history of change. 
Global, European and national changes have increased uncertaintY and turbulence and 
hastened the need for entrepreneurial action. They have allowed elites to accept that 
external sources of assistance have never really solved the problems, so they have 
found their own strategies for regeneration. Fragmentation has made identification of 
key variables problematic. These, and other weaknesses led this researcher to propose 
a methodology capable of synthesising more valuable elements of existing theories 
with elements taken from systems theories, strategy and stakeholder power models. 
The broad principles underlying this approach are that it is unwise to make 
assumptions on either categorisation of regime actors, their inter-relationships or how 
power is distributed or realised. In advancing an understanding of local, sub regional 
and regional change it is vital to use as many sources of data as possible to triangulate 
explanations and understandings, and support the main hypothesis. 
The researcher's own subjectivity was acknowledged in chapter two, as was the 
responsibility for constructing the research design, to interpret and present the results 
as they are recorded. The desired aim, which has been achieved and demonstrated 
throughout this research, was to conduct research in a systematic and rigorous 
fashion, to achieve objectivity and act as a catalyst between broad theoretical 
constructs and abstract frameworks. The objective was to use concrete empirical data 
on social practices, in a specific place, and over time. The meta level is where trust 
and co-operation, civic engagement and the 'social glue ' are located. The research 
has confirmed that regeneration is difficult to reduce to a single universal theory 
because the variety of phenomena are difficult to capture. Having stated at the outset 
that the interest was in the formal and infon-nal political and social interactive 
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processes this analysis shows how multi-agency elites have operated over time, across 
space, and between projects. Existing literature never fully explains how regimes 
were established, or changed over time, and as a consequence they are located at the 
descriptive, rather than explanatory level of analysis. 
This conclusion addresses a number of broad questions in the light of the three case 
studies (i) how useful is a fusion of theories, and what do they show about the 
existence of a regional regeneration regime of elites ? (ii) has the research illuminated 
an examination of regional as well as sub-regional and local change processes? 
do the cases allow me to make inferences and draw conclusions about the usefulness 
of Urban Regime Theories, other meso level theories, and managerial and political 
strategy and stakeholder frameworks? (iv) what future studies can this research 
suggest? 
Urban Regime Theories were essential components in helping to shape this research, 
after adaption to a regional level of analysis. They helped to identify important 
variables of urban change and in a region with a strong identity it was much easier to 
draw identifiable boundaries around the regional, sub-regional and local units of 
analysis. Weaknesses in Urban Regime Theories do not entirely negate their 
usefulness, because the framework allowed variables that might have been ignored to 
be identified and explained by the combination of other theories. 
Meso-level theories are notoriously difficult to operationalise because located as they 
are in the middle of a political/economic system they fail to encapsulate how micro 
level decisions are made. This perennial dichotomy between structure and agencý, is 
the stock in trade of social scientists and can never be solved by using 'one best 
theory'. The result is that more adaptable and flexible frameworks are sought in a 
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quest for greater understanding. Definitional squabbling, and more elaborate and 
descriptive typologies, move us no closer to explanation and prediction. 
The main problems with URT are underlying assumptions on incorporatism, state 
leadership, minimalist business involvement and insufficient or robust defence of 
such claims. No existing research provided evidence to support any of these 
assumptions, and it is this researcher's contention that earlier analyses were as flawed 
as the theories they were seeking to correct. The faults, however, do not lie xý'ith URT 
because they do provide adequate descriptive typologies but a major problem has 
been that they became embroiled and mixed up with other macro theories of the state. 
Debates on the role of the state were seamlessly absorbed into URT, and 
incorporatism as one form of explanation was accepted as received wisdom. The 
wholesale adoption of incorporatism meant that few challenges were articulated. 
These explanations remain unconvincing because the exact role of the state, especially 
in its present form has never been fully explained. Similarly there are incomplete 
pictures drawn about the concomitant role of business, or the failure to fully examine 
how social relationships, history and the external forces, beyond state forms, alter the 
way elites negiotiate and bargain within socio-political structures and traditional 
hierarchies to develop projects for growth. Pivotal to this negotiation is the absorption 
of civil servants and local state officials into political and managerialist forms of 
governance to formulate and implement strategies. This process is a useful way to 
validate and legitimise activities, and symbolism and manipulation confirms the 
ideology, thereby resisting criticism and conflicts. 
It would have been easy to let the theories drive the research but a central purpose of 
this research was to interrogate existing theories. All theories are useful mechanisms 
for gathering data but they become more problematic when they deflect the researcher 
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from looking 'outside the box' of their own understanding. It would have been verý, 
difficult to explain formal and informal inter-actions without using existing theories 
as a starting point for analysis. However, none of the existing research provided 
fundamental pointers or comprehensively explained what I N,, 'as trying to understand, 
although some recent writers have begun to address the post democratic world in 
which formal institutional and informal interactions are contextualised. It is ver", easv 
to bias research by collecting data to support a theory rather than letting interviewees 
shape the process, so a fundamental driving force was the need to allow elites to tell 
their own story, with an acceptance that some of these stories would inevitably be 
biased. This was countered by triangulating stories to ensure accuracy and validity. 
Concentrating on certain core elements of theories help to elucidate certain factors but 
this is always at the expense of others, of perhaps more importance. A lot depends on 
an individual researcher preferences and how theory is operational is ed. There was a 
determination to move beyond existing theoretical frameworks, whilst accepting how 
risky a venture it would be, and the ability to reflect on a huge amounts of literature, 
mostly of a contradictory nature, was of significance. 
URT identified critical factors, but recent researchers found them so inflexible that 
they either dispensed with them altogether, or aligned them to other frameworks. The 
empirical evidence presented in the three cases confirms that useful as some elements 
of URT are, it does not test the overall veracity of the model. Macro theories of the 
state are broad, abstract and lack precision on categorisation. This research has 
synthesised some macro and systems theories, drawn from the local dimensions 
identified in Regulation Theories, applied some of the aspects of meso level 
typologies found in URT and partnership and other network approaches to a regional 
level, and in doing, so has produced a more comprehensive and robust framework that 
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also combines strategy and stakeholder power models located at the micro level of 
decision making. The particularistic nature of URT failed to describe changes at the 
meso and macro levels, whereas structural theories not able to fully explain all the 
forces which shape local, sub-regional and regional decision making. 
Regeneration involves multiple parties, where diverse informal relationships are fluid, 
and the boundaries between state and non-state agencies, and democratic and business 
decisions are indistinguishable. Power and influence are difficult to determine 
because the strength and potency of power relationships depends on a number of 
internal and external factors. Traditional forms of decision-making are becoming 
obsolete, and history, social interaction and routinised practices were found to be 
significant factors in driving change. 
This research suggests that it is valid to consider how all multi-agency elites 
incorporate state actors into decision making, and the key issue is not which sector 
incorporates the other, rather how resources, personnel and infonnation are drawn 
together to satisfy objectives and legitimate activities. Clearly the fusion of roles. 
responsibilities, budgets and policies is the key to regeneration, as it is now a multi- 
level activity and no one agency can solve the problems. 
Political science and management models broadened out the analysis to develop the 
concept of a regional regime. They highlighted the difficulties and complexities of 
decision making and the inequality of power relationships and revealed that 
'managing' regional space excluded many disadvantaged groups from decision 
making forums. Managerialist models do not take account of history, power relations 
and informality, and though political science models proved useful, they have 
firnitations. Existing managerialist frameworks, used in conjunction NA-Ith classical and 
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contemporary political science models, elucidated some observable and unobservable 
aspects of the inter-relati on ships between stakeholders. Synthesising in this , N-aN- 
helped to understand inter-relationships between elites. 
It is accepted that this combined framework is not without its own weaknesses, but 
the use of the three distinctive cases allowed a focus on regional sub-regional le,,,, els, 
and demonstarted the longevity of regime activity. It showed the dynamic interplaý, 
between levels, and learning across space, time and regeneration projects. The fact 
that elites move between agencies over time, has allowed social networks and a 
formal and informal architecture to be sustained, both have helped to identify socially 
desirable projects. 
The proposed, synthesised model includes elites and agencies involved in change, 
structures, power relations, history and social relations. It also attempts to encapsulate 
how external forces impact on regime activities. In no way does this synthesised 
model fully explain all changes but it is anticipated that findings will be of use to 
policy makers within regeneration at a time of devolutionary change. Recent 
administrative changes such as RDAs, SRPs and LSPs are seemingly incapable of 
solving the problems, and have been criticised for lack of accountability. shortage of 
resources, and central control. This regime, based on formal and informal 
connections, and democratic and non democratic input is a pragmatic attempt to solve 
intractable problems of decline, but is by no means an ideal solution to a very 
complex problem. The regime is also unaccountable, and devolutionary demands are 
growing in the region. 
The chapters confirm that the context of regeneration, and the continued reform. 
structure and culture of both private and public services and pressures on vital 
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resources in part explain why multi-agency elites need to network more effectivek 
and innovatively to identify projects capable of meeting unmet social and economic 
need. The elite regime has a strong strategic approach to regeneration, appeals to the 
rhetoric of unity and harmonious relationships, and blends organisational resources 
and information to achieve regional objectives. Critically state officials have been 
core elites who validate activities, and act as the bridge between the region and 
national state. 
It has been argued that in the NE there has always been an elite regime of actors from 
multi-sectoral agencies who adopted a "managerialist" approach to problem solving 
by merging political and managerial objectives. This has been a deliberate policy, and 
the existence of a strong regional identity made the research much easier than it might 
have been in other regions without such distinctive boundaries. Historically the nature 
of elite regime membership has changed. In the late nineteenth century and early part 
of the twentieth century aristocrats, coal, mine and ship owners were the key actors 
involved in forums for regeneration. From 1945 until Nissan was attracted to the 
region the regime evolved to include other corporatist members, but since the mid 
1980s membership has even broader than in past regimes. It now includes individuals 
from across a range of public/private and other sectors of economic activity. The 
regime is stable but draws in other individuals and resources, as necessary. It is 
therefore an adhoc grouping capable of adapting national policies to particular 
circumstances by identifying specific projects for regeneration, but there is a continual 
struggle for legitimacy and autonomy as elites look for more flexible and innovative 
ways to regnerate the region while at the same time maintain, enhance and enlarý-, c 
their power base. 
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Elites are seen as significant, due to their cultural and reputed power. high profile. 
capacity to engage with, and lobby external actors. Relationships are based on 
longevity and friendship ties, and by informal means they are able to continually 
update regional knowledge, and sustain the regional story. As many of the communitv 
power and elite theorists found in the past, it is very difficult to gauge with real 
accuracy, what the levels of power and influence are, and often we must rely on the 
stories that are told. What is clear, though is that the NE regime is exclusive, does not 
involve excluded groups, but elites have a strong belief that close proximity to civic 
society makes them able to act on its behalf It is impossible to discern where this 
belief came from, but it is universally held. Activities are not always open to debate, 
or rarely challenged because many decisions are made in informal and secretive 
forums. As a result wider social influences have little impact. 
The NE elite regime shares many of the characteristics of urban regimes, in the US 
and with governance arrangements found in other parts of the UK, but despite the 
exclusivity it does have some female representation, all the more surprising in a 
macho region like the NE. There are some very strong female characters who lead 
regional agencies, and who have their own part to play in the regional story of 
regeneration. They have been pivotal links between the regional and national state. 
Interview data confirms that the closeness and geographical smallness of the region 
facilitates informality. However, this is not to say that there is an absence of conflict, 
because there is a stage-managed attempt by elites to create the impression of 
harmony, especially when dealing with external actors. The messianic drive to be 
harmonious and cohesive is confirmed with rhetoric and symbolism. The discourse is 
a chosen method to foster an ideology of transformation. There are many examples of 
turf battles and high profile in-fighting, but stage-managed cohesion detIccts any 
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criticism and allows elites to sustain this impression, because of the fear that to air 
regional differences might be detrimental to future funding. Many projects are 
unachievable without extemal sources. 
However, though the regime exists there are difficulties in analysim-, the motives of I- 
various elites and their levels of voluntarism in any regeneration initiative, it is 
inappropriate nowadays to speak of a distinctive business class, or to speak of a public 
sector because the escalation in the pace of change, has dramatically altered their 
roles, purposes, operations and strategies. The social context and space for collective 
action is now enlarged and the potential for ambiguity on legitimacy and autonomy 
has grown. The uncertainty of a dynamic environment means that elites have to adjust 
more flexibly to each other. Over time there has been an alteration in the nature and 
extent of political engagement and there are many reasons for these changes. 
Participants in regeneration act through many different channels of expression and 
engage with the political processes in diverse forms. 
Far from being auxiliary players in regeneration, elites from Universities, media, TU 
and other social and cultural organisations are prominent players who are drawn in to 
supply resources, expertise or information. Each elite exemplifies a synthesis or 
composite set of values, depending on the sphere of activity, and the objective to be 
achieved. They act through various means and will simultaneously share individual, 
organisational or civic values. 
In creating a strategic framework elites have positioned themselves to assess actiNities 
across many diverse regional initiatives and there is a deliberate attempt to harness as 
many regional resources as possible in the interest of the whole region. The reQlonal 
story continues to be enacted and articulated at all levels, and there is a shared 
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recognition that no single organisation possesses or has access to all requisite 
resources and have, over the years, come to depend on infonnal relationships based 
on trust and mutual dependency. 
Elites carry out numerous tasks, individually and in collaboration in the interests ot 
the region. In addition to the strategic approach to attracting inward investors theN I 
ensured that relevant services and aftercare services were in place, they meet formally 
and informally to welcome FDI executives, allow facilities and resources to be made 
available, and ensure that all regional resources are utilised to the full. Regional data 
bases are pooled and shared in regional efforts, as well as staff secondments bet, ývcen 
agencies. Research is shared, and most elites lobby and act as ambassadors for the 
region by fostering links with other regions and nation states. The determination to 
create and sustain supply chain linkages is an attempt to link SMEs and large inward 
investors. To facilitate this elites are involved in many regional forums and initiatives. 
Longevity and informal networking have been an important aspects of regime success 
because communication has allowed transfer of ideas, and secondment between 
agencies and rotation of elites has confirmed this. The success of this regime lay in the 
ability to balance a range of competing and variable aspects of regeneration; the 
activities of constituted agencies with informality between key actors, traditional 
practices with more innovative and flexible approaches, social and economic needs, 
corporatist arrangements with a broader and adhocracy of players. and regional versus 
sub-regional needs. In achieving this balance regional elites gained an understanding 
of what might be possible within mandatory constraints. The space between what 
agencies or individuals are legally obliged to do, and xvhat they can innovatively and 
entrepreneurial ly achieve by other means is of primary importance to elites and they 
\\-ere able to choose which initiatives would be beneficial to regeneration. given that 
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resources need to be devoted to any new initiative. Indeed the cases presented 
illustrate that concerted efforts to support initiatives resulting in social and economic I 
benefits, were as important as raising the regional profile with the external world. 
In other UK regions the importance of rhetoric and image boosting to change attitudes 
is the same as it is in the NE, but one major difference is that there is not the same 
level of hostility between sectors as those evidenced in places like Manchester and 
Sheffield. There is not the apparent fractures between sectors, instead there is a 
deliberate and consciously thought-out plan to merge sectoral activity and allow cross 
fertilisation and harness resources and information from all contributin2 sectors. The 
complex nature of regeneration has long been recognised by NE elites who are used to 
operating in fluid situations with shortage of resource, and in ývhich communication 
and transfer of knowledge, pooling of information, and sharing both tangible and 
intangible resources is critical. 
Informality needs to be created in other regions but in the NE informality is a way of 
life, and built into existing social relations. Formal mechanisms of regeneration are 
well established and institutionally NDC (now absorbed into ONE) and NEA were 
regarded as the primary agencies, but business representation has always been verý' 
strong. There is no clear evidence to support the view that any one sector has e\, er 
dominated regeneration, indeed the involvement of central goN, enunent and European 
civil servants has been a central feature. By engaging central officials. historicallý 
elites have been able to develop their own 'bottom up * solutions as an attempt to 
resist the 'top down' solutions that central government regularly imposes. A process 
of ne0otiation and bargaining greets any new administrative or political fix. as the 
establishment of NDC, NEA or ONE illustrated. The governance regime theref'ore 
exernplifies 'adaptable efficiency' rather than 'allocative efficiency'. 
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There is strong evidence in the NE to indicate that public bureaucrats regard 
themselves as entrepreneurial and business representatives are highly political. The 
findings show that this has led to the marrying of managerial and political values, and 
increased the capacity to work collaboratively. The acceptance that certain agencies 
and elites take the lead on initiatives, a strong strategic approach with sociallY and 
economically desirable goals at the core, not only minimise conflicts but ensure that 
regional interests are placed above individual, organisational or other interests. 
Elites are proud to seek local solutions to regeneration policies because the shared 
view that the central state has neglected regional interests, created a 'go it alone' 
mentality which runs very deep in the psyche of elite actor. National solutions have 
consistently failed and the evolution of the regime over the past century is a testament 
to this; they feel let down by central government. As a consequence political 
lobbying within and outwith the region, and achieving a high profile is regarded as a 
valuable elite skill. 
The Siemens UK case was of major significance to the NE economy, and gave 
credence to national policies. It showed how elites able to secure national resources, 
above and beyond generalised expenditure, and confirin that the region had reached a 
turning point in its modernisation. It also validated and confirmed the legitimacy of 
previous activities and processes. Elites were able to redefine their activities and inter- 
linkages because it was thought that Siemens was a classic catalyst for change. 
The regime was functional and instrumental as they all hoped that this success . vould 
create a new infrastructure, add to the R& D basis of the region, improve direct and 
indirect employment opportunities, as well as various spin off activities. In this way It 
xvas part of the traditional ideology of long termism and sustainability. 
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Resources and people were drawn together through formal and informal mechaiiisms 
and the ideology of growth was articulated by use of the media and any conflicts xvere 
managed so that future investments would not be jeopardised. Elites negotiated with, 
and lobbied central government, and Siemens executives, by using Denham and other 
senior civil servants to lubricate some of the bargaining meetings. Ultimately, despite 
the effectiveness in drawing on regional resources, they could do little other than to 
assemble a task force, given the volatility and transience of global capital. 
On a more positive note, Siemens did mark a shift in thinking, as elites began to 
articulate the plight of the region and think more deeply about the dependency on 
inward investment and many benefits accrued from Siemens, such as the development 
of technical know how, a skills base, R&D and organisational capacity, and none 
were entirely lost once Siemens withdrew. There is now an even greater bank of 
knowledge and information, and Siemens demonstrated that elites can work 
effectively together, but that support from external sources needs to be forthcoming. 
New innovative and entrepreneurial thinking, policies and practices cannot alone 
rectify the multitude of social and economic problems. 
Elites felt let down by central government, and the Siemens withdrawal gave a greater 
impetus for elites to articulate the unfairness of the Barnett Formula and to begin in 
earnest with demands for a Regional Assembly. Siemens was therefore a catalyst to 
greater political lobbying for the region to be allowed to detennine its own destiny. 
The Visual Arts case was hailed a great success, by elites and by independent 
research, because a region with few art galleries became the focus for international 
interest, and public perceptions and expectations of the role of art improved. Local 
authorities and businesses were galvanised into working xvith elites to initiate or 
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sponsor projects. The success created the confidence to bid to be the European Capital 
of Culture in 2008, but it was a catalyst for other projects. such as The Tall Ships 
Race, The Angel of the North, the f 23 million Baltic Centre. 
The event was a financial success, it achieved some of the economic. artistic and 
social/cultural regional objectives that elite actors had expected, but the ultimate 
objective of using it as a vehicle to make the NE a leading region in Europe for Arts 
has yet to be achieved. However, politically and commercially the national and 
international profile of the region was improved as a result of the initiative. Politically 
it had a bearing on the White Paper establishing RDAs, as it is cited as evidence of 
good partnership practice. It was a good example of strategic culture-led regeneration 
to meet unmet economic and social need. 
It is difficult to show effective elites were, but informal linkages between them were 
put to good effect, and the critical input from business like public entrepreneurs and 
political business interests added to a strong institutional framework, and there is an 
anticipation that long term, this sustainability will achieve success. If visitor figures 
and if media coverage is any measure, then VA was very successful, but bringing 
about attitudinal and cultural change, will be difficult to measure. It is arguable that 
the event could have succeeded without elite input. However, the fact that they ý, vere 
socially embedded in their locales, able to negotiate and bargain to draw on regional 
resources and information to support the project were significant. Elites negotiated 
with civil servants and other local state officials helped to formulate and implement 
the strategy, and legitimised activities by appealing to symbolism and rhetoric. VA 
was not as exclusionary as the Siemens' case, because community groups ý, verer 
involvcd in various activities, however the strategies were determined 'top-down'. 
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It would be difficult to give concrete evidence on ho-,, A,, successful elite inten, ention 
was, but some useful networks created were created for learning and ideas transfer. 
Valuable lessons were leamt from both VA and Siemens' and St. Peter's case. 
St Peter's was claimed as a physical success, and elites wanted it to sYmbolise that the 
region had moved away from a dependency, and could be focused on a post - 
industrial project involving research, education, cultural, artistic and leisure facilities. 
Elite networking and transfer of information and resources, between the collaborating 
elites and their agencies, became refined and many lessons learned and transferred 
from Siemens and Visual Arts. Elites were able to harness resources and information, 
and the project gave a clear sign that the NE was transfonning, again validating and 
legitimising elite activities. It further enhanced the networks and multi-agency 
relationships. 
St Peter's and the National Glass Centre gained a high national and international 
profile, in the same way that VAs 96 had done. The University Campus received 
numerous architectural awards, and communities became involved in specific projects 
that were sued as benchmarks for other projects across the region. St Teter's, unlike 
the two earlier cases was an attempt to involve disadvantaged and excluded groups in 
some, although not all activities, however strategic decisions still rested with elites. 
who were constrained by global or national constraints. 
Wright played a key role, but interacted with with other local and regional elites to 
raise the profile of the region. The chapter confirms lessons have been learned form 
earlier projects and this was a classic example of using collective wisdom to sustain 
changes. A strong institutional framework was developed which was critical to 
regenerative efforts. despite conflicts that inevitably arose between commercial and 
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social needs this case demonstrated that a successful and balanced outcome was 
achieved, in negotiating and bargaining between elites and state officials. 
Many of the initiatives under the St Peter's Development umbrella would have beeii 
impossible without an existing framework of community-based organisations. The 
strength of the informal and formal mechanisms for sharing information and capacity 
building was evident. 
By having a strategic overview of how regional projects such as FDL VAs and St 
Peter's Development elites were able to see how they dovetailed from community 
level upwards. Key regional personnel were in close and continuous communication 
at regional and sub regional levels, it was therefore possible to have a comprehensive 
and global picture. Over a period of time between projects the regional regime of 
elites redefined the strategic approach and improved the networking between the 
respective agencies. 
The cases and the more general findings showed that elites have always felt it 
necessary to lobby central government, due to the cyclical nature of industrial activity 
and the changing nature of central policies detrimental to regional fortunes. The 
traditional uncoordinated responses to regeneration and the poorly institutionalised 
field have left aps where elites have chosen co-ordinated, planned and strategic 9 z: I 
projects. This has created the best conditions for regeneration. 
Elites regard regional space as one where demands are be shared rather than aroucd tý 
over and where regional distinctiveness is articulated. The mixture of democratic and 
non-democratic representatives who interpret nationally determined policies, and 
adapt them to suit specific regional needs. All previous regional policies aimed at 
amelioratino the decline have been problematic and that setting up of RDAs may haN-c 
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been the result of elite activities as they lobbied for greater support. Insufficient time 
has elapsed to make a proper evaluation of the effectiN, eness of the RDA. but as an 
administrative, rather than democratically controlled bodv there are inherent weakness 
and evidence from other regions reveal that they have never realk, fulfilled the desired 
role of facilitating self-sustaining and innovative economic deý'elopment. 
This regime has plugged the democratic gap as an undemocratic grouping based on 
informality and secrecy membership excludes large numbers of individuals who live 
and work in the region. Many campaigners in the region argue for more 
democratically elected forms of decision making, not least to reduce this type of self 
help regime that has historically evolved to attempt to solve regional decline. The 
RDA includes a number of elites who have been involved in earlier activities, but this 
administrative fix is still regarded as an inadequate response from central government 
to ensure that the real needs of people in the region are met. It is a totally inadequate 
mechanism for regeneration and many believe that the only forward is to have control 
of resources and local democratic control. 
The frameworks introduced here could be further developed to appreciate the nature 
of power and influence in the region, and linkages ascertained. A large-scale survey 
of a much broader cross section of the region could ascertain other significant 
projects, and how strategies are formulated and implemented within the wider socio- 
economic system and traditional heirarchies. It would also be illuminating to identify 
how resources and information create power bases. By reference to some of the poNAcr 
models a typology to include civic, individual and organisational categories might be 
a more scientific measurement of elite activities and motivations could help to assess 
tI ormal and informal relationships. 
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The NE is in a similar position economically, as it has been for many years, so this 
begs the question ' if elites have been successful in regeneration projects why is the 
position unchanged'? On all criteria it is the most disadvantaged of the Eni:, Iish 
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regions, hence the demands for a political solution to the divisions. The fact is that 
while structural and global factors impact on elite activities it is almost impossible to 
achieve regeneration from within, because there is little autonomy to fund projects. It 
is difficult to say what the situation might be without these elite activities, or without 
lobbying to demand action. It is almost impossible to socially and culturally desirable 
projects in the same way that we might measure economic impacts. The regional 
question is undoubtdly further up the political agenda than it has been for decades, 
and despite some successful inward investments these are difficult to sustain in the 
face of turbulent and dynamic global pressures. 
There has been call centre growth but mainly low paid jobs, many parts of the region 
have been physical transformed, cultural and creative industries in a more flexible 
labour market, and the flat caps and whippets mentality is receding. It would be 
unwise, however, to say that the elite regime has been an outright success, because 
there is still a dire lack of business start up, an inability to encourage indigenous 
development; both would be good measures of growth in the economy. This is not to 
that there is a lack of entrepreneurialism, because the findings show the converse 
picture. The region has had support from the public purse, but many of the resources 
are directed into the wrong avenues. Innovation and venture capital funding from 
central government could be utilised more effectively in a region where networking, 
informality and lobbying are prized. Government policy might be better directed into 
mapping the informal aspects of regeneration, or setting up intennediary, broker 
institutions to harmonise individLials, agencies. resources and infonnation to achieve 
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regional objectives. This would require training in networkinL, and mapping of 
informal activities for project realisation, as existing, policies on clusters and 
entrepreneurship are flawed, nor those aimed at encourage business start ups and 
indigenous growth. Funding should be made available to lubricate multi-agency 
approaches to problem solving, ones that embedded in the meta le\'el betweeii the 
institutions and individuals. They are numerous ways that this could be achieved. 
Secondees from one sector could be usefully deployed in other sectors, as identified 
already in Durham County Council's Economic Development Strategy. One North 
East also needs to consider very carefully how to fund cross- sectoral networking, and 
use existing local, sub-regional and regional networks to establish others. 
Artistic and creative networks were shown to be an important aspect of the Visual 
Arts case so maybe growth could be investigated in this sector, but current formal 
mechanisms for achieving this are not working. ONE and GONE have absorbed the 
cultural sector into an economic cluster, which is totally inappropriate for this type of 
activity. Likewise farm diversification, artists, designers, cultural and creative 
industries could be engergised by networking and collaboratew orking. 
The characteristics of NE networking are quite different to those found elsewhere. 
given that most of them have a strong familial and historical basis, and a strong 
regional identity. Negative perceptions of dependency from external sources do not 
help to stimulate growth, so mechanisms for networks to flourish need to be found. 
Most educational provision is not tailored to the specific needs of either the 
individual, the organisation or indeed the civic, so innovation funding could be better 
used in setting up opportunities for people to network more effectively. 
285 
There is little doubt that the NE region is vibrant and significant part of the national 
economy, but this research supports the view that a number of policy gaps create. at 
best inconsistent perceptions about the needs and characteristics of the NE, and at 
worst militate against growth. The lack of a real understanding of the region 
inevitably leads to fragmented, and un co-ordinated policy making, directed toward 
the wrong areas by civil servants who often pay rare visits. These case studies have 
shown how elites with a sense of history and identity have developed mechanisms to 
choose projects that meet unmet social, cultural and economic, but that are 
constrained and contingent on factors outside of their control. 
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Appendixes 
Appendix 2.0 QUESTIONNAIRES 
Questionnaire: A Strategic Analysis of the Northern Region: Key Individuals 
and Partnerships for Regional Renaissance 
Questionnaire Date: 
Personal questions on respond 
Name: 
Organisation: 
Age range: 
Position in Organisation: 
As well as working in the North, do you also live in the North'? 
Location (which part of the region) ? 
How long have you lived in the North? 
Do you travel outside of the region on business? YES/NO 
If yes, how often do you travel: 
Outside the region, but within the UK 
To other European states. 
Outside Europe, ie, internationally 
Do you belong to any professional association, locally, regionally or nationally'? 
On a personal level do you belong to any groups, associations, political parties, clubs 
locally, regionally or nationally? 
Are you a Board Member on any Quango, either personally or as a representativc ot, 
your organisation? (e. g., TEC, NHS Trust, Sports Council, Arts Council) 
Is it local, regional or national? 
Images of the region 
-1 
Define the Northern Region. (Prompt ... boundaries) 
In your business travel outside the region what would you say was the perception of 
the region by others? 
Is the North: 
A good place to live in? Why? 
A good place to invest in? Why? 
Is the North a region dominated by: 
Small scale capital 
Large scale capital 
Public sector organisation 
Other 
Can you identify and name FIVE large firms that have relocated in the region in the 
last three years? 
Can you identify any small to medium size firms that have relocated or been set up 
in the region in the last three years? 
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Is this region: 
Dynamic 
Optimistic 
Looking forward to a positive future 
Or 
Keen to maintain the status quo 
Rooted in the past 
Pessimistic about the future 
Has the North aspirations for growth and change or not" 
Is the North proactive in changing or is it responding reactively to external 
influences? 
What are the external forces? (Prompt ... 
Europe, National Government, 
International competition, competition with other regions in the UK or in Europe) 
Which region in the UK is the most like the North" 
Which region in the UK is keenest competitor for Inward Investment? 
How does the Northern Region compare to other regions as a basis for Inward 
Investment? 
Does the North relate to any other regions (UK or Europe) in any way" (le Strom, 
links, competition, collaboration, etc. ) 
Can the North be described as homogenous or is it divided along class, religious or 
ethnic lines? 
Is there a strong sense of regional identity in the North? 
What explains this enduring regional identity? 
Is it stronger than in other regions of the UK? Why? 
What are your views on a Regional Assembly? 
Regional Regeneration 
Would a Regional Development Agency aid or frustrate the regeneration process? 
(Probe) 
Do politicians have much influence on regeneration" 
Is there political cohesion? 
Do politicians sink their differences in the interest of the region? 
We are all in it together (an oft quoted phrase). Do you agree that this is the general 
feeling or is there conflict on a regional basis? 
Is regional regeneration/renaissance a collaborative/coordinated process in the 
North? 
Would the position change with a change of central government? 
Would a Labour Government bring any further benefits for this region'? (Probe. what 
would they be? ) 
Is there evidence of strong public/private collaboration? Give examples of good Z-- 
practice. 
Does any organisation dominate the regeneration process? 
Name FIVE key agencies/organisations influential in regeneration/renaissance. 
Name FIVE key individuals influential in re gene ratiori, /renai s sanc e 
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Govemance of the Northem Region 
Uoes the term "Oovernance" mean anything to you? 
Is there a new Governance in the North? Is so, who dominates the process? Business, Politicians, Public Sector Officials, Quango reps/officials. Some other 
group/individual 
Is there an identifiable sovereign group? 
Why, on European issues does the North have a "go it alone" mentalitv? 
Change/Trans format 
Has there been a transformation in the North? YES/NO 
What accounts for any change? 
Is change top-down or bottom-up? 
Who is driving the change? 
Organisationally, Personally, Other representation 
Regional Elites 
Are you able to name TEN key individuals in this region who could be regarded as 
significant figures in raising the profile of the region and thereby aiding 
regeneration/renaissance? 
Why are they significant? 
How have they achieved such prominence? 
Where do each of them work? 
Business, Politicians, Public sector, Quango reps/officials, Other 
Are you aware of any important partnerships/networks that these elites belong to, or 
are at the head of.? 
Are they all "home grown notherners"? 
Does it matter whether they are "home grown or not"? 
Do elites in the North have an informal set of networks? (Probe ... outside formally 
established partnerships/networks) 
Has the Northern Regional a Business Cadre? Why do you say that? 
Is the business community a strong one in this region? 
Would you regard the business community as more powerful than other sectors in 
re gene ration/renai s sanc e terms? 
PARTNERSHIPS /NETWORKS - General 
Would you say that partnerships work better in this region than any other region" 
Why? 
If not, why do other regions do it better? 
How are partnerships generally formed? Organic or created? 
Narne FIVE examples of good partnership/network arrangements: 
FSuccess of Partnerships 
For the two most successful ones: 
Basis for Success?, Stimulus for existence?. Who set it up, vvhy". How often does 
it meet", Formal constitution?, Which organisations are represented" 
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Is it equal, is power distributed equally or is there a dominant partner/organisation". 
Stable or ad hoc?, Access to resources, people, info, etc? Who provides each? Has it 
achieved set outcomes?, Resolution of conflict?, Problems hampering its work" 
Personal/Organisational involvement in Partnerships/Networks 
Do you belong to any partnership s/network s concerned with economic 
re gene rati on. /I nward Investment or any other aspect of renaissance of the Region 
(either personally or as a representative of your organisation? ) 
If no, who in this organisation does act in a personal or organisational capacitv on 
such partnerships/networks? 
Identify THREE partnership s/networks that you belong to? 
N13 - Ask all the same questions as those shown in General Section above. 
Lead role?, Purpose/mission?, Informal links?, Outcomes?, Benefits to 
organisation?, Disbenefits? 
[Projects in -the Northern Region 
Are you aware of any large scale/high profile projects in the North. Name THREE: 
Are they property driven or socially driven? 
Lead body? Private/public? 
Do large scale projects contribute to the overall regeneration ofthe region? 
Are there real or imagined benefits? 
MANY THANKS FOR YOUR HELP 
Questionnaire: A Strategic Analysis of the Northern Region: Key Individuals 
and Partnerships for Regional Renaissance 
Questionnaire Date: 
Personal questions on respon 
(VISUAL ARTS & ST PETER'S) ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS 
Chronology of events 
Key Stakeholders (Organisations/individuals) 
Most powerful/central to decision-making 
Role of each actor/agency 
Basis for involvement/powerful position/status 
Proximity to decision making 
Longevity of involvement 
Profile 
Accessibility to resources/expertise 
Control over internal/external environment 
Informal links 
Fiiiance/Manpower/Resources/skills/expertise 
Size of agencies/closeness to strategy/budget share/support serVices 
Mandatory powers/discretionary 
LeadershiP/charisma 
Coal itions/linkages 
Discernible linkages to a "reponal regime" of actors/agencies 
9 
Additional questions (Siemens) 
It is said that Siemens considered a number of other sites before deciding on the UK, 
and then North Tyneside. What factors draw Siemens to the UK as opposed to other 
nation contenders such as Austria, Ireland, Portugal or Germany? 
How strong a contender was the Cork site in the Republic of Ireland. what dissuaded 
Siemens from locating the new plant there? 
Did the UK government play a significant role in attracting the new im-estment to 
the UK? What role did they play? 
What were the key factors which won the investment for North Tyneside, as opposed 
to other UK sites such as the other strong runner Wolverhampton? 
Numerous factors have been cited in the local and national press which favoured 
North Tyneside. Below is a list of cited "factors". Would you please ascribe each of 
them a weighting of importance indicating by any other the numbers reproduced 
below. 
A very important contributory factor - of crucial significance. 
An important supplementary factor 
A reasonable but not decisive plus point 
A minor positive consideration 
Of little significance in the deliberations 
Never was a factor 
Tyneside's reputation of a flexible workforce 
Good infrastructure 
Good access to UK domestic markets 
Success of inward investments by nearby Nissan, Fujitsu, Samsung 
Reports of what Freudenberg's experience of North Tyneside had been like in the 
meeting with Mr Rheinard Schutz MID 
Strong inter agency co-operation in the region (NDC, GONE, EP, NTBC) 
Mr Hesletine favouring a Tyneside location 
Financial inducements/packages on offer in the region 
Social chapter opt out 
Use of Port of Tyne for exports/imports 
Proximity of universities with relevant research track record in microchip 
technology 
Relatively low wages costs 
Availability of good leisure amenities ie theatre, shopping, accommodation, golf 
courses, etc 
Please ascribe a weighting of the importance and centrality of the role agencies listed 
below as either 
Crucially important 
Very important 
Important 
Not very important 
Not at all important 
Role of NDC 
Role of T'WECO 
Role of EP 
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Role of North Tyneside Economic Development Unit 
Role of Invest in Britain Bureau 
Role of Tyneside Tec 
Role of City Challenge 
Role of GONE 
Role of universities 
Role of employment services 
Role of the business community 
Are there any factors of significance omitted in this list? If so. please add them in the 
space below. 
What degree of cooperation and coordination did the agencies operating in the North 
East achieve? 
Which local/regional agency had the most influence in favour of North Tyneside 
being awarded the investment? 
Which market will the chips manufactured on Tyneside be targeted at? 
The wage rates in Siemens Germ plan vary from f 272.50 to f 795.00 per \ýýeek 
(gross). How will the wages compare in the Tyneside plant? 
Of the 2000 projected jobs, approximately how many will be filled by German 
nationals? 
Was the possibility of further grants from sources such as City Challenge a factor in 
North Tyneside's favour? 
What were the top three factors against North Tyneside being awarded the 
investment? 
Why was the speed of building the plan such an urgent factor? 
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Appendix 3.0 Key Statistics for the North East 
North East ý UK 
Population, 1999 (thousands) 2581 5950 
1 
Percentage aged under 16 20.1 20.4 
Percentage of pension age or over 18.7 18.1 
Standardised Mortality Ration, 1998 114 100 
Gross Domestic Product, 1998 (E per head) 9819 1245 
5 
36 month survival rate for businesses registered in 1995 
(percentages) 
57.0 61.0 
Economic activity rate for people of working age, Spring 2000 
(percentages) 
74.3 78.7 
Employment rate, 1998-1999 (percentages) 67.1 73.5 
ILO unemployment rate, Spring 2000 (percentages) 9.1 5.5 
Average gross weekly earnings: males in full-time employment, 
April 1999 (E) 
384.6 440.7 
Average gross weekly earnings: females in full-time employment, 
April 1999 (E) 
289.8 325.6 
Average gross weekly household income, 1996-1999 (E) 357 430 
Average household expenditure, 1996-1999 (E) 283 333 
Average dwelling price, 1999 (F-) 59442 9825 
21 
Recorded crime rate, 1998-1999 
(notifiable offences per 100,000 population) 
10359 9785 
2 
I Data related to England 
2 Data related to England and Wales 
Source: Office for National Statistics; Department of Trade and Industry HM Land 
Registry 
Home Office 
29 
Appendix 3.1 Explanations for enduring sense of regional 
identity 
'The North East has the greatest sense of regional identity in the country. You ýý-on, t 
find this ethos anywhere. Informal partnerships and structured partnerships x1th us 
all working around the same objectives is the way ahead. ' (Sir P Nicholson) 
Tommonsense of deprivation, industrial decline' (K Frankish) 
'Shared experience of troubles' (0 Grant) 
'A siege mentality' (A Balls) 
'Peripherally, we are the last outpost before Scotland' (Sir F Holliday) 
'Pride in our working class heritage' (D Robson) 
'We haven't been penetrated by immigrants' (J Lennox) 
'We have few people migrating out' (J Bridge) 
'The dislike of Westminster and Whitehall' (Sir I Wrigglesworth) 
'We need to stick together as resources are always channelled to the South East' 
(J Lennox) 
'We have been forced to acknowledge self decline' (G Gill) 
'Class lines are diminishing' (P Denham) 
'Networking fosters the regional identity' (Sir J Beecham) 
'Sport brings us all together, its a great leveller' (P Denham) 
'Our tradition and strong culture' (D Byrne) 
'Comrades in adversity' (J Mills) 
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Appendix 3.2 Comparison of regional GDP per head (1997 
figures) 
Region E's Index rating 
UK 11488 100 
North East 9473 82 
North West 10481 91 
Yorkshire & Humberside 10244 89 
East Midlands 11002 96 
West Midlands 10669 93 
East 11739 102 
London 14411 125 
South East 13549 118 
South West 11213 98 
England 11740 102 
Wales 9442 82 
Scotland 10975 94 
Northern Ireland 9235 80 
Source: ONS, 1999 
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Appendix 3.3 GDP by Industry - North East and UK 
f- million and percentages 
fm illion Perce ntages 
North East United 2 North East United King dom Kinq d OM2 
1994 1997 1994 1997 1994 1997 1994 1997 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry 203 203 10777 10596 0.9 0.8 1.8 1.5 
and fishing 
Mining, quarrying of energy 123 106 2459 2394 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.3 
producing materials 
Other mining and quarrying 86 83 1250 1609 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 
Manufacturing 6306 6863 128202 148619 28.9 28.2 21.6 21.3 
Electricity, gas and water 566 583 15932 16230 2.6 2.4 2.7 2.3 
supply 
Construction 1146 1429 31347 36927 5.3 5.9 5.3 5.3 
Wholesale and retail trade 2412 2563 71201 85865 11.1 10.5 12.0 12.3 
(including motor trade) 
Hotels and Restaurants 537 724 17023 22585 2.5 3.0 2.9 3.2 
Transport, storage and 1497 1599 50708 57916 6.9 6.6 6.6 8.3 
communication 
Financial intermediation 810 751 45421 43852 3.7 3.1 7.7 6.3 
Real estate, renting and 2838 3552 109077 140311 13.0 14.6 18.4 20.1 
business activities 
Public administration and 1471 1433 37945 38101 6.7 5.9 6.4 5.5 
defence 3 
Education 1547 1637 32788 38818 7.1 6.7 5.5 5.6 
Health and social work 1963 2213 39405 46344 9.0 9.1 6.7 6.6 
Other services 850 1066 25248 34567 3.9 4.4 4.3 4.9 
Adjustment for financial -543 -482 -26410 -25678 -2.5 -2.0 -4.5 -3.7 
services 
Total 21812 24323 592373 699056 100.1 99.9 98 100.0 
Based on SIC 1992 
Excludes production from Extra-Region. 
Public administration, national defence and compulsory social security 
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Appendix 3.4 Business Formation, by region, 1981 - 1989 
Re ion 
New Business Registration Net change in stock of 
businesses g Number Rate Number Rate 
(000s) (000s) 
South East 698.3 96.1 152.1 20.9 
East Anglia 70.9 104.1 13.9 20.4 
South West 153.5 99.6 33.0 21.4 
East Midlands 114.6 78.1 21.8 14.9 
West Midlands 147.8 72.1 24.1 11.7 
Yorks-Humberside 129.0 69.7 18.5 11.7 
North West 170.2 69.0 17.7 7.2 
North 62.9 56.1 8.6 7.7 
Wales 75.9 80.8 12.2 12.9 
Scotland 109.9 54.9 17.1 8.5 
Northern Ireland 31.9 63.0 6.8 13.4 
United Kingdom 1764.9 80.6 325.8 14.9 
Source: ONE, 1999 
Appendix 3.5 Changes in start of year stocks of VAT registered 
businesses (1994 - 1999) 
North East sub-region 1994 1999 Change % Change 
Tees Valley 10540 9700 -840 -8 
County Durham 9095 8740 -355 -4 
Northumberland 7715 7535 -180 -2 
Tyne and Wear 13495 12750 -745 -6 
North East 40845 38725 -2120 -5 
Source: ONS, 2000 
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Appendix 3.6 Regional Trends in Self-employment, 1979-90 
Change in employees in 
Region Self Employed employment 
1979 1990 Change 
1979-90 1979-1990 
(000s) % (000s) % (000s) (000s) 
South East 651 34.2 1198 35.7 547 165 
East Anglia 79 4.1 156 4.6 77 ill 
South West 146 7.7 306 9.1 160 173 
East Midlands 116 6.0 220 6.5 104 12 
South 992 52.1 1880 55.9 888 461 
West Midlands 141 7.4 244 7.3 103 -144 
Yorks- 134 7.0 271 8.1 137 -82 
Humberside 
North West 214 11.2 326 9.7 112 -250 
North 79 4.0 116 3.5 37 -133 
Wales 124 6.5 199 5.9 75 -40 
Scotland 160 8.4 247 7.4 87 -129 
Northern Ireland 64 3.4 76 2.3 12 -9 
North 916 47.9 1479 44.1 563 -787 
United Kingdom 1908 100.0 3359 100.0 1451 -326 
Sources: Department of Employment; Daly (1991) 
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Appendix 3.7 Membership of Development Boards, 1938 
Su orted W 
Tyneside Industrial Development Board 
Tees District Development Board 
Newcastle Corporation 
Gosforth UDC 
Longbenton UDC 
Wallsend Corporation 
Tynemouth Corporation 
Whitley and Monkseaton t ýDC 
South Shields Corporation 
Jarrow Corporation 
Hebbum UDC 
Felling UDC 
Gateshead Corporation 
Ryton UDC 
Prudhoe UDC 
Newburn UDC 
Middlesbrough Corporation 
Stockton Corporation 
Thornaby-on-Tees Corporation 
Redcar Corporation 
Eston UDC 
Billingham UDC 
Tees Conservancy Commissioners 
Teesside Chamber of Commerce 
Sunderland Industrial Development Board Sunderland Corporation 
Sunderland Chamber of Commerce 
Sunderland Chamber of Trade 
Sunderland Gas Company 
South-West Durham Reconstruction and 
Development Board 
Hartlepool and District Development Board 
Stanhope UDC 
Shildon UDC 
Willington UDC 
Spennymoor UDC 
Crook UDC 
Bishop Auckland UDC 
Tow Law UDC 
Barnard Castle UDC 
West Hartlepool Corporation 
Hartlepool Corporation 
Hartlepool Chamber of Commerce 
Source. - Minutes of Evidence, R. C. Geographical Distribution of the Industrial Population. 
(31.3.1939), P. 554 
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Appendix 3.8 Organisations Represented on the Council of the 
North East Development Board, 1938 
Development Boards and Tyneside Industrial Development Board 
Committees Tees District Development Board 
Sunderland Industrial Development Board 
South-West Durham Reconstruction and DeN, elopnient 
Board 
Hartlepool and District Development Board 
Berwick Development Committee 
Others Borough of Morpeth 
Seaton Valley UDC 
Northumberland CC 
Durham CC 
Haltwhistle Improvement Association 
Members of Parliament for the North Eastern Area 
Newcastle and Gateshead Chamber of Commerce 
Northern Association of Chambers of Trade 
University of Durham 
River Wear Commissioners 
Ministry of Labour Employment Exchanges 
Industrial Advisory Council 
North of England Shipowners' Association 
Durham and Northumberland Coal Owners' Association 
Durham Miners' Association 
Federation of British Industries 
North-East Coast Engineering Employers' Association 
Society of Chemical Industries 
North-East Coast Institute of Engineers and Shipbuilders 
London and North-Eastern Railway 
British Iron and Steel Association 
North-Eastern Electric Supply Co 
British Broadcasting Corporation 
Source Minutes Evidence RC on the Geographical Distribution of the Industrial 
Population (31-3-1938), p554 
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Appendix 3.9 Summary of Regeneration Expenditure 
1998- 
99 
outturn 
1999- 
00 
outturn 
2000-01 
estimated 
outturn 
2001- 
02 
plans 
2002- 2003- 
03 04 
plans plans 
Regional development agencies 
_(net)' 
12.8 584.4 917.3 1254.8 ' _ 1 '359.9 1506.6 
_New 
Deal for Communities 0.2 4.7 - 60.3 - 281.0 - 409.0 - 479.0 
European regional development 
jund 
231.1 233.3 268.3 293.3 210.1 254.0 
2 
_English 
Partnerships - - 
_Urban 
Regeneration Agency 156.3 -365.9 17.7 43.2 38.2 3 8.2 
_Commission 
for the New Towns 322.9 -62.7 -110.9 -63.8 -63.8 -63.8 
Coalfields Trust and Fund 0.0 1.6 26.1 15.0 20.0 15.0 
Housing action trusts 121.8 108.3 129.9 133.2 163.2 112.2 
Estate action 96.7 56.8 68.4 39.4 13.0 5.0 
Groundwork 6.7 7.5 7.7 8.0 9.3 10.6 
_ 
_Special 
grants programme 1.1 1.4 1.6 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Single regeneration budget 558.9 169.5 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Publicity and programme 
support 
0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
-Other 
10.0 10.0 10.0 
4 Closed programmes 19.3 4.6 4.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
jotall Regeneration 1238.0 743.3 1390.6 2016.5 2171.3 2369.2 
Centrall Government's own expenditure 
_ Voted in Estimates (RfR 1) 197.0 135.6 92.7 193.9 325.8 371.1 
Non-voted 286.1 244.2 779.8 1217.3 1238.4 1334.1 
. Central Government support to local authorities 
Voted in estimates (RfR 1) 615.7 216.4 518.1 605.3 607.2 664. 
Non-voted 139.2 147.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Includes expenditure by the new London Development Agency from July 2000. Expenditure 
sponsored by other Government departments and their corresponding contribution will not appear 
in this table but in those departments' own reports. Expenditure up to and including 2001-02 
covers a number of programmes, including land and property budgets, rural development 
prograrm-ne, single regeneration budget and inward investment. From April 2002, RDA 
programmes will be brought together into a single programme. C) 0 
On I April 1999 we transferred the regional role of English Partnerships to the RDAs, except =1 
London which transferred on 3 July 2000. English Partnerships includes spending on coalfield 
regeneration, on the Greenwich millennium site from 1996-97 to 1990 -00, on the derelict land 
grant Lip to 1998-99, and on the partnership investment programme from 1999-00 to 2000-0 1. 
Relates to expenditure by the Government Offices prior to transfer of the programme to the RDAs 
and the London Development Agency Z 
Closed programmes includes the urban programme, safer cities, business start-up scheme, local 
initiative fund, compacts, teacher placement service, education business partnerships, TEC 
challen0e, prograrnme development fund, regional enterprise arant section II (part), ethnic 
minority business initiative, GEST 19, city action teams, Manchester regeneration (Olympics). 
coalfield areas fund, local investment fund, urban development -, rant. Dearne Valley College, 
inner-city task forces, Manchester city centre and city challenge (but excluding city challenge 
expenditure by the Housing Corporation). 
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Appendix 5.0 Manufacturing Labour in various locations 
considered by Siemens 
Non-wage labour costs as a Hourly Labour Costs in US$ 1993 percentage of total labour costs , 
Country Index 
UK 23.5 25.71 201 
Germany 15.5 12.76 100 
Ireland 15.7 12.18 95 
Portugal 23.8 4.60 36 
Source: US Bureau of Labour Statistics. 
Note: 
The figures for total labour costs come from the US Bureau of Labour Statistics., These 0 1% e 
total hourly labour costs in manufacturing industry. These figures also show the proportion of 
total cost that goes in direct pay, including the figures for total labour costs, from the US 
Bureau of Labour Statistics - these give total hourly labour costs in manufacturim, industry. 
These figures also show the proportion of total cost that goes in holiday pay and paý for time 
not worked. The remainder, the non-wage element, mainly comprises employers' social 
security contributions and other compulsory expenditure like pension contributions and health 
insurance. 
Appendix 5.1 Average Gross Weekly Earnings in Great Britain 
April 1994 
Adult Earnings (E) Region Men Women 
South East 299.2 204.4 
East Anglia 273.5 172.5 
South West 271.1 173.4 
West Midlands 274.2 175.4 
East Midlands 273.3 169.7 
Yorkshire & Humberside 277.0 172.7 
North West 279.4 175.7 
North 278.5 172.9 
Wales 272.3 175.7 
Scotland 269.5 183.1 
England 282.6 183.1 
Great Britain 280.7 181.9 
Source. - New Earnings Survey - Part A 
Published September 1994 Department of Employment HMSO 
Note: Full Time Manual Employees on adult rates - pay unaffected 
bN absence. 
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Appendix 5.2 Unemployed workers in North Tyneside 
Breakdown by previous occupations 
UNEMPLOYMENT IN NORTH TYNESIDE 
35 
30 
0 
w 25 
0 
-J 20 CL 
2 
w 15 
z 
lo 
5 
0 
PREVIOUS OCCUPATIONS (SEE KEY) 
Key to Occupations: 
1: Managers 6: Personal/Protective 
2: Professional 7: Sales 
3: Associated Professional and Technical 8: Elementary 
4: Clerical and Secretarial 9: Unallocated Yet. 
5: Plant/Machine Op/Craft/Related 
Source: Emplo 
' vinent 
Sen, ice Job Centres (Wallsend, North Shields, Wcstmore &- Whitle. 1, BqY) - October 1996. 
Appendix 5.3 The pool of graduates and post-graduates from 
NE Universities in disciplines directly relevant to 
Siemens' recruitment needs 
University Graduates and Post-Graduates in disciplines 
directly relevant to Siemens' recruitment needs* 
University of Newcastle Upon Tyne 63 
University of Northumbria at Newcastle 144 
University of Sunderland 120 
University of Durham 19 
University of Teesside 32 
TOTAL 378 
Source: The Universities of Newcastle, Not-thumbria, Sunderland, Durham, and Teesside. 
Note: * Summer 1994: BEn-. Electrical and Electronic Engineering, MEno Electrical and Electronic 
En-Ineering, BEn-. Electronic En(yineerin-, BEng. and MEncy. Microelectronics and Software I -- -1 It, -- En-Ineering, MSc Microelectronics, BSc Optoelectronic Engineering, BEng. Digital Engineeri 1 11 1 11: ý ltý -- 
IIi ng,.. 
BEng. Instrumentation and Control. I 
03 
1 
Appendix 5.4 A Comparison of various locations' relative 
suitability according to the responses of Siemens 
Management to author survey. 
Weight 
Variable Weight 
Scale 
1 11 111 IV V VI 
Market Size 1-5 5 5 4554 
_Land 
Topography/Geography 1-3 1 3 2 3 31 
Land Ownership Costs 1-3 1 3 2 3 31 
Electricity Costs 1-5 4 5 3 4 44 
Water Volume 1-5 4 5 2 4 44 
Water Quality 1-5 4 4 2 4 45 
Vibration 1-5 3 4 4 4 4 
Practical Assistance from Local 
Agencies 
1-5 4 5 5 5 5 4 
Transport 1-3 3 2 3 3 3 2 
Labour Costs 1-5 5 5 5 2 2 5 
Taxation 1-5 4 5 4 3 3 4 
Permits profits to be easily remitted 1-5 5 5 4 3 3 5 
Labour Availability / Flexibility 1-5 5 5 4 2 2 5 
Training / Research 1-5 3 5 4 4 5 4 
_ Grants 1-5 3 4 4 5 4 4 
Stability Political 1-5 4 4 3 4 4 3 
_ Labour Relations 1-5 4 4 4 3 2 4 
TOTAL 62 73 59 61 60 63 
Note: 
Key Iý Wolverhampton; II= North Tyneside; III = Portugal, IV = Austr1a, V= Gerrnanýý \11 - The 
Republic of Ireland. 
Appendix 6.0 Employment in the Cultural Sector (1995 and 
1999) 
1995 1999 Main Job 
Thousands Percentage Thousands us Percentage rc 
Cultural Industries 174 30.7 204 ,L 31 
_ 
_Cultural 
Occupation 252 44.5 5z 287 443 
Both 140 24.7 156 24.1 
_ jotal 566 100.0 647 100.0 
Sources: Labour Force Survey, Spring 1995 and 1999 
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Appendix 6.1. 
Employment in all sectors: 25,973,000 (1995); 27,251.000 (1999) 
Cultural jobs as percentage of all main jobs: 2.2% (1995); 2.4% (1999) 
Artists, graphic designers, etc 99882 25.5 -fO9996 2-4.8 
_Actors, 
stage managers, etc 57981 14.8 68738 15.5 
-Musicians 
21301 5.4 29498 6.6 
_Camera, 
sound, etc, equipment operators 48947 12.5 4 ý78 ý11 0.5 
L 
Total 
1 392228 100.0- 
L ý43597 T ICO 0.0 
, ýources: LaPour PorceNurvey, ýPring 1995 and 1999 
Appendix 6.2 Employment in the Cultural Sector by Industry 
and Occupation (1995 and 1999) 
Main Job 
1995 1999 
- Numbe rl % N u rn 
-be rj % 
Cultural Industries 
Publishing/reproduction/ 
Recording 
40198 12.8 45696 12.7 
Films 37648 12.0 40085 11.1 
Radio, TV activities 64199 20.4 70433 19.6 
Artistic/literary creation, etc 77656 24.7 92485 25.7 
Arts facilities 15506 4.9 26617 7.4 
Library/archive activities 52903 16.8 47563 13.2 
Museum activities 25946 8.3 37075 10.3 
Total 314056 100.0 359954 100.0 
Cultural Occupations 
-1 Entertainment and sports managers 47221 12.0 56939 12.8 
Libra ria ns/a rch ivists and curators 25835 6.6 32809 7.4 
Authors, writers and journalists 91061 23.2 98836 22.3 
-NO 
.i- 
Appendix 6.3 
Centrally Determined 
Strategies 
Dept Culture, Media, 
Sport, eg. 'Culture and 
Creativity' 
Lottery Strategies 
PAT 10 Report 
Creative Industries 
Urban & Rural White 
Papers 
National Strategy for 
Neighbourhood 
Renewal 
EAZ's, HAZ's, SAZ's 
Other Statutory Plans 
Land-Use Plans 
Community Safety 
Plans 
Local transport Plans 
Health Improvement 
Programmes 
Education Development 
Plans 
Quality Protects 
Management Plans 
Other Non-statutory Plans 
Local Agenda 21 
Strategies 
Economic Development 
Strategies 
Regional Cultural Strategy 
Holistic Vision for 
culture and creativity 
Reconciles competing 
sectoral demands and 
policies 
Sets commonly agreed 
regional cultural 
themes, priorities, 
targets 
Informs/influences 
others spending 
decisions on cultural 
activities 
LA Individual Service 
Plans 
Annual Library Plans 
(statutory) 
Arts, Sports, Parks, 
Tourism Plans 
Best Value Plans 
Regional Strategies 
Regional Economic 
Strategy (ONE) 
Regional Innovation 
Strategy 
Regional Planning 
Guidance 
Single Programming 
Document 
Regional Transport 
Strategy 
Lottery Distributors 
Regional Strategies 
Regional Cultural 
Agencies 
Plans/Strategies (RABs, 
AMCs, Sports Boards, 
Tourist Boards, etc) 
Local Cultural Strategies 
Deals with cultural well 
being of area 
Includes local authority 
services, services of 
other agencies, other 
activities 
Sets objectives, 
priorities, targets 
Community Strategies 
Sets long-term vision 
for are and outcomes to 
be achieved 
Aligned with other 
agencies 
Local Authority Corporate 
Strategies/Bcst Value 
Performance Plans 
Sets corporate 
objectives 
Reports on performance 
of service identifies 
targets for services 
Sets out means of 
achieving targets 
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Appendix 6.4 
Tourist attractions in the North-East with 100000 or morevisitors in 1-989 
Attraction 
0/ 
Visitor Numbers 0 Ad- 
Change mission - -- - 1985: = 19 89 1 1985/89 Charge 
Museums and art galleries 
Beamish 289000 486565 68 ý'es 
Captain Cook's Birth Museum 111633 100000, -10 ý'es 
Laing Art Gallery, Newcastle 93855 104229 11 No 
Preston Hall Museum, Cleveland 379787 462317 No 
South Shields Museum and Art Gallery 55000 139558 154 No 
Sunderland Museum and Art Gallery 174111 1 
122) 550 -30 
Historic Properties 
Bamburgh Castle 82000 115328 41 Yes 
Durham Cathedral 341000 4002961 17 No 
Housesteads Roman Fort 115069 129032 12 Yes 
1 1988 figure 
Source: Tourism Fact Sheets: Northumbria and Sightseeing in the UK, 1989, prepared b, I, A 
Creigh-Tyte and B Thomas, 'Employment', in S Selwood, Ed, The UK Cultural 
Sector, Policy Studies Institute 
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Appendix 6.5 
45 
40 
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15 
10 
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0 
Jan/Feb vs Sept 1996 
Tyne Tees TV 
BBC 
Local Press 
Border TV 
Word of Mouth 
Posters 
Local Radio 
Through Friends 
National Press 
Leaflets/Fivers 
1996 - The Year of Visual Arts in the North 
Awareness - Visual Arts UKIThe Year of visual Arts 
Total Sample 
Where Heard About Visual Arts Uk Activities/Events 
D Jan/Feb 96 
Others 6 
ýM Sep-96 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 
70 
Source : Harris Research (1997) Visual Arts 96: Qualitative Findings, prepared 
for the UK Arts 
Council and Northern Sights, Surrey, Harris Research Centre 
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Appendix 7.0 TWDC - The record so far 
THE RECORD SO FAR 
Overall investment attracted 
New Business Districts created 
f-1.0 billion 
7 
New industrial/commercial floor 
space 
1 million square miles 
New homes built 4,000 
Companies supported with grant aid 130 
Land reclaimed 427 hectares 
Trees and shrubs planted 150,000 
New roads built 31 kms 
Jobs created/safeguarded 28,000 
Source: Riverside Revival, TWDC document 199 7 and 199617 Annual Report 
U () 
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